







# **CHINA FIGHTS FOR THE WORLD**

*By the Same Author*

CHILDREN OF THE YELLOW EARTH





*China's National Hero, Chiang Kai-shek*

# CHINA FIGHTS FOR THE WORLD

By  
J. GUNNAR ANDERSSON

London  
KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER & CO. LTD.  
BROADWAY HOUSE: 68-74 CARTER LANE, E.C.



UNDER BRINNANDE KRIG

*First Published in Stockholm 1938*

CHINA FIGHTS FOR THE WORLD

*First Published in England 1939*

*Translated from the Swedish*

*by* ARTHUR G. CHATER

## CONTENTS

CHAP.	PAGE
PREFACE . . . . .	ix
I GREATER SHANGHAI . . . . .	1
II A PILGRIM SEES MECCA . . . . .	12
III SPRING ON THE PURPLE MOUNTAIN . . . . .	26
IV TIME FLIES QUICKLY OVER CHINA . . . . .	33
V CHIANG KAI-SHEK AND THE NORTHERN CAMPAIGN . . . . .	43
VI CHIANG FIGHTS FOR THE UNITY OF THE COUNTRY . . . . .	62
VII RECONSTRUCTION . . . . .	69
VIII THE NEW LIFE MOVEMENT . . . . .	81
IX CHIANG AND THE REDS . . . . .	90
X THE SIAN EPISODE . . . . .	104
XI JAPAN'S CONTINENTAL POLICY . . . . .	120
XII FROM LU KOU CHIAO TO THE YELLOW RIVER . . . . .	133
XIII GOOD-BYE TO PEKING . . . . .	147
XIV THE FIGHT FOR SHANGHAI . . . . .	155
XV THE BURNING OF CHAPEI . . . . .	166
XVI THE FALL OF NANKING . . . . .	176
XVII THE STRUGGLE FOR HSUCHOW AND HANKOW . . . . .	184
XVIII GUERRILLAS . . . . .	202
XIX THE WAR AND THE GREAT POWERS . . . . .	215
XX HONG KONG AND PORT COURBET . . . . .	229
XXI THE FUTURE OF EAST ASIA . . . . .	245
INDEX . . . . .	269



## ILLUSTRATIONS

	FACING PAGE
CHINA'S NATIONAL HERO, CHIANG KAI-SHEK . . . . .	<i>Frontispiece</i>
OFFICES OF THE CHINESE MAYOR OF SHANGHAI, BEFORE AND AFTER THE FIGHTING . . . . .	6
THE CHINA NATIONAL AVIATION CORPORATION'S DOUGLAS PASSENGER PLANE ABOVE THE GREAT WALL, NORTH OF PEKING . . . . .	38
THE FIRST MASS WEDDING IN SHANGHAI, 1935. A YOUNG COUPLE COULD BE MARRIED FOR 23 SHILLINGS, WEDDING DINNER INCLUDED . . . . .	82
JAPANESE TROOPS FORDING THE YUNGTING RIVER. THE MAN BY THE SIDE OF SOLDIER NO. 2 IS A PRESS PHOTOGRAPHER, HOLDING HIS CAMERA HIGH ABOVE HIS HEAD . . . . .	136
THE JAPANESE BUILD A FLOATING BRIDGE OVER A RIVER IN NORTH CHINA . . . . .	136
CHINESE SOLDIERS RELIEVING THE FRONT LINE IN SHANSI . . . . .	142
CHINESE TROOPS MARCHING ON A MOUNTAIN PATH IN SHANSI . . . . .	144
A PICTURE TAKEN ON AUGUST 14TH 1937 SHOWING THE IMMENSE CROWDS ON GARDEN BRIDGE AND THE BUND TO WATCH THE FIRST AIR ATTACK ON THE <i>IDZUMO</i> . . . . .	158
A CHINESE SOLDIER EXAMINING A COMRADE WHO HAS BEEN KILLED BY A BOMB. TAITANG, OUTSIDE SHANGHAI . . . . .	162
EFFECT OF A BOMB IN HONGKEW, SHANGHAI . . . . .	170
THE WHANGPOO RIVER, SHOWING A GREAT FIRE ON THE POOTUNG SIDE, CAUSED BY A BOMB . . . . .	178
FROM THE WAR IN NORTH CHINA. JAPANESE OFFICERS OBSERV- ING THE BOMBARDMENT OF CHINESE POSITIONS . . . . .	192
"BLOODY SATURDAY" IN SHANGHAI (AUGUST 14TH 1937) . . . . .	214

	FACING PAGE
"BLOODY SATURDAY" IN SHANGHAI (AUGUST 14TH 1937)	. 224
JAPANESE SOLDIERS DURING STREET-FIGHTING IN SHANGHAI	. 228
JAPANESE SOLDIERS CLIMBING THE TOWN WALL OF I HSIEN	. 228
THE HARBOUR OF HONG KONG WITH PART OF THE BRITISH CHINA SQUADRON. IN THE FOREGROUND PART OF THE WATER-FRONT OF VICTORIA ; IN THE BACKGROUND KOWLOON AND THE MOUNTAINOUS MAINLAND SECTION OF THE COLONY. FROM THESE HEIGHTS THE TOWNS AND HARBOUR COULD BE SHELLLED BY HEAVY ARTILLERY . . . . .	. 236
GENERAL MAP OF CHINA . . . . .	<i>at end</i>

## PREFACE

**F**OR thirteen years, from 1914 to 1927, I served as mining adviser to the Chinese government. I was fortunate enough from the very outset to establish cordial co-operation with Chinese geologists and mining engineers, and the Central government, at that time located in Peking, as well as the provincial authorities, extended to me every possible support and facility. As far as my personal technical work and scientific research were concerned these were the happiest years of my life.

But as my liking for the industrious, peace-loving and friendly Chinese people deepened, in proportion as my knowledge of things Chinese expanded, I became aware of the critical stage of readjustment to modern conditions in which the immense population of China was involved during those years.

The corrupt and degenerate alien Ch'ing dynasty had been disposed of in the revolution of 1911-12, but the old and powerful mandarin state survived in the stout person of the cunning and resourceful Yuan Shih-kai. After his failure to establish a dynasty of his own and his death in misery and solitude in 1916, there remained as his fatal legacy to his people a most poisonous element, the military governors in the provinces, later nicknamed the "War Lords", some of them men of considerable ability who seriously desired to save their country, but taken as a whole

a set of greedy and inefficient generals who, in order to carry on their endless and fruitless civil wars, exacted exorbitant taxes from the poor peaceful peasantry. The countryside was impoverished and devastated, the rolling-stock of the railways became terribly depleted in the hands of the fighting armies, banditry prevailed, the students in their despair turned to Communism as a last resort. Many of the intellectual leaders held the recovery of their country to be a question of decades, still distant.

Then, in the hour of direst need, there emerged a young leader. Chiang Kai-shek, a military officer who had acted as Chief of the Staff to Dr. Sun Yat-sen ever since the revolution of 1911-12, had established in 1924, under the orders of this "father of the revolution", the Whampoa Military Academy near Canton and had here created in the space of two years a new type of military cadets educated to fight, not for any individual War Lord, but for the liberation of China.

Starting from Canton on July 27th 1926 Chiang, with an army of only one hundred thousand men, set out northwards to subjugate the provincial satraps and unite China. With his small force he was going to face armies many times more numerous than his own and commanders like Wu Pei-fu, Feng Yü-hsiang, Sun Chuan-fang and Chang Tso-lin, men whose feats had inspired their opponents with awe.

Thanks to the careful planning of the campaign and to the patriotic spirit of his young officers Chiang succeeded. On July 5th 1928 his troops entered Peking. A brilliant campaign, a march almost incredible, extending from the south coast through the whole length of China to the Mongolian frontier and accompanied by constant fighting against War Lords battling for their independence, was successfully

accomplished in less than two years. The foundation was laid for the rebirth of China.

But no more than the foundation. Rebellions cropped up in different parts of the immense empire, the allies of to-day became the enemies of to-morrow, as the formerly independent provincial chiefs felt that their very existence was at stake. A still more deadly danger to Chiang's great unification scheme was the formation of a Soviet rule over a large part of the provinces south of the Yangtze. Communism became a formidable threat to the rule of the Kuomintang, the party of Sun and Chiang. Not till he had engaged them in five most sanguinary campaigns was Chiang able to oust the Communists from southern China, only to see them erect a new stronghold in the distant north-west, where they are still in control at the present day.

But side by side with repeated wars for progressive unification, Chiang, backed by a great number of active and capable men, succeeded in building up during the short period from 1930 to 1937 a new modern China with a stable financial system, a reformed currency, simplified and unified taxation, important new railways and an immense network of motor roads. A new army was trained and equipped with the very able assistance of German military advisers, and an air force was created with the help of American and Italian instructors.

I left China in 1927 at the lowest ebb of political decay, and I entered it again in November 1936, finding everywhere sweeping evidences of the rapid renaissance of a vigorous and healthy nation.

The work of reconstruction would have been a still more assured success, had not Chiang and the thousands of able reformers working with him been labouring all the time under the most terrific stress, walking "between the devil



and the deep sea". On the one hand, there were the constant onslaughts of the rebellious generals and the Communists, on the other, the never-ceasing encroachment of land-hungry Japanese militarists on Chinese territory. In 1931 Manchuria was occupied, in 1932 occurred the fighting at Shanghai, in 1933 there followed the seizure of Jehol and the invasion of eastern Hopei, and in this region from 1934 to 1936 entirely lawless conditions prevailed, with armed smuggling which caused the Chinese government a loss in revenue of two million dollars a week.

Finally, the desperate Chinese patriots lost their temper. "There is no limit to the aggression of the Japanese, but there is a limit to the patience of the Chinese" (Hu Shih).

Chiang and his military advisers tried to postpone the inevitable armed conflict, but in the early part of July 1937 the war broke out over a trifle. The Japanese expected the Chinese to yield—as had always happened before. But they did not take into account the new national spirit which had spread all over China. The patience of the Chinese was exhausted. In their despair they determined to hold up Japanese aggression at any cost.

The undeclared war which the Japanese have forced upon the peace-loving Chinese nation has now lasted more than two years, and so far no end is in sight.

The scheme of the Japanese army was to seize northern China, then to stop and consolidate that gain. But the Chinese, once forced into war, have never allowed the Japanese to rest and consolidate. In spite of repeated Japanese victories on the battlefield, the Japanese have only plunged deeper and deeper into a gloomy adventure, the issue of which now looks more doubtful than ever. A year and a half ago they captured Nanking and then waited for the Chinese to sue for peace. Nearly a year ago, after

a protracted and most sanguinary struggle, they captured Hankow, and now again they invite the Chinese to come to terms—terms which are generous according to the Japanese, but which, in the opinion of the desperate and stubborn Chinese, are only terms of surrender and subjugation. The situation seems very absurd. The victors offer peace time and again, obviously anxious to see the war ended. The retreating Chinese refuse even to discuss the Japanese terms, still hoping to make the aggressor collapse under a protracted war of attrition.

There are, of course, also among the Chinese war-weary patriots who desire a speedy end of the struggle. Above all, there is a handful of political adventurers ready to fish in troubled waters. But still the determination of Chiang and his followers to fight on for victory and national liberty seems unshaken.

In the course of the war Chiang has explained on occasion that it is hard for him to follow *the middle course*. One extreme, repeatedly offered to him, is to accept the Japanese terms and hand over China to totalitarian rule and to co-operate in forming a Tokyo-Nanking axis, making the war chariot of the dictatorial States a four-wheeled vehicle. The other extreme is to throw in the lot of the Chinese with Bolshevik rule, a terrible temptation in this hour when all the resources of China are strained to uphold the national cause. But in spite of all allurements from Tokyo and from Moscow the Kuomintang government of China still stands firm in upholding the middle course, its democratic rule, and in doing so it fights for a principle that ought to be supreme in all democracies of the world, the right of every people to live its own national life.

J. G. ANDERSSON.

STOCKHOLM, *July* 1939.



# CHINA FIGHTS FOR THE WORLD



## CHAPTER ONE

### GREATER SHANGHAI

SHANGHAI, *March* 1937.

WHEN the Swedish Crown Prince and Princess visited Shanghai in November 1926 the royal travellers were received by the former chief of the Geological Survey, Dr. V. K. Ting, in his capacity of Mayor of Greater Shanghai. After the conclusion of the festivities—I stayed on in the city for a few days—Ting called one evening to renew our old friendship of the days when we camped together in the original modest offices of the Geological Survey of China in the western city of Peking.

The story he had to tell that evening was quite a stirring one. After very complicated military operations around Shanghai at the turn of the year 1925-6, General Sun Chuan-fang had made himself master of this region. On May 3rd 1926 he arrived at Shanghai and then appointed Dr. Ting as the representative of a new municipal idea, Greater Shanghai. This was no tranquil office. It was not long before Ting, with such troops as were at his disposal, was called upon to wage a little war along the railway line between Shanghai and Hangchow. "We were very poor soldiers," he added with a twinkle in his eye, "but luckily the others were worse." Consequently he succeeded with an inferior force in holding up the advance on Shanghai.

## 2 CHINA FIGHTS FOR THE WORLD

But Ting was not to hold his post for long. On December 13th, only a few weeks after the Crown Prince's visit, he was the victim of a severe motor accident and had to resign his administrative appointment.

I must admit that until I came here on this second visit, ten years later, my ideas of Greater Shanghai had remained rather vague. But now, as I explore this complex problem, it becomes clear that in the short time at his disposal Ting managed to lay the foundations of an important constructive work. In association with the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Hsu Yuan, he succeeded after prolonged negotiations with the consular corps of Shanghai in reaching a solution, very favourable to the Chinese, of the old and very delicate question of the Mixed Courts, as they are called, in Shanghai.

For this work Ting possessed one great advantage. He had received his academic education at English universities and spoke a very refined English without a trace of accent. This in itself disposed the most influential contingent of the extremely international community in his favour. As in addition to this he was a very charming but at the same time extremely resolute man, he won for himself popularity among the foreign residents which still persists. A year after his premature death I constantly see his utterances quoted in the leading papers. I judge this to be of a certain interest, as during the Crown Prince's visit in 1926 I read in an English paper here in Shanghai a pronouncement of the Chinese Mayor, as he then was, which would certainly have had a doubtful reception, to put it mildly, if it had come from anyone else. We must consider that just at that time the situation was overshadowed by the events of the foregoing years, which had violently disturbed the previous good relations between the foreign community of

Shanghai and the Chinese. Well then, Ting declared with his usual frankness that his future aim, admittedly a distant one, was by the establishment of an exemplary and trustworthy administration to induce the foreigners of Shanghai voluntarily to relinquish their concessions and place themselves under Chinese authority. My reason for reproducing this utterance of ten years ago, Utopian in most people's eyes, is that I now see how Ting's successors with more means at their disposal are pursuing this object, which, it is true, must still lie far below the horizon.

Ting was succeeded by the recently deceased General Huang Fu, who was the first Mayor of Shanghai to be appointed by the new Nationalist Government at Nanking. He became in due course Foreign Minister, and the same was the case with Ting's next successor, Chang Chun, who until quite recently was entrusted with the by no means easy post of dealing with China's foreign affairs. The present Mayor, General Wu Teh-chen, was appointed in 1932. Hardly had he had time to familiarize himself with his new functions when he was brought face to face with surely the most difficult task that his office could involve. As a reaction against the important events of 1931 in Manchuria a violent tension had arisen in Shanghai between Japanese and Chinese, a tension which led to the landing of Japanese marines on January 28th 1932 for what was expected to be a rapid and simple action—the dispersal of the Chinese defensive forces. The Nineteenth Chinese Army's capacity for defending itself came as a surprise not only to its attackers but to the world at large. Not until very considerable reinforcements had been brought from Japan did the Nineteenth Army retire in good order on March 2nd ; but by then the district of Chapei, where the fighting had taken place, was no more than a heap of ruins,



#### 4 CHINA FIGHTS FOR THE WORLD

and it is estimated that the material damage in this thickly populated quarter amounted to 350 million Shanghai dollars.

Hardly had hostilities ceased when Wu Teh-chen's men set to work to bury the dead and to bring order into the chaos produced by the bitter fighting. The Japanese episode had delayed but in no way disturbed the plan of the "Civic Centre of Shanghai", the administrative offices of the Chinese municipal authority, which had been sanctioned as early as July 1929.

When two years earlier the new Nationalist Government of Nanking had transformed Shanghai into an independent administrative district, the boundaries of this were drawn very liberally so as to surround the two districts under foreign control with a vast area, many times greater than that of the foreign concessions. On the north this municipal area extends as far as Woosung, at the confluence of the Whangpoo river with the Yangtzekiang; on the west it encloses the foreign concessions in a belt far wider than these districts themselves; on the south it reaches far down to the western course of the Whangpoo and on the other side of the river it includes the Pootung region as far as the Yangtzekiang. To the north of the foreign concessions a district was set aside for the new town plan, bounded on the east by the Whangpoo river and extending towards Woosung. This tract consisted for the most part of agricultural land and thus offered no serious obstacles to building development.

It cannot be said that those responsible for this town plan denied themselves anything in the way of thoroughness. A committee of eleven Chinese, mostly technicians, representing the different branches of the municipal administration, was formed under the chairmanship of Dr. Shen Yi,

a town-planning engineer trained in Germany, whose adviser, the architect Dayu Doon, trained in America, proved in the course of years to be possessed of a particularly valuable power of initiative. Three foreign experts were placed at the disposal of this Chinese committee, namely Dr. C. E. Grunsky, former president of the Society of American Civil Engineers; Mr. Asa E. Phillips, a well-known American town-planner, and Professor Herman Jensen of the University of Berlin. A layman's impression of the plan for the Civic Centre, as it grew under the hands of these men, is that it is a child of boldness, imagination and far-seeing calculation. It shows an imposing geometrical and monumental idea, which no doubt is extremely rare at the present time and reminds one rather of the imperial architects who in the fifteenth century constructed the magnificent rectangular contours of Peking.

The administrative offices, which are centrally situated in the new city, take the form of two ellipses with straight long-sides, laid one over the other so as to form a cross. This design is framed by four boulevards, sixty-five yards wide, the main arteries of the new city. The western is called San Min (the road of the three principles), the eastern Wu Chuan (the road of the five rights); the northern, Sze Chai, and the southern, Ta Tung, are named after metaphysical conceptions.

At the point of intersection of the two ellipses is a plaza, intended for mass-meetings and reviews, and in its centre rises a pagoda, visible from all four cardinal points. A hundred and fifty yards north of the pagoda, on the northern edge of the plaza, stands the central building of the whole Civic Centre, the Mayor's offices and the headquarters of the whole municipal administration. This building, one of the remarkable works due to Dayu Doon, is designed in



## 6 CHINA FIGHTS FOR THE WORLD

the style known as Chinese Renaissance, which aims at combining the style of the old temples and palaces, distinguished above all by its sweeping tent-like roofs, and modern demands in the way of several storeys and much window-space. This Chinese Renaissance style is the subject of a good deal of discussion just now. It will be readily understood that the Chinese, having resolutely thrown so much of their beautiful old art into the voracious melting-pot of the modern age, have wished to conserve at least these wonderful palace roofs, which more than anything else may be considered symbolical of all that is ancient and dignified in this country. But there is more than one side to the question. It is a fundamental principle of the old palace style that the buildings should have only one storey, and when modern public buildings are raised to two or three storeys it gives them at once a certain air of affectation. The first experiment in this renaissance style on a grand scale was, I think, the Rockefeller Institute in Peking, and here the result was very favourable, thanks to the unifying mass-effect of similar buildings connecting at right angles.

On the other hand, when one sees these palace roofs carelessly interspersed among ultra-modern functionalist packing-cases, as in modern Nanking, which in recent years has been rebuilt at a feverish rate, one cannot avoid misgivings. But this is a matter to which we must return later.

But in the Civic Centre of Shanghai the renaissance style has been handled with conspicuous success by a bold and skilful touch. In this central administrative building the architect has effectively succeeded in solving the problem of combining the handsome sweeping roof with a two-storeyed house. He has done the trick in this way: by

PLATE II



*Offices of the Chinese Mayor of Shanghai, before and after the fighting*  
*(Facing p*



building a low basement with small windows, lighting a number of offices. Upon this low substructure rests a splendid main floor, the entrance to which is reached by a sloping marble bridge. The effect is that one overlooks the useful but skilfully concealed basement and is lost in admiration of this cunning fellow who has managed to conjure up the appearance of a one-storeyed palace in the good old style.

In the planning of two other municipal buildings, the Library and the Museum, Dayu Doon has solved the problem of style in a different way, fully in accordance with tradition. These buildings have modern flat roofs, but over the main entrance there is a monumental tower-like edifice, crowned by a sweeping roof in two stages, just like the gate-towers of the old town-walls.

Besides the buildings already mentioned several other units of the monumental plan have been completed: a stadium, an open-air bath, a building for indoor sports, and certain sections of a very extensive medical complex with hospital, laboratories, etc. Around this administrative centre lies a broad belt of land, already laid out in streets and blocks for private occupation. A small number of houses lie scattered rather thinly over this immense area, but Doon, with whom I had an opportunity of discussing the prospects of the new city, admitted that the sale of building lots had not come up to expectation. Presumably the nervousness of 1932 still made itself felt locally.

Possibly it may be said with a certain justice that what has been done hitherto in the materialization of the new town plan is mainly decorative in character, a pompous façade which does not conceal very much in the way of substantial reality. But the façade in itself, as we see it there, is an extremely remarkable demonstration of a

grandiose and well-thought-out decision to create an entirely modern metropolis under Chinese administration, offering such advantages that the foreign settlements will find it to their interest to propose co-operation. In other words, the plan of Greater Shanghai must not be judged merely by the monumental public buildings and the few hundreds of private houses which are now completed. Only when we get to know the plan in its full extent does it become clear that we have to deal with a great and real conception which has a future before it, even though it may be delayed by political considerations.

The living force of this project is the great harbour plan, already partly realized. The two foreign communities, the International Settlement and the French Concession, owe their existence to trade and shipping. Beginning merely as a cluster of a few warehouses the city has grown as best it could, without any guiding will to draw up a far-seeing plan in advance, or, later, to drive boulevards relentlessly through the dense congeries of houses. In saying this I have not the slightest intention of criticizing the Shanghai Municipal Council, which has shown great prudence and thoughtfulness, but which has been compelled by circumstances to accommodate itself to the development of the city rather than to control it. Not with impunity does a city grow into one of the biggest in the world and the leading port of the East in a fortuitous fashion and without any national government behind it. Though neon façades may glow in the fairy-like night, though skyscrapers may shoot up in record time out of the waterlogged ground, though the Bund and the river offer a spectacle of rapidly pulsating life which is without parallel, it is not difficult to point to defects which are now scarcely to be remedied—within the framework of the concessions.

The most backward is the very thing of all others that ought to be up to date, namely the harbour. As far as the authority of the Whangpoo Conservancy Board, of which the Swede, H. von Heidenstam, was once director, extended, very considerable progress has been made: the bar at Woosung has been cut through and the river regulated, allowing large vessels with deep draught to reach Shanghai. But in other respects Shanghai is far from being a modern port: along the river front is a long line of quays with their warehouses, each quay owned by one of the shipping companies using this port. The harbour master is the only unifying force in this old-fashioned conglomeration of divergent interests. The available quay space is far from adequate. Not a few vessels have to moor to buoys lying out in the river, and most of the quays and warehouses for heavy goods lie at Pootung on the opposite side of the river, which is only connected with Shanghai by tugs and lighters. The port is almost entirely unprovided with mechanical equipment for handling goods, which are moved by the manual labour of great gangs of coolies. But the strangest thing is that this vast harbour, the first in the East as regards goods traffic, has no direct connection with the adjacent railway system. The State railways have not a single track running down to the quays at any point. It may be willingly admitted that most of the goods arriving here are reshipped into the interior by water. But the importance of the railways is growing daily, since the Nanking line has been connected with the railways of North China by the Pukow ferry and the construction of an extensive railway system for South China is about to be undertaken.

It is these great traffic problems that the plan of Greater Shanghai is to solve. A first stage of the new harbour



plan has already been reached in the completion of the Yukong wharf, on the river bank opposite the Civic Centre. This wharf, which is situated only half-way up the river, enables large vessels to come alongside a quay easily and safely in a single tide, while at the same time avoiding the crowded traffic of the rest of the port. In the planning of this new wharf the engineers had the great advantage of free movement on an unoccupied stretch of shore, and everything has been done to bring it fully up to date. A railway line will be laid to connect it with the new central station, and for the first time in the history of Shanghai a rational provision will have been made from the outset for the comfort and well-being of travellers.

But what has been done hitherto is only the first step in the extension of the port. In due time, when the Yukong wharf no longer satisfies requirements, a modern port will be constructed at Woosung, right out at the confluence with the Yangtzekiang, with docks separated by narrow strips of ground, which will carry warehouses, railway lines and cranes.

The way is thus laid out for the natural growth of the city in the direction of the river mouth. But plans for the future go farther than this. There is a scheme to connect Shanghai with Pootung by two tunnels under the river. As soon as this has been done the rate of growth of Greater Shanghai will be nearly doubled. Where the river is now bordered only by quays and goods depots, while the country behind still lives the same primitive life as fifty years ago, skyscrapers will spring up, the two banks will greet each other with a blaze of light and perhaps some day a new residential quarter will arise far out towards the Yangtzekiang. What I am saying about the development of the Pootung side is of course more or less fanciful, as it is scarcely likely that the

town-planners themselves have yet gone into details. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that the Chinese plan for Greater Shanghai points the way out of the congestion in which the city now fights for air and elbow-room.

## CHAPTER TWO

### A PILGRIM SEES MECCA

SHANGHAI, *December* 1936.

WHEN I arrived at Peking on May 16th 1914 to take up my appointment as geological adviser to the Chinese Government, I turned a page in my life's book. A much later page, written for the most part by other hands than mine, was turned when I visited Nanking on December 11th and 12th 1936.

In the years 1911-12 a proud and ancient imperial edifice, time-worn and weather-beaten, had fallen to the ground, and the new men who were to build a fresh one were still somewhat dazed and bewildered, wondering how to begin. At the head of the Department of Mines, to which I considered myself to belong, was an amiable little mining engineer, trained in France; a well-meaning and conscientious man, but scarcely a pioneer in difficult times. Above him was the Minister of Agriculture, a learned man of the old school, famous for his beautiful handwriting and for the model community he had made of his native village, but he too was hardly one to use a motor-plough.

But after some months had passed there came a man whose whole type was symptomatic of a new age. This was a young geologist who had studied first at Cambridge and afterwards with Professor Gregory in Glasgow. He was

just back from a tour of exploration in Yunnan and was nominally chief of China's projected Geological Survey. "But a chief without a staff," as he put it rather sarcastically at our first meeting.

Meanwhile, we Swedish colleagues had achieved a certain success at the very beginning, namely the discovery of the Lung-Yen ores. I received orders from the then President, Yuan Shih-kai, who was a man of great gifts but hopelessly restricted by the old-fashioned ideas of imperial times, to go to the palace and submit a report on what was known of the iron ores of China. After a two hours' demonstration of all our material Yuan summed up the situation in a masterly way, and a few weeks later, in January 1916, he issued an order for the appointment of a considerable staff for the Geological Survey which till then had only existed on paper. For an organization of this sort the few Chinese geologists and mining engineers had been carrying on a preparatory work for two years with great personal sacrifice, by establishing on private initiative the Geological School, in which some twenty young men went through two years' intensive training in order to form the first staff of the government institution. On the completion of the school course the authorities showed their confidence by inviting me to examine these young men during a week's field work on one of the great coal-fields of North China and to recommend the best of them for appointment as geologists.

Thus Dr. V. K. Ting, the young chief geologist, was now provided with a staff, and it was not long before he proved himself not only a successful organizer but a forceful hand at getting hard and efficient work out of the young men. These first years of unassuming pioneer work were a very happy time, during which the staff was strengthened by

#### 14 CHINA FIGHTS FOR THE WORLD

the addition of Dr. Wong Wen-hao, a smiling and amiable young man who came direct from the university of Louvain with his doctor's diploma in his pocket and soon proved himself to be not only a very expert mineralogist but also an excellent candidate for the post of our chief, if, as we all feared, Dr. Ting should be called away to a higher appointment. And, in fact, when in 1922 Ting was placed at the head of a new coal-mining enterprise in southern Manchuria, Wong was chosen on his recommendation to succeed him as director of the Geological Survey of China and filled this office with the greatest success.

During my later years in China, from 1921 onward, I was more and more drawn into archæological studies, which occupied my whole interest, and thus I could only follow at a distance the rapidly growing interest in geological research, an interest which in 1920 took a new form with the foundation of the remarkably active Geological Society. Only in one small sphere did I retain direct contact with the work of the geologists, as until my return home in 1925 I remained curator of the geological museum which we had established in the building of the Geological School.

In 1926 Ting was summoned from his directorship of the coal-field in Peipao to a much more important and difficult task as mayor of Greater Shanghai, the Chinese part of that metropolis.

When the Swedish Crown Prince and Princess visited Shanghai in the late autumn of 1926 they were received, as I have already mentioned, by Dr. Ting as Mayor of Greater Shanghai, and he was their host at a private dinner during their stay. Unfortunately his term of office was far too short, as the Governor of the province of Kiangsu, in which Shanghai is situated, was driven out during the advance of the Kuomintang troops in 1927. But Ting's

work has been continued by the present, capable and respected Mayor, General Wu Teh-chen, and every year it becomes more noticeable that Ting during his brief term of office laid the foundations on which the new community is being built up.

After a few years of retirement spent in scientific work, Ting was appointed in 1934 to a great task of organization. In the course of years a number of scientific institutions had grown up in various parts of the vast country, many of them indifferently planned and insufficiently provided with funds and personnel. The new government of Nanking resolved therefore to found a great organization, to be called *Academia Sinica* and designed to initiate and regulate all scientific work both in the humanistic faculties and in those of natural science. This vast organization was to include in its sphere of interest engineering and the sciences connected therewith and social science, but not medicine, for which a great collective organization had long been in existence, the China Medical Board. The *Academia Sinica*, or as this nationwide institution is alternatively called in English, the National Central Research Institute, has in Shanghai its departments for physics, chemistry and engineering, while all other branches of research, biology, astronomy, meteorology, geology, history including archæology, philology, psychology and sociology, are located in Nanking. This organization, founded by the great pedagogue Tsai Yuan-pei, was completed by Ting, of course with many willing collaborators, in the course of a couple of years. In the field of archæological research we Swedes, who are specially interested in the earliest history of China, have had to seek information about the sensational finds which the investigators of the *Academia Sinica* have made in recent years at Anyang in northern Honan, splendid finds which have

torn the veil from the hitherto semi-legendary Shang dynasty.

During the nine years in which I had been absent from China a succession of tragic events had played havoc among my little circle of friends.

Davidson Black, the brilliant Canadian anatomist and anthropologist, the gifted interpreter of Peking man, succumbed to overwork in 1934.

In the same year Dr. Wong Wen-hao was the victim of a terrible accident. While travelling from Shanghai to his native province Chekiang his automobile collided with a heavy omnibus. Wong had a great part of his face crushed and hovered for two months between life and death. His elder colleague and friend Dr. Ting watched over his life as a father over a beloved son, as a French archæologist and friend of us all expressed it in a letter to me. The best medical aid to be had in China was placed at his disposal, and by a miracle this little shattered head was restored to working efficiency.

Then at the beginning of 1936 our circle received its heaviest blow. In December 1935 Dr. Ting, while on a geological expedition in the province of Hunan, was accidentally poisoned by carbon monoxide in his room at a Chinese hotel. Wong at once secured the best doctor in Nanking and flew to Hunan. Later specialists were also summoned from the great medical college in Peking. But on January 5th the ravaged lungs ceased to function. China had lost one of her best sons, a man equally admirable for his perspicacity as an organizer, his keen critical acuteness and his unflinching loyalty to those who had once gained his friendship.

It was to find a sorely reduced band of colleagues and friends and a country that had changed in many ways since

I left it in 1927 that I landed in Shanghai on November 26th 1936.

I knew, of course, in advance that the new age had wrought many changes among my friends the geologists. One of the young men, Chu Chia-hua, had for a time been Minister of Communications ; Dr. Ting himself was designed at the time of his death for a newly created ministry, and I had heard time after time while in Sweden that Dr. Wong had been offered and had refused the post of Minister of Education. But the latest information which reached me shortly before I left home was that in addition to his directorship of the Geological Survey he was now Chief Secretary of the Executive Yuan, that is, the next man to Chiang Kai-shek and the one who had to carry out the decisions of the Cabinet. Professor Nyström had jestingly warned me that I should never be able to see Wong before eleven at night.

I knew Nanking pretty well from the winter of 1919-20, when I investigated the iron ores not far to the south of the town. At that time the provincial capital Nanking was a dead city, which had never had strength to recover from the terrible disasters of the Taiping rebellion in the 1850's and 60's. As I saw the place in 1920 the town walls were fairly well preserved, but they were like an empty shell with one group of buildings down by the Customs and another, with the Yamen and other ancient Chinese features, far away in another corner close under the wall. The rest of it was not unlike the country outside the walls : broad fields with farm-houses and bamboo thickets, here and there a few houses, and then a deserted road leading up through the empty spaces within the walls.

When my train arrived in the early morning at the Nanking station I recognized nothing except that the



cleanliness and easy politeness of the railway staff, the representative of the travel bureau and the porters, which I had found in Shanghai, were the same here. The dirty coolies who formerly swarmed about platforms and stations were gone. The China Travel Service, a bureau which covers the whole country, was evidently only a part of the new traffic system.

And when an hour later I sat in a car spinning along the great avenue which runs through the city it struck me that I was looking at a new town which had suddenly risen out of the ground. The motor road itself was already finished but the side roads for lorries, rickshaws and pedestrians were being laid ; we passed gang after gang of workmen and the roads swarmed with wagons of every description from huge lorries to carts resembling those the Chinese were using in the days before our era.

The cornfields which sixteen years before had filled the vacant spaces within the walls had now made way for new quarters. Many of the private houses and shops had naturally been run up casually and were without style and dirty, as is everywhere the case in China when these people flock together for trade and residence. It is chiefly among the big public buildings fronting the main streets that one can see the restless and variable face of the new age, now monumental edifices like palaces in the old imperial style now purely functionalist, as for instance the Metropolitan Hotel, where I put up that morning.

On the right hand I then caught sight of a well-proportioned brick building within an open yard planted with trees which could not be much more than a year old. It occurred to me that this ought not to be an ordinary government building but was more probably a modern peacefully situated scientific institution. Hardly had

thought this out when my eye caught the Chinese inscription and I found I had reached my goal, the Geological Survey of China, in its new home in Nanking.

No sooner had I entered its gate when I was greeted in a good Stockholm accent : " Welcome back to China, Doctor Andersson ! " It was Dr. T. H. Chow, who studied for three years under Professor Halle at the Riksmuseum and learned to speak Swedish to perfection. And so I had him for my guide through the three floors of this airy, light and excellently arranged building.

Not without a touch of jealousy I recalled the ramshackle quarters in which we worked at Peking, laying the first unassuming foundations of this great, entirely modern and beautifully planned museum.

On the mezzanine floor the central hall itself had a surprise in store for me which quite took my breath away. In our library in Stockholm we already possessed an atlas of China, published by Ting and Wong in celebration of the diamond jubilee of the leading newspaper *Shun Pao*. This atlas had been universally admired for the wealth of its material, which gave us for the first time a reasonably good cartography of the vast empire, but also for its fine modern production, with graduated colours indicating the altitude. Here I found the hand-painted original of this map and, as the foremost exhibit in the hall, a relief on the same scale of the whole of East Asia, giving reliefs both above and below sea-level. In the course of the day I also had an opportunity of making the acquaintance of Mr. Tsen Shih-yin, a shrewd and dexterous little man who was actively responsible for the production of this fine piece of cartography. And at the same time I was shown the side building in which the topographical department of the Survey was housed, together with the library, which now,

after twenty years, is twice as large as the eighty-year-old library of the Swedish Geological Survey.

But let us go back to the museum. We entered first the mineralogical-petrographic section, arranged in two alternate types of show-case, one for minerals, the other for rocks. The suitability of such an arrangement may be open to discussion, but it has a handsome and ingenious appearance.

Then we went up to the top floor where the archæological material is exhibited, with the great, amazingly rich finds from Chou Kou Tien. And here we saw first of all the splendid sepulchral urns from Kansu, which we had in Stockholm for examination and which had now been moved with the rest from Peking. Thank heaven—in this case the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities in Stockholm with its spacious and airy arrangement of the Swedish half of the material is technically superior. Though for that matter it is not to be wondered at that this geological museum, representing an area approximately as great as Europe, should have to content itself with showing the finest of the urns in a crowded setting of which we should not approve.

But then we came to the finds from Chou Kou Tien, the home of Peking Man. Here again I could have wished for a more roomy method of display, above all one which would have enabled the objects to be taken in at a glance. But to me personally this is of secondary importance—to me whose immediate feeling is one of reverence for the overpowering wealth, completeness and beauty of the treasure. Good heavens, what paupers we really were in 1921, when we discovered this unique Mecca of anthropological research! A pig's jaw, part of the lower jaw of a strange stag, a bit of a sabre-tooth belonging to a *Machairodus*, half a rhinoceros tooth—at that time we counted all these as

great prizes. And on my own private account I was then wondering, somewhat to the amusement of my companions, whether the quartz flakes among the sand of the cave might not possibly be the implements of an extremely primitive human race !

And now ! Here in a window show-case is a magnificent assortment of Peking Man's incontestable but extraordinarily primitive implements, not merely the quartz flakes, which occur in hundreds, but also larger implements, struck from various kinds of rock.

The human remains, or, as it is more scientifically correct to call them, the hominid skulls, the relics of the head-hunter *Sinanthropus pekinensis*, are still at Peking, in the anatomical section of the great medical college, and here in Nanking the *pièce de résistance* is only the casts which are now to be found in every anatomical collection throughout the world. The bulk of the mammalian material from Chou Kou Tien has also been left in Peking. But a choice collection of the finest and most complete mammalian finds has been brought south to Nanking. And what treasures they are : a whole skull of *Bubalis Teilhardi*, the Chou Kou Tien buffalo ; a whole leg of *Paracamelus gigas* ; two whole skulls of the curious stag *Euryceros pachyosteus* ; more or less complete skulls of the great cats and of bears, skulls of horse, whole jaws of rhinoceros, and so on.

Then they have made a thing which is singularly ingenious and at the same time very instructive : a model on a scale of one in a hundred of the cave with its immediate surroundings. The rock, which in our time was covered with debris, has now been cleaned up, so that you see the limestone surface with the narrow passages leading to the deeper parts of the cave. It is a vast system of subterranean rooms which has now been explored to a depth of forty metres.

The attractive feature of this model is that certain vital parts of it can be taken to pieces, much in the same way as a child's box of bricks. And thus by raising some of the movable blocks one can get at any desired subterranean room in order to show the exact position in which a particular fossil was found.

It is perhaps quite natural that I should give the first place to the Chou Kou Tien finds, which have a personal interest for me and moreover are among the rarest treasures of this museum. But my account of the development of the institution would be incomplete and one-sided if I did not add that two entirely new sections have come into existence, which were not even suggested in my time, namely a technical laboratory for the investigation of China's vast and extremely various coal deposits, and another laboratory for the study of soils.

It was only a couple of years ago that the question was raised of moving to Nanking to escape the pressure of the Japanese in the north. And if we consider that for part of that time the director, Dr. Wong, hovered between life and death, that he afterwards had more important duties to perform which claimed a large share of his time, and that the growth of the institution was constantly hindered by financial difficulties, it must be acknowledged that its recent progress has been simply phenomenal. What I had an opportunity of witnessing here in the course of one day was only one of the minor details of the renaissance which this great nation is passing through at the present time. The doubts and hesitations of the first twenty years after the revolution are now past. Mistakes are being made no doubt in many directions. But millions of workers are nevertheless rapidly building up a new empire under capable native leadership.

And now at last I come to my meeting with the man who created this new institution. After spending an hour in the new museum we telephoned to Dr. Wong at the Executive Yuan and he proposed that I should call on him there. We took a couple of rickshaws and drove through part of the old town with its stinking slums, with children crawling in the dirt and with coolies barefoot or in straw sandals.

The Government building is smaller and not so attractive as the fine edifice of the Geological Survey. It gives one a heavier and more serious impression, quite appropriate, by the way, to the house in which the nation's most fateful decisions and most far-reaching resolutions have to be made. Naturally the police guard is here many times stronger than in other government offices and visitors are subjected to strict supervision. The attempted assassination of Wang Ching-wei, the former Prime Minister, casts its shadow over the place.

We sat waiting for a few minutes, and then a comical thing happened, at the same time almost pathetic. Through the door of the waiting-room a pock-marked face peeped in, beaming like a sun from one ear to the other. One second, and I had spotted the man : it was the little attendant who twenty years before had padded about filling our smoky fireplaces in the shabby old offices we had at Bing Ma-ssu in the western city of Peking. So he had been brought by his thoughtful little master to these new glories in Nanking, and now he was radiant with joy at recognizing "An Ku Wen", Andersson the adviser, who had been absent for ten years.

Then Dr. Wong entered the room. That poor little head ! Never in my life have I seen such an injury in a living person. More than half the forehead had been forced back to a depth of quite two centimetres. The right eye

had been badly crushed and was unable to move freely. The left seemed to have too much room and projected a trifle too far. And on these small shoulders, so obviously weak even before the accident, with little more than the proportions of a child, a share of the responsibility for a fifth part of the world's population had now been laid. But the man was the same, with the same rapid and eloquent gestures, the same slightly neighing laugh, the same modest avoidance of anything like posing. Half in joke I told him that I had asked Mr. Chow whether I ought to say "Dr. Wong" as in old days or alternatively "Your Excellency". "No," replied Wong with a little laugh; "I am not excellent at all!"

It turned out that Nyström had exaggerated a little in assuming that Wong would now have little time to bestow on his old friends. That same evening I dined at his home together with Chow and Tsen from the Geological Survey. Our host spent a great part of the evening in giving us an account of the circumstances surrounding Ting's death nearly a year before. The surviving friend seemed worried by the thought that perhaps he had made a mistake in not transporting Ting in his aeroplane to Peking, a distance of eight hundred and seventy miles, to get him into the great Rockefeller Institute there.

On the following morning Wong came to my hotel and took me to see Ting's widow, that I might have an opportunity of expressing my regrets to her. I now heard for the first time that Ting had collected from private donors sufficient funds to build a nice little house for the Geological Society. On the ground floor there was only the lecture-hall and a reception-room. On the floor above there was a library to which Ting had presented his collection of books. Adjoining it was a little flat where Ting had lived as the

Society's tenant. His widow was now living there at a greatly reduced rent, partly as the honoured guest of the Society. What interested her most was to hear about Ting's visit to Stockholm in August 1933, and I tried to reconstruct our doings from day to day.



### CHAPTER THREE

## SPRING ON THE PURPLE MOUNTAIN

NANKING, *April* 1937.

**R**EGARDED purely as a geographical feature, Nanking possesses a neighbour of the first importance, and that is the Yangtze river. Just outside Hsia Kuan, the Maritime Customs, the mighty river rolls its grey and muddy stream between low banks. But it certainly cannot be said that the Yangtze is any tourist attraction in this part of its course. Up in Szechuan it has provided one of overpowering majesty in the famous Gorges, but at Nanking it is chiefly regarded, from the point of view of tourist traffic, as a dirty and troublesome obstacle to railway connections between Nanking and northern China. I am inclined to bet that scarcely one in a hundred of the tourists who travel from Shanghai merely to visit Nanking have ever seen a glimpse of the great river.

Thus the southern capital would occupy quite a commonplace situation on the flat plain of the delta, did not the Purple Mountain lend a peculiar charm to the surroundings. While, however, the Purple Mountain gives the capital a claim to the attention of travellers, it is to Nanking that the mountain owes its fame. For this hill of no more than thirteen hundred feet, which takes its name from the colour of its rock, is only one among many in this mountainous country. But rising as it does immediately

above the north-eastern corner of the town wall, it shows a bold outline to Nanking which I greet from my study window daily with the same delight.

Although one must admit that the modern development of Nanking is unequal and imperfect, for want of a directing hand which might have made a monument of the rebuilt capital, one may survey with pleasure the southern slope of Tzu Chin Shan or Chung Shan, which is the latest Chinese name for the Purple Mountain, realizing that here a national sanctuary on the grandest scale is in process of formation, and at the same time a park which ought to be extraordinarily beautiful when the newly planted trees have grown.

The plan of a monumental site outside the capital, which is now being carried into execution, originated some five centuries ago, when the huge tomb of the first emperor of the Ming dynasty was built on the slope of the Purple Mountain just above his palace. A walled space over half a mile in length leads through massive gateways up to a burial mound which merely by its diameter of four hundred and fifty yards and its dense hood of trees gives the impression of a veritable little mountain. But to this must be added the avenue of symbolical animals, warriors and courtiers, colossal figures in stone, grim and grey and immovable, which have guarded the tomb for over five hundred years. These sculptures are the only things that have escaped destruction, more or less. As regards the tomb itself, on the other hand, one may safely say that the Taiping rebels of the 1860's, after thoroughly destroying the city, with the exception of the walls and some of the gate-towers, did their best to demolish the buildings of the Ming tomb, of which in some cases only the bases of the columns are visible. Some remains of the sculptural decoration are to

be discovered in out-of-the-way holes and corners. But if the destruction was methodical, the same thing can scarcely be said of the restoration which has been carried out since the new régime was established here ten years ago. It is true that the site has been tidied up so that it is easy to get about, and under the capable hands of the new head gardener creepers and flowering trees now give an idyllic atmosphere of spring to the grim ruins. But if one examines the steps and balustrades one discovers things to make one's hair stand on end. Marble slabs with sculptured reliefs are mixed indiscriminately with ordinary building stones, and a charmingly graceful balustrade column has been firmly embedded in mortar in the edging of one of the terraces. The bridge which leads through the park up to the tomb precinct has been restored by simply casting it in cement, hardly an inspiring approach to one of the great historical monuments.

The new age has now taken possession of the Purple Mountain. On the highest summit the military authorities have built a fort for the defence of the city against air attack and in connection with this the upper part of the hill is entirely closed to ordinary traffic. The third summit has been occupied since 1934 by the central observatory, belonging to the Academia Sinica, at a height of eight hundred and seventy-six feet. Here in a semicircle are the six buildings of the institution: the main building containing the 600-millimetre reflector, the meridian circle building, the building for the 200-millimetre refractor telescope, building for the 100-millimetre Ross camera and two dwelling-houses.

When Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the father of the revolution, died in Peking on March 12th 1925, after an almost endless succession of reverses and difficulties, it was decided, in agreement

with his own express desire, that he should be buried on the slope of the Purple Mountain. Just as his life had been full of sorrows and disappointments, so were the honours paid to him when dead brilliant and generous. He was awarded, like the dead monarchs of bygone dynasties, a posthumous title: Chung Shan, the Middle Mountain, with the same written character as the name of the country, Chung Kuo, the Middle Kingdom. The main street of Nanking, the line of which was arbitrarily drawn straight through the city, demolishing all obstacles, was named after the father of the revolution Chung Shan Lu, and its completion was accelerated so as to be ready for the funeral procession to his final resting-place.

The ground plan of Sun's mausoleum is in the form of a bell, three hundred yards in length, the symbolical meaning of which is that it rings in the ultimate success of the revolution and the reunification of China. Five hundred yards below this bell-shaped, walled burial-place we first come to a *pailu*, a triumphal arch. From here a road, bordered by the Chinese *arbor vite*, the cypress, leads up to the first terrace with a pavilion containing the memorial stone, thirty feet high. Here begins a steep ascent of fifty yards with two hundred and twenty-four steps up to the mausoleum itself, which is flanked by two richly carved obelisks in Foochow granite. The central hall is supported by pillars of polished black Tsingtao granite, and on its walls Dr. Sun's political testament and other texts from his hand are carved. In the centre of the hall sits Dr. Sun, in white foreign marble.

From the north wall of the hall heavy bronze doors lead into the domed burial chamber, the floor and walls of which are lined with white marble.

In his colour scheme the architect has tried to imitate

the colours which go to form the Chinese flag under the new Kuomintang régime. Thus the discreet green and yellow roof glazing of the old temples and palaces has been replaced by blue, which to my mind has a rather glaring effect. The stone façades are of white Hong Kong granite, and the Foochow granite of the steps is expected to deepen to a red shade in the course of years ; all of which is intended to symbolize the blue sky, the white sun and the red earth.

To an old geologist, who has always enthusiastically advocated the use of natural stone for façades, it was a pleasure to acknowledge the many-sided and on the whole well-thought-out use that has been made of China's resources in granite and marble. The use of a foreign marble both in the central hall and in the sunken burial chamber with its recumbent figure of the deceased is in every respect a disturbing departure from Chinese tradition, but probably an intrusion of new motives and new material has taken place in all ages, so perhaps we need not be more Chinese than the Chinese themselves in these matters. And what now appears glaringly new and garish in this elaborately decorated mausoleum will in time be toned down by the sun and worn by the weather. The ancient monuments, which now have a patina of five centuries, were also brand-new in their day. And perhaps the only correct angle from which to judge this magnificent monument to Sun Yat-sen is one of surprise that so much of traditional beauty and dignity has been faithfully copied, in spite of this being the tomb of a revolutionary. But this, too, when all is said and done, is only a phase of the great popular movement which is here taking place. What was shattered by Sun Yat-sen's revolution was not merely the imperial régime but above all the degenerate barbarian Manchu dynasty. China

is now free to revive historical traditions as she pleases, and one constantly hears that decrees have been issued for the commemoration of this or that historic personality.

The first thought, however, is to remember the victims of the revolution and the men of mark who died in the service of the Republic. Close to the city wall—that is, to the west of the Ming tomb—the State has erected an imposing tomb to Liu Tung Chi, one of the leaders of the Kuomintang party. Far more extensive work has been carried out to the east of the Sun Yat-sen mausoleum. Here in the Valley of Spirits a number of memorial buildings are collected, such as the war memorial with tablets commemorating all the soldiers who fell at Shanghai in the spring of 1932, and the tomb of T'an Yen Kai, one of the first prime ministers under the new régime.

The whole of this tract on the southern slope of the Purple Mountain, from Liu's tomb on the west to the Valley of the Spirits on the extreme east, is now being transformed into a park-like recreation ground, which when the trees have grown will be a handsome gift for the population of the capital. The broken nature of the ground, with knolls, ponds and purling brooks, makes the foot of the mountain extraordinarily well suited for laying out in this way.

But the completion of Dr. Sun's memorial park, which now surrounds the whole of the Purple Mountain with an area of about six thousand seven hundred acres, is in the hands of Mr. H. K. Fu, its energetic and capable director. In front of and around the Ming tomb he has opened up a great stretch of ground which was lying waste with a broken column or a richly carved fragment of marble sticking up here and there. Extensive nurseries have already made it possible to cover the Purple Mountain with saplings

of *Pinus Massoniana*, *P. Thunbergii*, *Thuja orientalis*, *Juniperus sinensis*, *Liquidambar formosana*, *Acer buergerianum*, *Pistacia sinensis*, *Quercus serrata* and other species, *Lithocarpus spicata*, *Zelkova serrata*, *Ulmus pumila* and *passifolia*, as well as *Robinia pseudacasia*.

But Mr. Fu's activities are not confined to dendrology. In his expeditions to the adjacent provinces of Kiangsu, Anhui and Chekiang, and also to more distant parts of the empire such as Honan, Kuangsi and Szechuan, he has collected a great store of seeds, bulbs, roots and dried botanical specimens. His collections now comprise fifteen thousand pressed plants and fifteen hundred seed specimens of various species. In order to acquire foreign material this botanical institution has arranged exchanges with two hundred and five similar institutions in thirty-three countries all over the world. From its extensive open-air plantations, beds and forcing-houses this central garden is now able to supply the public buildings of the capital with flowering plants.

When I visited Mr. Fu one day I found myself surrounded by fruit-trees in blossom. Plums and apricots had already shed their petals, but cherries and peaches were now in full bloom, light pink for the cherries but a deeper tone for the peaches. One of the biggest cherry-orchards surrounds the colossal animals and warriors whose double ranks guard the approach to the Ming tomb. They looked more than usually primeval, unwieldy and grey in the midst of this airy play of colour. Finally, Mr. Fu took us to the Valley of Spirits, where the cherry-trees border the ponds in double rows. As I let my eyes wander over the newly erected buildings on the summits of the mountain and over the flowering trees and slender pines at its foot, I felt I was drinking in the Purple Mountain's springtime to the full.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### TIME FLIES QUICKLY OVER CHINA

NANKING, *April* 1937.

**D**URING my springtime stay in Nanking it happened that I had to pay a lightning visit to Shanghai, and I decided to fly for the first time. I found at once that the whole thing was far simpler than I had believed. The take-off from the Nanking flying-ground was so imperceptible that I was quite confused about it all. Part of the aerodrome was under repair and crowded with coolies wielding spades and picks. I saw us advancing on these labour battalions and had an uneasy feeling that we were going to do them some damage. Only at the last moment I noticed that we had already left the ground and were flying many yards over their heads.

For the first time in my life I had a lesson in geography, aided by a correctly plotted map on a natural scale.

Of mountainous country one may say that it should be seen both in the old way from the ground and from the air. But no one who has not flown has really seen the delta of the Yangtzekiang. When you sit in the train crawling along between Nanking and Shanghai you do get a glimpse now and again of a canal, of green fields, a sheet of water, an industrial town. But only the bird's-eye view gives you the great general idea. No wonder the birds know so much more than we do !



What strikes one first is the complete uniformity of the delta plain with the surface of sea and river. One has the impression that it floats on the water like a lotus-leaf, or perhaps more intelligibly, like a half-submerged pancake. The outer portion of the delta was formed in historical times ; thanks to historical documents we know precisely when this little town or that village was added to the map. But the greater part of the delta plain has been the home of industrious agriculturists and fishermen for two thousand years. And yet the whole of this part of the earth's surface is being slowly depressed. Borings under Shanghai as well as Tientsin and Peking prove that the great alluvial plains consist to a depth of several hundred metres of delta deposits which were formed in conjunction with a former sea-level. When a tract like this is left to itself its surface is raised by the mud of fresh delta deposits. But when some centuries ago these industrious people erected embankments and prevented the river from performing its legitimate work, the little human ants had to take over the job, which is everywhere proceeding incessantly, though not very perceptibly. In the metropolis of Shanghai this work of stratification sometimes assumes grotesque forms, as, for example, around the offices of the Municipal Council itself, where last winter they were engaged in raising the level of the ground a foot and a half to prevent the river water from flooding out the town councillors.

But forgive me ; the old professor is dropping into a lecture, as we glide handsomely over the land of the delta. Fortunately for us the weather is so fine that we can fly at a low altitude over this beautiful natural map. How easily one can take in everything, seen from above ! Only now do I realize the perfection of the system of canals, thanks to which every little bit of the delta is accessible

by boat. From the great canals smaller ones of the second and third grade branch off, and in the fourth grade you see only little blind alleys which end abruptly where there is no need to carry them farther. Among the network of these canals the level plain is neatly divided into squares like an endless succession of well-tended gardens. Among the lush green of wheat and beans there are bright rectangles of virulent sulphur-yellow, planted with *Brassica*.

Everywhere in China one sees fortresses strongly walled to give protection to the local inhabitants in times of trouble, just as our forefathers used to build their strongholds on hill-tops difficult of access. But here in the delta, where there is not a sign of a mound, recourse has been had to earthen ramparts, over which a single narrow path leads to the place where the population assembled as soon as danger threatened. These fortified places, surrounded by ramparts, remind one of the south of Sweden, and indeed the fine cornfields have just the appearance of the land of Skåne, flat as a pancake and sodden with water, if it lay floating on the surface of the Baltic.

One of the funniest features in this ground-plan of a fertile district is the innumerable well-heads, which look from above like neat little rings, resembling the fastening of a glove. But if the wells are without number one seldom sees a temple. Once, up in the mountains west of Peking, I counted in the course of my survey four temples to the square kilometre, including the humble little Tu-ti-miao, where the peasant prays for rain to fall on his dried-up fields. But here the water is always so near and so surely to be relied on that piety has to take a back seat, especially as this soil is far too fertile to be wasted on unproductive temple building.

Well, that was quite a lot of useful information to gather

on the hour's flight between Nanking and Shanghai. But now we are over the great city. The skyscrapers stand out like huge beacons in the sea of houses. The plane circles in an elegant curve over the Whangpoo and the Pootung shore. And look, greatest of all aviation's wonders, the young Chinese exquisite sitting across the gangway is getting himself ready to alight by smearing his fine manly lips with rouge ! We are in Shanghai, the city of industry and sin.

As we know, appetite comes with flying, to adapt the proverb slightly, and having once tried this really interesting means of transport I was smitten with the desire to find out a few things about the history of the art of flying in China. Like everything else in this land of ancient civilization its roots lie deep in the earth. A relief on a tomb dating from the beginning of our era shows a great lord driving in his chariot, which takes its course over clouds drawn by scaly winged dragon-horses. In another image, a wood carving of the Ming dynasty, we see a pair driving through the clouds in a lumbering car.

The first attempt at flight in China with a modern aeroplane was made in 1909 by a French airman, M. Wallon, who gave several exhibition flights at Shanghai with a Sommer biplane. But in one of these flights he crashed on the Shanghai race-course and was killed instantly. A street in the French Concession bears his name, and a monument was raised to his memory in a neighbouring park.

In 1910 a Russian airman made several flights at Peking with a Bleriot monoplane, and these aroused so much interest that the great generals all over North China began to provide themselves with pilots and fighting machines. But during the anarchy which followed the death of Yuan Shih-kai this material changed owners time after time with

the result that it deteriorated rapidly, and it can scarcely be said that the aeroplane played any important part in the long succession of civil wars.

In any case, on May 7th 1920 a propaganda flight from Peking to Tientsin was made with a Handley-Page machine piloted by a Scot, Captain Mackenzie. Ten guests accompanied him, among them the then British Ambassador. The flight between the two cities took exactly an hour and the machine returned to Peking the same afternoon. During the summers of 1921 to 1924 a fairly regular week-end connection was maintained between Peking and the bathing resort of Peitaiho.

As with the rest of the work of reconstruction, flying was only placed on a serious footing after the formation of the Kuomintang government at Nanking in 1927. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the famous father of the revolution, had always taken a special interest in questions of communication, and in the new government a strange duplicate organization was set up to deal with these matters: on the one side a Ministry of Communications, and on the other, curiously enough, a separate Ministry of Railways. Friction was not long in coming. Sun Fo, son of the famous doctor, was appointed Minister of Railways and as such exceeded his special sphere of action by forming in 1929 the China National Aviation Corporation in co-operation with the American Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Corporation. This contract caused a great flutter in the Ministry of Communications, and for a time the two ministries were actually competing with each other in aerial traffic on the line Shanghai-Hankow. A decision of the Supreme Court enacted that civil aviation was the affair of the Ministry of Communications. Sun Fo resigned, and on July 8th 1930 the Minister of Communications signed the document

establishing co-operation between the Aviation Corporation and the Curtiss concern. Thereby civil aviation in China found the form which was to make it a factor in the rehabilitation of the country.

As early as October 20th 1929 the first step towards commercial flying was taken in China. For on that day a trial flight was made with a Douglas Transport machine on the route Shanghai-Hankow, and the five hundred and thirty-seven miles were covered in seven hours. A good idea of the progress commercial aviation has made in the seven years that have elapsed since this first flight is provided by the fact that on May 12th 1936 one of the China National Aviation Corporation's Douglas Transport planes covered in one day two thousand four hundred and twenty-four miles, or nearly five times the distance that had constituted a record seven years before.

The China National Aviation Corporation has taken charge of the three main routes for passenger and mail service :

- (1) Shanghai to Chengtu, via Nanking, Kiukiang, Hankow, Ichang, Wanhsien and Chungking.
- (2) Nanking to Peking, via Hsuchow, Tsinan and Tientsin.
- (3) Shanghai to Canton, via Wengchow, Foochow, Amoy, Swatow and Hong Kong.

With Canton as a terminus a more local organization, the South-West China Aviation Corporation, has established communication with Europe via Hanoi in connection with Air France. In the same way another route to Europe is open via Hong Kong by Imperial Airways. In the other direction Hong Kong acts as the intermediate station for the American Clipper Service across the Pacific.

While thus the Americans in co-operation with the Chinese

PLATE III



*The China National Aviation Corporation's Douglas passenger plane above  
the Great Wall, North of Peking*



have secured a very strong position as the dominating foreign nation on three of China's regular flying routes, the Germans come in as a good second in the race for aviation traffic in China. As early as 1926 the Germans were far-sighted enough to provide themselves, through the Hedin expedition, with a network of meteorological observation in those regions of Inner Asia over which Lufthansa was planning to establish its great line of air traffic between the Far East and Berlin. Almost simultaneously with the formation of the China National Aviation Corporation the Ministry of Communications made an agreement with Lufthansa, as the result of which the Eurasia Aviation Corporation was constituted, with the main object of flying between Shanghai and Berlin either via Manchuria and Siberia, via Urga and Siberia, or via Chinese Turkestan and Siberia. On this point the existing tension between Soviet Russia and the Third Reich has proved an irremediable obstacle to the main German plan of a regular route across Inner Asia. But while waiting for a clarification of this great question Eurasia has provided quite a network of flying routes, chiefly in northern China.

So much for civil aviation. In order to create an effective air arm Chiang Kai-shek has established in his native province of Chekiang, not far from the provincial capital, Hangchow, a military flying school with three aerodromes, workshops, petrol tanks, etc. Its director is a Chinese air-force general, but he has at his side an American air-force colonel and with him fifteen American instructors. The flying school has at its command three hundred mechanics, and in 1936 it could show a total of thirteen thousand flying hours with a loss of only two lives. The cadets at this flying school, all of whom must have a university or college education, go through a preliminary course in Nanking and



then a year's hard training at Hangchow. Only about fifty per cent. of the candidates succeed within this year of training in taking their certificate as military pilots.

It is difficult for a foreigner and a layman to acquire real knowledge of the fighting value of the Chinese air arm. But one sign of the times is the national subscription for presenting Chiang Kai-shek with fighting planes on the occasion of his fiftieth birthday. The subscription is still open. New presentation planes are constantly being dedicated all over the provinces and sent to the leader of new China. The number of machines thus subscribed for must be in the neighbourhood of one hundred at the present time. I met in Nanking an agreeable group of young flying generals. They are obviously filled with the same conviction of the importance of the new arm in a future war as is doubtless to be found among the young flying officers of all countries.

On account of local geographical conditions the aeroplane has come to play a part in the domestic politics of China which is peculiar to that country. This side of the matter has been dealt with in an illuminating way by Madame Chiang Kai-shek in a newspaper article. It is, in fact, extremely significant of the situation out here that such a subject should be treated in the press (*Shanghai Evening Post*, March 12th 1937) by the foremost lady in the land, who is herself an enthusiastic and constant flyer and some months ago had no hesitation in using this means of rapidly reaching the spot where her consort's life was at stake.

China, with its immense area and its population of about a fifth part of the whole world's inhabitants, may be described as an agglomeration of largely independent provinces, many of which have a population equal to that of a Euro-

pean Great Power. One of the causes of the country's collapse during the years succeeding the revolution was the difficulty experienced by the Peking Government in communicating its decisions to the distant provinces. The mail service was so slow that the political situation had time to swing all round the compass before a reply reached Peking.

The new masters in Nanking were already aware, when they assembled there in 1927 in their attempt to save the disintegrating empire, that the problem was largely one of communications. Therefore, from the very beginning their greatest efforts were directed to the rapid construction of motor roads and the provision of reliable air connections. The tenacity, the recklessness in the face of danger and the self-sacrifice with which during the last six years Chiang Kai-shek has been in the air early and late on the way to some point or other which at the moment was critical, make up a heroic saga to which none of the other present-day empire-builders, Kemal, Mussolini or Hitler, can show a counterpart. In December 1936 this temerity was within an ace of leading to disaster. We shall see whether the great man's new two-engined Sikorsky S-43 will be less constantly in use than the old machines with which he bound together the conflicting parts of the empire.

I cannot conclude this chapter on flying in China without recording a brand-new example of sky-writing which excited a good deal of attention. It is well known that the Chinese love and honour their beautiful writing in a way which we Westerners find it difficult to understand. For this reason aviation in China was given a powerful lift when, on October 29th 1936, Captain A. L. Patterson wrote the character *Shou*, which means long life, above Shanghai. The *Shou* is a complicated sign of no fewer than fourteen strokes of the brush, which in sky-writing were reduced to

eleven. Patterson used for his experiment a fairly slow Stearman instructional plane. The writing was accomplished at an average altitude of twelve thousand feet in the course of nine minutes, during which time eighteen kilometres of smoke were emitted to form a character which was two kilometres in length. So now the Chinese have seen it written in letters of fire upon the sky that the aeroplane will have a long life in China.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### CHIANG KAI-SHEK AND THE NORTHERN CAMPAIGN

**I**N the autumn of 1926 I published a book, *The Dragon and the Foreign Devils*,<sup>1</sup> in which I described on the one hand my impressions of travel during twelve years in the service of the Chinese Government, on the other the tumultuous history of China after the revolution and the beginning of the Chinese Renaissance, which has proceeded so vigorously since that time.

From a political point of view my description was a disconsolate story of constant futile civil wars between military governors, none of whom was of sufficient stature to be able to defeat the rest and unite the great suffering empire. It was a war of elimination, apparently without meaning or end, in which no one was sufficiently superior to his rivals to be able to draw the great prize.

The chapter of my book headed "The Petty Kings", in which I deal with these lamentable civil conflicts, concludes with the following words :

"The civil war in China will go on until there appears a leader capable of defeating all his rivals and uniting the country.—Perhaps this man of the future is still sitting on

<sup>1</sup> *Draken och de främmande djävlarne*; Stockholm, 1926. English translation by Charles W. Stork; Boston, 1928.

the students' bench in some university or serving as a young officer under one of the war lords."

In reality the new man was much nearer than I had dared to imagine. At the beginning of July 1926, as I sat in Stockholm writing the chapter referred to, the then thirty-eight-year-old General Chiang Kai-shek assumed in Canton the post of "Commander-in-Chief of the National Revolutionary Army", and on the same day, July 9th, his army began the march northward from Canton and thus initiated one of the most remarkable undertakings in military history, the northern campaign, which after the most fantastic difficulties and fluctuations ended in complete victory on July 5th 1928, when the new national flag was hoisted by Chiang's troops in Peking and a new era, the domination of the Kuomintang over a more or less united country, was ushered in.

I must here draw the main outlines of the career of this great soldier and statesman up to the hour of writing, and in this I am aided by two collections of material, both published in 1937, at the outset of the great trial of strength now proceeding between China and Japan.

One of these is Hollington K. Tong's authorized biography in two volumes, issued by the China Publishing Company in Shanghai. The author's acquaintance with Chiang goes back to 1905, when the then seventeen-year-old Chiang was studying in the Lungching College at Fenghua in the province of Chekiang. Tong was at that time one of the masters in this college and he has a good deal to tell us about a pupil who was afterwards to become the leader of his country in its period of greatest peril. Afterwards Chiang and Tong met by invitation of the former when he had risen to the highest position in the land and when the latter was merely "an ordinary newspaper man of no

particular importance". Thus this authorized biography came about.

The other biographical work, *Chiang Kai-shek is Great*, is of an entirely different character. Its author is a Japanese naval officer, F. T. Ishimaru, who has already achieved a reputation as a bold and interesting writer on military policy by such works as *Japan Must Fight Britain* and *Die Bedeutung der Insel Hainan*. That so imperialistically minded a Japanese officer should have set himself to write this animated and well-informed panegyric of the great Chinese leader is one of the most remarkable signs of the deep-seated forces which are now rapidly reshaping the Far East.

On October 31st 1887, in the village of Chikow, district of Fenghua, province of Chekiang, there was born to the distinguished family of Chiang a boy child, whose grandfather gave him the pet name Yui-yuan, but whose official "baptismal name", to use Western terminology, was Kai-shek.

Chekiang has the name of being one of the most beautiful provinces of China. Within a wonderful belt of islands, which has inspired the greatest masters of classical landscape painting, rise fantastically shaped groups of mountains, divided by valleys and richly fertile plains. Fenghua, situated quite near to the town of Ningpo, is one of the richest districts in the province, famous for the excellence of its agriculture, its domestic industry, particularly its well-known skill in working bamboo, as well as for its trade and shipping. Little Chiang was fond of spending his time among the poor seamen and listening to tales of their hard life at sea. On the one hand the magnificent and noble landscape, on the other the hardships and privations of the people; these were the two impressions of his childhood's

surroundings which were stamped most deeply in this young mind. Time after time the famous man returns to this beautiful native tract, mixing there with the sons and daughters of his former playmates, not as the mighty ruler of his country but as the son of a respected family of the neighbourhood. The bond with his native district is a powerful factor in Chiang's personality, but his whole being is still more strongly attached to the family traditions.

For generations Chiang's ancestors had been agriculturists, but his grandfather abandoned this family tradition and devoted himself to trade. Living between the mountains and the sea, he dealt in the products of both, tea and salt. His son, Chiang Su-an, Kai-shek's father, followed in the old man's footsteps. Both these men won respect not only for their literary attainments, but above all for the public-spirited way in which they devoted themselves to local affairs. Chiang Kai-shek's father was a kind of self-appointed justice of the peace, to whom his neighbours brought their disputes and troubles. Thus, though of comparatively modest origin, the boy grew up with a sense of duty towards a respected family name.

But his most precious spiritual heritage was nevertheless the memory of his mother, who in many ways was an unusually wise, resolute and courageous woman. He was only nine when his father died, and after that the whole responsibility for the home and for the education of the children rested on their mother alone. Corrupt officials and dishonest tax collectors attempted to fleece the apparently defenceless widow. But here they encountered a will that was more than a match for them. In various ways, before the courts and otherwise, she defended her rights and those of her children, and when she died in 1921

the whole neighbourhood revered her as the most upright and strong-willed member of a respected family.

In his article "Thoughts on my fiftieth birthday", which was reproduced in every Chinese paper and magazine, Chiang Kai-shek gives an extremely interesting account of the admirable work his mother accomplished in keeping the home together and bringing up her son to be a capable and conscientious man.

"She impressed on me that in order to be an obedient son it was not sufficient to show respect for one's parents, the same devotion must also be given without fear or hesitation to all the affairs of the nation."

And in her actions, in spite of difficult circumstances, she lived up to this lofty ideal. When her son wished to go to Japan to study military science, she supported him financially, against the advice of the family. When, during the revolution of 1911-12, he openly acknowledged his adherence to the revolutionary party and took an active part in the conflict, all his relations and friends in his native place turned away from him. "All my relatives, except one, severed their connection with me. This one, who always had confidence in what I did and was ready to do everything to support me morally and financially, was my mother."

In 1906, when Chiang had completed his studies in his home province, he had an opportunity of following the dictates of his heart and training to become a soldier. With this object he was sent by the provincial authorities to the military academy established by Yuan Shih-kai at Pao-tingfu, not far from Peking. Here he made such progress with his studies that within a year he was selected, together with a few of his comrades, to be sent to Japan for more advanced military studies.



An interesting anecdote is told of these cadet days. The instructors at the Paoting academy were for the most part foreign military men. One day in the course of his lecture a Japanese instructor in hygiene took a cubic inch of mould and held it up before his pupils. "This cube contains four hundred million microbes," he said; and added; "this lump of earth may be compared with China with its four hundred million human beings."

This comparison so incensed Chiang that he rushed up to the lecturer's desk, broke the cube of mould into eight parts and cried: "Japan has fifty million inhabitants. Are they to be compared with the microbes in the eighth part of this lump of earth?"

Before reaching Japan in 1907 he had to go through a training at the Shinbo Gokyo, the preparatory military academy established by the Chinese War Ministry to fit Chinese students for further military studies in Japan. He passed out of this preparatory school after two years and was then attached to the thirteenth Japanese regiment of artillery (Takada) as a cadet for admission to the Japanese military college.

The four and a half years he spent in Japan made him familiar with the duties of an officer and especially with the Japanese system of military training, but at the same time his attention was directed to another quarter. By the Chinese revolutionary Chen Chi-mei he was introduced into the revolutionary organization known as the Tungmenghui, which was later reorganized as the Kuomintang. Chen put him in touch with Dr. Sun Yat-sen, "the father of the revolution".

When the first shot of the Chinese revolution was fired at Wuchang on October 10th 1911, it found an immediate echo in Tokyo. Chiang and two of his comrades, one of

whom was Chang Chun, afterwards Foreign Minister in Nanking in 1935-6, hastened to make secret arrangements for their passage to Shanghai. Just before sailing for China they returned their uniforms and swords to their respective regimental headquarters.

The revolution of 1911-12 was far from bringing China the new springtime that Chiang and many young patriots with him had hoped for. It is true that within a short time Chiang captured Hangchow, the capital of his native province, and that he thus gave the first proof of his capacity as a leader of troops. Shanghai was occupied at the same time by Chen Chi-mei, and a month later Nanking was taken. But this was the end of their successes. Yuan Shih-kai, a mandarin of the old type and a very crafty gentleman, who controlled the situation in Peking, placed himself between the decadent Manchu dynasty and the revolutionaries of South China. The Manchus were frightened into abdicating, but Yuan plucked the fruits of their abdication for his own account, in the hope that he himself might found a new dynasty. He was entirely a man of the old school. Dr. Sun with his Kuomintang coalition and his three fundamental principles—Nationalism, Democracy, Socialism—were mere idle talk to Yuan. A powerful emperor on the dragon throne in Peking, that was the medicine the sick country needed. And at the outset Yuan had all the best cards in his hand. The imperial family, scared out of their wits by Yuan's gloomy predictions, accepted fairly generous terms of abdication; the foreign Powers furnished him with a "reorganization loan" of twenty-five million pounds, and his well-trained troops recaptured Hankow and Peking from the southern revolutionaries.

Sun Yat-sen, who had been elected provisional President,

resigned in the interests of peace in favour of Yuan, who now, with all the cunning of the old mandarin, prepared the way for the proclamation of a Yuan dynasty. But when, in December 1915, he was proclaimed Emperor in Peking, strong anti-monarchical forces were set in motion against him from different parts of the country, and in June of the following year he died in his palace, a lonely and broken man, vanquished by the forces of a new age which he did not understand.

Yuan left behind him a disastrous heritage, which involved the unhappy country in ten years of meaningless civil strife, during which the power of the Peking government was more and more curtailed and relaxed. The provinces were in the hands of military governors, who served Peking as little as possible, while at the same time intriguing against and from time to time fighting each other in constantly changing alliances. The presidents of the somewhat mythical republic, residing in Peking, were men of no importance, in some cases corrupt, who were in no way capable of maintaining respect for the power of the government. Finally the "republican" Peking régime fell so completely into discredit that scarcely any self-respecting man could accept office in the northern capital.

Meanwhile, the military centre of power still lay in the north. Chiang, who after the first successes of 1911 soon realized the impotence of the southern revolutionaries in the face of Yuan's well-equipped armies, returned for a couple of years to Japan, where, while perfecting his military knowledge, he published a review dealing with military science and wrote a number of articles on the subject of China's political situation and military needs. A collection of these articles has been published under the title of *Self-examination*. In the preface to this volume he quotes from

Mencius an utterance of the philosopher Tseng : " If I find after self-examination that I am not upright, ought I not to fear even a beggar in his rags ? If on the other hand the hours of self-examination convince me of my honesty, shall I not go forward, if called upon, even against thousands and tens of thousands ? "

The self-examination of which he speaks in these articles concerns not only himself individually, but the whole people. Among the few national weaknesses of the Chinese is that of being open to uncritical mass-suggestion. In the face of real or supposed aggression by foreign Powers Chinese opinion was instantly ready to demand reparation by force of arms or reprisals in the form of boycott. Frequently the measures demanded by student demonstrations were out of all proportion to the means at their disposal. It is against short-sighted outbursts of rage such as these that Chiang warns his countrymen. He insists first on real knowledge of the political situation, and then on the creation of a defensive system in correspondence with this state of affairs. His analysis of China's political problems is remarkably correct, especially when one considers that the young officer was master of no foreign language but Japanese. The zones of contact with foreign Powers are according to him : with England through Tibet, with Russia through Mongolia, and with Japan through Manchuria. He states positively that the first-named is of small importance, but dwells at length on relations with Russia and above all with Japan. In his opinion it would only be possible to put the national defences in order with the required rapidity if attention were concentrated exclusively on the army, which ought to have a strength of six hundred thousand men, well-trained and equipped, also as regards economic preparedness, and placed entirely under the command of

the central government. He also points to the system of provincial governors that had prevailed since Yuan's day, combining civil and military power, as the greatest danger to the unity of the country.

The figure of the twenty-five-year-old Chiang, sitting in Japan biding his time, while drawing the main lines of his country's military rebirth, is a very curious one. Here is a young officer tracing the outlines of his country's foreign policy, warning his countrymen against embarking on war-like adventures with insufficient strength and indicating the size and distribution of the army required for the country's security. His words show a wisdom and foresight which might be expected of an "Elder Statesman" about to take leave of his public career. So clear-sighted a survey of the country's needs had not appeared since the great Viceroy Chang Chih-tung wrote his famous memorandum on "The need of knowledge".

During his repeated visits to Japan, Chiang had met and become a disciple of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, "the father of the revolution". Chiang's admiration was repaid by Sun's confidence and thus a warm friendship sprang up between the old revolutionary and the young. Chiang cannot possibly have failed to see how doctrinaire and unpractical the old gentleman was, amongst other things in his blind faith in people who grossly deceived him. But Chiang's sense of loyalty obliged him to follow Sun Yat-sen through thick and thin. In the same way he showed gratitude and respect for his Japanese military instructors. Yuan Shih-kai, on the other hand, in whose military academy he had received his early training, was with all his brilliance and cunning nothing but a traitor to the cause of the republic in Chiang's eyes.

When in 1917 Sun Yat-sen established in Canton a govern-

ment and a parliament as a reaction against the growing political decadence in the north, he was accompanied by his young military adviser Chiang Kai-shek. The latter, however, found his work in the south almost hopeless for many reasons. Intrigue and corruption surrounded the too confiding Sun, who had difficulty in asserting his leadership ; one of Sun's most trusted military chiefs, Chen Chiung-ming, was finally exposed as a downright traitor. The training of the troops was very defective and their discipline was slack. Chiang soon realized that no great blow could be struck for the unification of China under a powerful government until a new army organization had been built up from the foundation.

Thus, in the year 1924, the Whampoa Military Academy came into being with Chiang at its head. In the previous year Chiang had visited Russia for purposes of study. A number of Russian instructors were attached to the new academy, and the course of study was essentially the same as that laid down by Trotsky for the training of officers in the Russian Red Army. In one year nearly a thousand cadets were trained here, and these afterwards formed the nucleus of the force with which Chiang won his now famous campaigns. To have been trained under Chiang in the Whampoa Academy is looked upon in the Chinese Army as a distinction of much the same sort as is conferred in the United States by having had an ancestor on board the *Mayflower*.

Chiang devoted all his time and all his strength to the school. He lived there, got up and went to bed at the same hours as the cadets. He started work at five o'clock. After putting his bedroom in order he made a round of inspection. If anyone was late he was severely reprimanded. He reminded the delinquent that these were revolutionary

times and that they all had important duties to perform. In spite of the strict discipline—or perhaps rather because of it—he became very popular among the cadets. The young men felt that this was a new type of military training, that it was an honour to take part in it and that they were being fitted to co-operate in the accomplishment of hard and onerous tasks.

Chiang's work at this time was obstructed by a thousand difficulties. Political complications threatened him, both from the extreme Left of his own party and from the Conservatives, who for egoistical reasons sought to undermine his activities. Financial resources were scanty and equipment far from adequate.

But without allowing any complications to disturb him the young general worked incessantly for the realization of Sun Yat-sen's plan of a great campaign against North China in order to unify the country under the republican Kuomintang régime. At last, in June 1926, after two years of training and organization, he was ready to begin the northward march at the head of one hundred thousand men. Relying on the superior training and stricter discipline of his troops he advanced without hesitation to wrest power from the hands of the northern generals, whose forces many times outnumbered his own.

What sort of opponents were those he was now challenging? In the far north-east, in Manchuria, he had Chang Tso-lin, originally a robber general, whose ability had made him absolute ruler of the Manchurian provinces. His troops were well equipped but not very effective.

In north-western China, the provinces of Kansu and Shensi, there was Feng Yü-hsiang, a violent and unreliable man, swinging between Christianity and Bolshevism, but a resolute soldier with well-disciplined troops.

The province of Shansi had been governed ever since the revolution of 1911-12 by Yen Hsi-shan, who thanks to his excellent civil administration had won the title of "the model governor". As a soldier comparatively unimportant.

Shantung was ruled by Chang Chung-chang, one of the most gruesome and brutal rascals this century's Chinese history has to show.

The five rich provinces around the lower Yangtze-kiang were under the sway of Sun Chuan-fang, with his residence in Nanking. An enlightened and progressive man with considerable military resources.

Foremost among Chiang's prospective opponents, both in geographical situation and military prestige, was Wu Pei-fu in the Wu-Han towns, that huge congeries Hankow-Hanyang-Wuchang at the confluence of the Han River with the Yangtze-kiang. Wu was a man of the Cœur de Lion type, recklessly brave and fearless, but useless as an administrator. As a soldier his cardinal failing, which now proved his ruin, was that he despised and underrated his opponent.

With all their weaknesses and limitations, however, these six "Super-Tuchuns" represented a mighty force, trained under the vicissitudes of ten years' civil war.

In July 1926, then, from the capital of the southern revolutionary government, Canton, which for a succession of years had brought ridicule and contempt upon itself as a hotbed of treason and political intrigue, the comparatively unknown, thirty-eight-year-old General Chiang Kai-shek set out for the north to carry out the testament which Sun Yat-sen, at his death in 1925, had placed in the hands of his young chief of staff: the unification of China in accordance with the republican principles of the Kuomintang.

Chiang's armies amounted only to a fraction of the numbers



that could be put into the field against him. His financial resources were insufficient, the technical equipment of his troops was defective, and the danger of political intrigue lurked continually in his rear.

How was it possible that so far-sighted a man as Chiang could embark on such a hazardous undertaking ?

First of all : he had no choice, if he was to extricate the Kuomintang from the morass of political intrigue into which the Canton government had sunk. Only the road to the north through a series of decisive victories over the Super-Tuchuns could save and unite China.

His strength lay in his undivided command ; he alone stood at the head of his hundred thousand men, among whom he had distributed the young officer graduates from the Whampoa Academy, who had all received their training under his eyes and were ready to die for their young leader, whom they loved, admired and trusted implicitly.

While the northern generals had no guiding and uniting political idea, but on the contrary were each fighting greedily for his bit of power, Chiang's commanding officers were glowing with a single great idea, worthy of the supreme sacrifice : they were to help Chiang to execute Dr. Sun's testament, to unite the disrupted and suffering country and lay the foundations of a new order.

Chiang, who in everything he did showed an appreciation of the importance of details, carefully planned the supply and transport service of his armies. I remember very well the first signs that something new and remarkable was happening down in the south. A newspaper told us how Chiang had organized a new system of army transport. In previous years the northern generals in their wars had assembled some thousands of coolies, who were carried along with the army, without pay, were ill fed and regarded as

perishable goods, of which at the most a small remnant returned to their homes. Chiang established instead a system of stages. No group of porters was to be employed more than a hundred *li* (thirty miles) from its home, but along this stage they marched continually backwards and forwards like a travelling belt, with fresh loads, sufficiently fed and decently paid.

From his Russian instructors, of whom more in a subsequent chapter, Chiang had learnt the power of propaganda. This was the second piece of news from the south. We read of the troops of propaganda agents in civilian clothes who were spread out like a screen in front of the armies, preaching that the Kuomintang was the people's own party, the liberators who were to make an end of the Super-Tuchuns and their arbitrary taxation. Chiang's troops were welcomed as deliverers from the oppressions, exactions and lawlessness of the militarists. The town of Kiukiang in Kiangsi, to take one example, voluntarily opened its gates and greeted the Kuomintang troops with the new flag, a white sun in a blue sky.

But side by side with all this idealism and good organization, which led the armies to victory, there was a terrible contingency awaiting any commander who failed in his duty. In the event of retreat the commander was shot. If the commander of an army corps stood his ground on the battlefield and was killed, while the divisional generals retired, all these were held responsible for the defeat and executed. For Chiang's armies there was but one direction : forward !

On July 27th 1926, Chiang himself joined the northward march.

The southern part of the province of Hunan was easily subdued by his subordinates, and at the beginning of August

the Kuomintang troops entered the provincial capital, Changsha. By now both Chiang and his celebrated opponent, Wu Pei-fu, had reached the front. Fierce and finally decisive fighting took place at a point of strategical importance, Tingszekiao, in southern Hupeh. At first the Kuomintang troops succeeded in occupying the place without much difficulty. But Wu ordered the execution of nine officers who were responsible for the loss. Soldiers armed with swords were posted at eight points to cut down anyone who retreated. In consequence Wu's troops fought with desperation, and on the evening of August 27th they recaptured Tingszekiao. Chiang at once gave orders that the place was to be reoccupied at all costs, and on the morning of the 28th it was again in possession of the southern troops. Wu called up his reserves, and after heavy losses on both sides he again occupied Tingszekiao. Now Chiang in his turn threw the southern armies' general reserve into the firing-line; and after a whole day's fighting Tingszekiao remained finally in his hands.

In 1920, when Wu was a general of division under Tsao Kun, he won his first laurels by a victory over the Kuangsi troops at Tingszekiao, where now, six years later, he met his Waterloo. The foremost Chinese general of modern times before Chiang Kai-shek never recovered from this blow. Chiang had bought his victory at a cost of terrible losses, but after this battle he and his northern campaign became a stern threat to the Super-Tuchuns of North China. After much hard fighting, especially round the walls of Wuchang, the province of Hupeh was also occupied by the southern armies at the close of September.

It was now urgently necessary for Chiang to lose no time in turning against the mighty Sun Chuan-fang, who controlled five provinces (Kiangsi, Fukien, Chekiang, Anhui

and Kiangsu) and had at his disposal the best-equipped troops.

As early as September 19th one of Chiang's generals occupied Nanchang, the capital of Kiangsi. But here again reinforcements were brought up on both sides, and fighting proceeded continuously until November 8th before the town was definitely in Chiang's hands.

On December 2nd one of Chiang's subordinate commanders entered Foochow, the capital of Fukien, and on February 19th 1927 Hangchow, the capital of Chekiang, was occupied. Some of Sun's subordinates now went over to Chiang, and the commander-in-chief of the fleet also joined him. Later Feng Yü-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan followed their example and went over to the Kuomintang.

On March 24th General Cheng Chien with the seventh Canton army corps occupied Nanking. He was accompanied by political agents who were infected by Communist doctrines and sought to compromise Chiang in the eyes of foreigners. Some foreigners were killed in Nanking and a great number of their houses were plundered. Probably a great massacre of foreigners would have occurred, if the guns of the foreign warships anchored in the Yangtze off the city had not set up a barrage round the hill on which their nationals were gathered.

Chiang was on board a steamer on his way down the river when this happened. He realized at once the extent of the danger he incurred through this reversal of his own extremely considerate policy towards foreigners. Without pausing at Nanking he went on direct to Shanghai, assumed command there and gave such assurances regarding the safety of the foreign settlements that he regained at one stroke the confidence of the Powers. After this there was

a combing out of the instigators of the Communist excesses in Nanking, and in April the Kuomintang government was constituted in that city, "The Southern Capital".

Before the month was ended Chiang occupied Pukow, the ferry station opposite Nanking, and continued his victorious progress northward. On May 21st Pengpu fell and on June 2nd Hsuchow, the town which has now become so famous in the war with Japan.

Chang Tso-lin, the war lord of Manchuria, was now seriously alarmed and succeeded in getting Japan to send a force to Tsinan, the capital of Shantung and at the same time the southern bridge-head on the Yellow River. This Japanese intervention directly barred the way to Chiang's continued advance northward. And now he had other difficulties in his rear. A rival government to that of Nanking and one with strong Communist tendencies was established at Hankow and was intriguing against Chiang.

When he saw that in the existing difficulties a further advance to the north was unthinkable, he made on August 12th one of those lightning moves with which time after time he has disarmed his opponents. He resigned the command and retired to a Buddhist temple at Fenghua, near his ancestral home.

In the revolutionary camp confusion grew worse and worse. No one was in a position to check the return of the northern troops to the Yangtzekiang. At the beginning of December Chiang was invited to resume command. On April 7th 1928 he again set out for the north. Chang Tso-lin fled to his Manchurian capital, Mukden, and on July 5th Peking, the northern capital, was occupied by Chiang's Kuomintang troops without resistance.

A brilliant, an almost incredible campaign, extending

from the south coast of China nearly to the Mongolian frontier and covering fully two years, had been successfully brought to an end. The foundation was laid for the unification of China under a capable government.

## CHAPTER SIX

### CHIANG FIGHTS FOR THE UNITY OF THE COUNTRY

**E**VER since Chiang Kai-shek joined the ranks of the revolutionaries in 1911 his life has been one sad pilgrimage amid countless conflicts and strenuous endeavours to fashion the vast country into a healthy and vigorous State.

The previous chapter, which describes the great northern campaign, gives some echoes of the almost continuous hammer-strokes by which the warrior Chiang forges the many conflicting wills into a rudimentary unity.

But no graphic method can be found of giving the foreign reader an idea of the jealousy, the avarice and the perfidy which time after time, year after year, caused political intrigues, petty revolts and dangerous rebellions to break out like malignant tumours on a body politic that could only be brought into a healthy condition by boundless patience coupled with surgical audacity, when all else failed. In fairness it must be insisted that Chiang personally hated civil war. He tried all peaceful means of settling the conflict, but when mediation and conciliation proved ineffectual he used his divisions rapidly and relentlessly, usually with the result that the revolt soon ebbed out, after which he was amenable and willing to point the way to future co-operation. In more recent years, when his advantage over the intriguers

was becoming more palpable, he resorted more and more to preventive tactics, moving forward step by step his own reliable officials and his crack divisions, till one day his opponent found himself checkmated by Chiang, in the great game for army corps and provinces.

In sketching in the following pages the main outlines of the political intrigues and armed revolts after the conclusion of the northern campaign I can give no more than a few examples of the endless difficulties through which Chiang found his way. The names of his opponents are so numerous and to the foreigner they all sound so perplexingly alike, that my account must take an extremely simplified form.

In the spring of 1928, when the armies of the Kuomintang, Chiang's from the south, Yen Hsi-shan's from the west and Feng Yü-hsiang's from the south-west, were converging on Peking, that city was occupied by the last opponent of the Kuomintang alliance, the redoubtable ruler of Manchuria, Chang Tso-lin. When Chang saw that his position in Peking was threatened, he withdrew to his own dominions, but as his train entered the capital, Mukden, on June 4th a mine exploded under it and killed him. The author of the outrage was never revealed.

Chang was succeeded as ruler over the rich Manchurian provinces by his eldest son, Chang Hsueh-liang, "the Young Marshal". Opinions about this man have been much divided, and in many quarters he has been branded as a traitor to Chiang and to the republic. As we shall see in the sequel, this judgment seems to be altogether too harsh. He is rather to be regarded as a weak and self-indulgent person, who nevertheless lent Chiang a helping hand in a critical situation.

In spite of strong pressure from the Japanese, who of course were deeply interested in Manchuria and North



China, the young Chang declared his willingness to subordinate himself to the Nanking government, and on December 29th 1928 the Kuomintang flag was hoisted in Mukden.

The successful culmination of the northern campaign and Chang Hsueh-liang's adherence to Nanking meant a nominal unification of China. But in reality the work was far from complete. The great generals, the war lords aiming at power and money who had hitherto ruled supreme over their respective groups of provinces, understood only too well that Chiang's efforts at unification threatened their separatist tendencies, and in several quarters preparations were made to resist Chiang and the Nanking government. The Wuhan towns were now occupied by powerful generals from the province of Kuangsi, foremost among them Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi, who were growing more and more aggressive in their opposition to Chiang. After fruitless efforts to arrive at a peaceful understanding Chiang determined at the end of March 1929 to crush their resistance. He acted with his customary rapidity. On April 1st his offensive was launched. Only four days later the Wuhan troops were in full retreat, and on April 5th Chiang occupied Hankow. The revolt, which spread as far as to the extreme south, had for a moment threatened Canton. But here too all danger was over by the end of May. And a month later the very seat of the insurrection, the capital of Kuangsi, was occupied. Chiang's prestige was greater than ever before, the unity of the country seemed achieved, as twenty-two provinces were paying taxes to the central government.

But just because the power of the refractory satraps had been shaken to its foundation, one outbreak now followed closely on another.

Already in May, that is before the Kuangsi revolt was fully liquidated, Chiang had difficulties with his ally in the

northern campaign, Feng Yü-hsiang. The latter had been invited to Nanking as War Minister, but his ambitious and querulous nature could never adapt itself to the refined life of the capital. He criticized everyone, the army commissariat, the Nanking municipal administration and the Ministry of Finance. When invited as the guest of honour to a great banquet he gave a regular lecture on the importance of the simple life. Finally he returned to his armies up in the north-west. On May 16th he got his generals to appoint him "Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Armies charged with the saving of the country". At the same time one of his subordinate commanders blew up a number of strategical bridges on the main railway lines with the object of checking the advance of the Nanking troops.

Chiang, unwilling as ever to start a fresh civil war, tried to open negotiations with Feng, and thus ensued a prodigious telegraphic duel, in which Chiang appeared as the old-fashioned man of letters, appealing to all the wise men of history in urging discretion and patriotism, while Feng, the laconic soldier, replied with brief but venomous salvoes. But by the middle of October it became clear to Chiang that nothing was of any use but an appeal to arms. The war was fiercely fought but of short duration. In December Feng's armies, which had been forced to abandon arms, ammunition and large sums of silver in their hasty retreat, were driven back into the relatively poor provinces of the north-west.

During the war of words which preceded hostilities the Nanking government had been accused by the rebels of corruption and incapacity. Now that Chiang was left as the undisputed victor he made a remarkable admission. He declared that "no government can last long without

the confidence of the people, and no people is willing to tolerate indefinitely a corrupt and incapable government". He knew that much of the criticism was only too well founded, and this was a warning to the incompetent mandarins in his own ranks.

Fresh revolts broke out like sores on a plague-stricken body. Chang Fa-kuei with his "Ironsides" marched south against Canton in September 1929, but was completely vanquished at the beginning of 1930. Shih Yu-san, the governor of Anhwei, occupied Pukow, the bridge-head opposite Nanking, but this revolt was easily suppressed. Tang Sheng-chi in western Honan attempted a rising, but after severe fighting his troops were disarmed.

In February 1930 perhaps the most dangerous of all rebellions against the Nanking government was started by the sudden demand of Yen Hsi-shan that Chiang should resign all his offices. Yen was soon joined by the old conspirator, Feng Yü-hsiang. Minor rebellious movements raised their heads in many parts of the south. With remarkable nonchalance Chiang declared in the midst of all this unrest that it promised well for the cause of the republic that all the opposition parties had come out into the open at one time, so that it would now be possible "to crush them all at a single blow".

The three Kuangsi leaders, Li Tsung-jen, Pai Chung-hsi and Chang Fa-kuei, who had previously given Chiang so much trouble, appeared again in open conflict. Wang Ching-wei, the radical Kuomintang leader, formed a kind of opposition government in Peking.

The revolt in the south was suppressed with comparative ease, but in July the combined armies of Feng and Yen came in contact with Chiang's divisions. Severe and protracted fighting left the issue for a long time undecided.

But in the middle of August Chiang succeeded in throwing back Yen's troops, which had occupied Tsinan, the capital of Shantung, in the direction of the Yellow River with such violence that the retreat was turned into a complete debacle. But strong Feng-Yen forces still opposed Chiang in Hopei, and the issue of the mighty trial of strength depended on the attitude adopted by Chang Hsueh-liang of Mukden. Emissaries from Yen, Feng and Wang Ching-wei besieged him with supplications to come over to their camp, and the Japanese, who in the course of years had been growing more and more hostile to Chiang, threatened Chang with destruction if he threw in his lot with Nanking. But nevertheless the Young Marshal stood firm in his adherence to Chiang. When in a telegram of September 18th 1930 he openly declared himself on the side of Nanking and sent troops to make an end of the war, the leaders of the northern groups realized that Chiang had once more gained a great advantage, and the northern generals began the customary round of submission.

Six months of the most sanguinary war that had been fought in China since the Taiping rebellion of the 1860's had come to an end. The northern armies had lost one hundred and fifty thousand men and Chiang ninety thousand. Great tracts of the country were terribly devastated. But the work of unification had again been consolidated.

With the year 1931 begins the great Japanese aggression against China, the first stage of which was the occupation of Manchuria, September to December 1931. In all probability the Chinese would have been able to act with greater decision if just at the most critical period Chiang had not been entirely taken up with political complications with Canton. The situation at last became so confused that Chiang and with him a large proportion of the government

resigned office on December 15th 1931. But it was not long before the opposition found itself obliged to beg him to return.

In the autumn of 1933 a revolt broke out in Fukien, which, however, was quickly crushed.

In the spring of 1936 the provinces of Kuangtung and Kuangsi declared themselves independent of Nanking, but this revolt was brought to an end in July, when the Kuangtung air force flew over to Chiang's flying base at Nanchang in Kiangsi and placed itself at the disposal of Nanking.

For ten anxious years, amid constant fighting, now with the Super-Tuchuns, the great provincial governors, now with the Red armies, Chiang had welded the country into something resembling a unified state. It was to be shown, however, in the great events before and during the war with Japan, how far this cohesion yet came short of accomplishment.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### RECONSTRUCTION

A GOOD criterion of a government's soundness and efficiency is its capacity for setting up and maintaining a well-balanced system of taxation and for distributing its revenues in a methodical way, so that all the functions of the national life may be duly provided for. Measured by this standard the administrations which succeeded one another in Peking from the establishment of the republic in 1912 to the occupation of the northern capital by the Kuomintang troops in 1928, must be regarded as showing a progressive and finally catastrophic degeneration.

Yuan Shih-kai still had the provincial finances more or less in his hands, besides being able to raise considerable loans, which, however, tied down the country more and more under foreign financial control. But when "the mandarin who wanted to be emperor" fell through his own foolish ambitions in the summer of 1916, no statesman was found strong enough to hold the provinces in submission to the national capital. Thus began around Yuan's bier the disastrous misgovernment of the "war lords", which reduced the once-mighty empire to extreme impotence. In 1918 there were only three provinces which still kept up a semblance of liability to the State treasury. From 1921 on practically no provincial taxes reached Peking, and by 1926 the Peking government had *de facto* ceased to

exist. Its authority scarcely extended beyond the walls of the capital.

The Kuomintang government, which was formed at Canton by Sun Yat-sen in 1925 in opposition to the Peking government, made certain not altogether unsuccessful attempts to bring order into the financial chaos, but it was not until the Kuomintang government was removed to Nanking in 1927 that the first steps towards national reconstruction were taken. But even this administration led an uncertain existence during its first years on account of the political cabals and military revolts which succeeded one another in rapid succession. Actually it is only after the suppression with the support of Chang Hsueh-liang at the critical moment, of the great rebellious coalition of 1930 that we can reckon with a fully consolidated national government in Nanking.

As then the period of really effective reconstruction only includes the six years preceding the outbreak of war in the summer of 1937, and as these years were also occupied by the desperate struggle against the Communists and by other military risings, one is filled with amazement and admiration on realizing the vast extent of the work that was carried out in this short time. In order fully to understand the difficulties in which the Nanking government accomplished its work of reconstruction we must take into account how, ever since the occupation of Manchuria in 1931, Japanese aggression step by step deprived Nanking of important sources of revenue. Finally, in 1934-6 an entirely lawless state of armed smuggling on a grand scale was brought about under the protection of Japanese troops in the eastern part of the province of Hopei, which cost the Chinese government a loss of revenue of no less than two million dollars a week.

The two men who took the lead in the reorganization of the national economy are Dr. H. H. Kung, Finance Minister and since the war also Prime Minister, and T. V. Soong, Director of the Bank of China and temporary holder of government appointments connected with the conduct of high finance. In the preliminary conferences which framed the new financial plan eminent foreigners took part, among them the Englishman Sir Frederick Leith-Ross. The corner-stones of the new financial edifice are :

1. Centralization of the revenues in the hands of the national government.
2. The drawing-up of an annual budget, with the object of establishing a balance between assets and expenditure.
3. The simplifying of the fiscal system by the abolition of a number of arbitrary methods of taxation. The counteracting of corruption and "squeeze".
4. Reorganization of the economy of the provinces and districts (Hsien).
5. The strengthening of national credit through the funding of government loans.
6. Organization and simplification of the banking and monetary system.

To anyone who, like the author only fifteen years ago on his journeys in the interior, has had to handle a new monetary unit in almost every city of any size, the present strictly enforced currency of the Chinese silver dollar over the whole country comes as a pleasant surprise. Chinese government bonds have been maintained at a surprisingly high level, and even now during the war the Finance Ministry does its utmost to meet its loan obligations.

Through the compliance of the Great Powers, including at that time Japan, China was enabled in February 1929



to introduce Customs autonomy with greatly increased import duties. The Customs dues, which were Nanking's chief source of revenue, rose from 245 millions in 1929 to 316 millions in 1935.

The salt tax, which was thoroughly reorganized, increased from 85 millions in 1929 to 184 millions in 1935. Even more pronounced was the increase within the group known as "consolidated taxes", with a rise from 39 millions in 1929 to 116 millions in 1935. On the outbreak of war China possessed a gold reserve abroad of between six and seven hundred million dollars, with which the purchase of arms and ammunition was financed.

Foremost among the items of expenditure we have the votes for defence. In drawing up his armaments programme Chiang Kai-shek realized that it would never be possible for China to rival a great maritime Power like Japan on the sea. The quite insignificant and out-of-date fleet was therefore obliged to be content with a modest vote for maintenance. In spite of this, however, it has played a not unimportant part during the war by constructing booms and laying mines in various sections of the Yangtze river, which defensive measures have had their share in delaying the Japanese advance on Nanking and afterwards on Hankow.

We have already related in the chapter on the northern campaign how Chiang while in Canton built up his first armies round a solid nucleus composed of the cadets from the Whampoa Military Academy. When firmly seated in the saddle at Nanking he set about training crack divisions on a large scale and in this he had the collaboration of a great number of German officers, several of whose names were famous in the World War. When I was in Nanking in April 1937 it was said that the German military com-

mission was gradually being dissolved, and at the outbreak of war perhaps not more than about sixty men remained in the service of China. These German officers were then under the command of General von Falkenhausen, who with his compatriots rendered very great services to China during the present war. An interesting detail concerns the personal intercourse between Chiang and Falkenhausen. The former speaks no foreign language except Japanese, but as Falkenhausen was for many years German military attaché at Tokyo and learned the Japanese language, the Chinese Commander-in-Chief and his German adviser conferred together in the language of the enemy. When the German officers were recalled in June 1938 they took with them many proofs of Chinese gratitude. One day, when the story of the German military commission comes to be written, we may expect not merely an expert contribution to the history of the present war, but detailed information about the most remarkable and significant foreign commission that has ever worked in the service of the Chinese Government.

In the chapter "Time flies quickly over China" the reader was given not only an account of Chinese air traffic, which at the outbreak of war was more developed than civil flying in Japan, but also some details of the Chinese air arm, which has grown up under Italian and American instructors.

That the military power of China, in spite of its numerical superiority, has not been able to offer a fully effective resistance to the Japanese is doubtless due to two main weaknesses. The Chinese armies which took the field at the beginning of the war certainly possessed no mean fighting experience according to the standards of the last twenty years' civil wars. But the Japanese army with its victorious

record of nearly fifty years and its complete familiarity with the methods of modern warfare was, nevertheless, much more than a match for the young Chinese defensive organization. Unquestionably it was an even more precarious factor that China possesses hardly any war industry corresponding to the gigantic armies which are now conjured into being. The purchase of arms and munitions from abroad has not always given entirely satisfactory practical results, and in spite of all praiseworthy efforts the mechanical superiority of the Japanese army is still overwhelming.

If we wish to obtain a statistical measure of the extent of China's material renaissance under the Kuomintang government, we shall do best to study the development of the system of communications. As indicated above, the progress of civil aviation has been described in another chapter.

With regard to railway construction the completion of the line between Canton and Hankow must first be mentioned. The construction of this line was begun as early as 1898, but on account of the uncertainty of the political situation and the lack of funds only the northern and southern sections of the line were completed : from Hankow (Wuchang) to Chuchow, a distance of 259 miles, and from Canton to Shaokuan, 138 miles. The middle section, however, from Chuchow to Shaokuan, 283 miles, has only been completed quite recently, in many ways an interesting and significant undertaking.

Interest attaches in the first place to the financing of the undertaking. During the 1920's the foreign Powers found it inopportune to retain their shares of the unreasonably heavy indemnity imposed on China for damage to foreign property during the Boxer rebellion of 1900. The United States returned their share to be used in the maintenance

of the Tsing Hua University, an institution on American lines outside Peking, and for other cultural purposes. Between the British and Chinese governments an agreement was concluded in 1930 providing that the British share of the indemnity should be used for technical reconstruction and for the development of higher education. Two-thirds of the available funds were set aside for the completion of the Canton-Hankow line with material purchased in Great Britain.

As the central section of the line had to cross the Tayu mountains, which form the natural border between the provinces of Kuangtung and Hunan and at the same time the watershed between the Yangtzekiang and the Pearl River, the work here was very difficult. But the Chinese government, aware of the political necessity of completing this important main line with all possible speed, pressed on the work, which in its final stage proceeded day and night, with the result that through traffic could be started in May 1936.

That China was able with appreciable success to defend herself in the war which was forced upon the country one year after the completion of the Canton-Hankow railway, depends in part on the possession of this route for the vast quantities of war material which were imported through Hong Kong and conveyed thence to Canton over the Kowloon-Canton line. The construction of the section from Chuchow to Shaokuan, which completed the Canton-Hankow railway, is an example of the co-operation of two States to their mutual advantage. China got this vitally important line ready at the eleventh hour thanks to her understanding with the British Empire, while England on her side immensely widened the commercial hinterland of the British port of Hong Kong. At the same time the

collaboration on this line of railway has greatly contributed to the popularity which England at present enjoys in China.

It would be tempting to describe the construction of other railway lines, such as the western section of the Lunghai railway, the Soochow-Kashing line, and others, but what I have mentioned gives an idea of the expansion that took place in this sphere up to the outbreak of war.

In no other department has the work of new construction been more active than in that of motor roads. Apart from the striking force of Nanking's crack divisions nothing has contributed more powerfully to the consolidation of the country, which ten years ago was in a state of utter disintegration, than the improvement of means of communication. Strategical railways could not be built with sufficient rapidity to an extent that would cover the country's military needs. It was therefore unquestionably a wise decision on the part of the central government to concentrate its efforts on the provision within a short time of an extensive network of well-chosen motor roads. The result is imposing. The length of completed motor roads exceeds sixty thousand miles in a network covering nearly the whole of China proper. I have myself traversed considerable sections of this vast system in its most distant section, on the way to Tibet. The topographical difficulties, which in places are enormous, have been overcome with boldness and skill. That the road-surface falls short of European requirements is scarcely to be wondered at; the roads answer their local purpose. The only valid criticism one can make is that a road, once well constructed, is often left without sufficient maintenance.

As part of the material progress achieved under the Kuomintang government we must also reckon the building of the new capital at Nanking. I have told in another

connection how in 1920 I found Nanking an empty shell, the old embattled city walls quite well preserved, and within them wide stretches of cornfields with somewhat ramshackle settlements in a couple of corners. What I saw in 1936-7 was an intensive and purposeful effort to build a new modern capital worthy of the name. The streets swarmed with lorries and other commercial vehicles. Whole quarters were transformed in a few months, and straight through the city, from one gate to the other, the main street, the Chungshan Road, was being driven. The whole aspect of the city could perhaps hardly be called mature and thoroughly thought out. The old and the new stood side by side, and this perpetual alternation of functional and tradition-laden Chinese style, of well-proportioned brick buildings and heavy, lifeless boxes of concrete, gave the city a look of hesitation and restlessness. The roadway of the monumental Chungshan artery might also have been a good deal better. But all these minor faults could by no means vitiate the fact that a very imposing work had here been carried out in record time for the housing of the administrative machinery of a mighty empire on the one hand, and on the other for providing hygienic living conditions for the population of a great city. When the Kuomintang government was constituted here in 1927, there was absolutely nothing to begin with. Everything, streets and government buildings, water, drainage and lighting had to be created from the very foundation.

If we now took a drive in the environs of the city our eyes were met by an almost interminable succession of military establishments. As far even as the hot springs of Tangshan the military was the dominating element.

Nanking was at that time a city of hard work. The old mandarin type was extinct. In the simple official uniform

prescribed by Sun Yat-sen the gentlemen of the government departments arrived early at their offices. The majority of them were young men and the rate of work was regular. But in the evening they danced at the International Club with their charming little ladies. One day I had the pleasure of speaking at a Rotary lunch, and I was struck by the way in which Chinese and foreigners mixed. It was very different from the spring of 1927, when the foreigners ran for their lives across the fields to escape the shots of the plundering Cantonese soldiers. But in the genial international intercourse at Nanking in the spring of 1937 one seldom saw a Japanese. Tension had already become dangerously high. The gentlemen from the eastern islands knew they were not popular. They were biding their time.

One of the great events was an exhibition of Chinese art, modern as well as antique. The section for contemporary art, both in Chinese and in Western style, was very comprehensive and included a number of really good things. But it spoke rather of technical ability than of originality and inspiration. Here the past still predominated. From the imperial collections, formerly preserved in Peking, whole series of Ming and Sung paintings, which had never before been accessible to the public, were exhibited. Not only the archæologist, however, but with him the general public, foreigners and Chinese alike, were agreed that the *clou* of the exhibition was the Academia Sinica's collection of objects in bronze and marble from the royal tombs at Anyang, three thousand years old, which mark the beginning of historical China. Detailed plans of the vast and complicated necropolis illustrated these excavations, which in historical importance are to be placed beside the great finds in Egypt and Mesopotamia. Most extraordinary among

these venerable objects were perhaps the marble sculptures, which in a mysterious way remind one of carvings from the ancient cultures of Central and South America.

The archæologists of the Academia Sinica were also kind enough to show me their prehistoric collections. I was particularly impressed by their immense quantities of what is known as the black pottery, a culture-group succeeding the Yang Shao period, discovered by these investigators.

The Academia Sinica was much more than a scientific academy in the Western sense. Besides the institute for philology and history, which was responsible for this epoch-making archæological research, there was in Nanking an astronomical and a meteorological observatory, and—in addition to the very important State Geological Survey—an institute for theoretical geological research. Furthermore the Academia Sinica had its own departments for chemical and physical research, situated in Shanghai.

I now find myself slipping into the subjects which are of special interest to myself, and it might be tempting to describe many more of the scientific institutions which have grown up during the last ten years in other parts of the country, but I beg to refer the interested reader to a volume published in 1936 by W. Y. Chyne, a member of the Chinese National Committee on Intellectual Co-operation in Shanghai. This *Handbook of Cultural Institutions in China* gives in a concise form a survey of all the scientific societies and institutes, as well as all universities and other establishments for higher education, which were in operation in the year before the outbreak of war.

In some of the public squares of Nanking strange monuments were to be seen, gigantic models of aerial bombs, intended to impress people with the horrors of aerial warfare and to stimulate their interest in the national collection



for the purchase of a hundred warplanes to be presented to Chiang Kai-shek on his fiftieth birthday as a gift from the nation.

Nanking lay smiling in spring-like calm when I passed through it for the last time in the middle of May. Two months later, and the war was in its initial stage. It is outrageous that this unexampled disaster should fall upon an ancient civilized nation, just as a well-constructed modern Chinese political organism was rising from the ashes of the totally burnt-out old China. If the Japanese had struck ten years earlier, when not only China's Western friends but with them many of that country's best sons were in despair over the prevailing political anarchy, there would have been some justice in the claim of reducing the chaos to order. But we see that history's cruel chain of causality led to a crisis just at this moment. Under a wise and strong leader China was about to become a modern Great Power. If the attack was to be attempted, it was high time to strike before the victim had grown so strong that the projected military promenade might be turned into a defeat.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

### THE NEW LIFE MOVEMENT

NANKING, *April* 1937.

**I**N former days old age was a distinction in China. When one had got so far as to be reckoned a Lao Yeh, an honoured veteran, one might float on the surface merely on the strength of one's remaining grey hairs. And this applied not only to men but perhaps even more to women. When a lady had attained to the rank of mother-in-law she had within her not particularly gentle grasp a little creature whom she could bully at pleasure. The young wife had to stand up and wait while mother-in-law dined. Not till that was done might she sit down to what was left. All the children of the younger secondary wives were claimed as her own by wife number one. And the old gentleman might be looked upon as superior to all criticism.

Naturally this led to a greybeards' rule, more or less. Capable young men had to bide their time, till their own sap began to dry up. And the weaker among them tried to look old. It was distinguished to walk with a stoop, to bury one's hands in one's long sleeves when it was a trifle cold, to hold a handkerchief to one's mouth as soon as a little Peking dust blew about.

Of course the best among the younger generation rebelled. My friend V. K. Ting, who was an unusually outspoken person, was sitting once at a dinner, more than ten years

ago, in the company of nothing but old gentlemen, former ministers and provincial governors. One of these notabilities complained that modern young men did not show that respect for age which was prescribed by Confucius. General approval and lamentations over the wickedness of the new age.

Then Ting burst out with an utterance which afterwards became historic, while at the same time it considerably increased the number of his enemies: "But, gentlemen, why should the young respect you? You take bribes and embezzle government funds, you smoke opium and visit brothels. Now and again you add another little item to your harem. Why should the young respect you?"

So that was that. Ting is unfortunately dead, but out of the ashes of the past a new China has risen into the light of day.

During the ten years of civil war following the decease of Yuan Shih-kai many a man, not only among the Chinese but also among China's foreign friends, wondered how long that hopeless anarchy would last. Indeed there were faint-hearted souls who thought the outlook altogether desperate. But to-day, when we can look back on the dark years in an, admittedly short, historical perspective, even that time acquires a meaning. The revolution of 1911 swept away the barbarian dynasty which for two hundred and sixty-eight years had ruled the country, at first in splendour and greatness, afterwards in headlong decline. But the old mandarin state survived. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who with all his limitations was in any case a genuine revolutionary, was spirited away by the great mandarin Yuan Shih-kai, and when the latter had cut his own throat with his megalomania of a new Yuan dynasty, a ten years' pandemonium set in, during which a great number of petty mandarins fought

PLATE IV



*The first Mass Wedding in Shanghai, 1935. A young couple could be married for 23 shillings, wedding-dinner included*

[Facing p. 82



each other, while the State treasury grew emptier, the railway material more dangerously worn out, the people more bewildered and the judicious more despairing day by day. The capable and well-informed young men who returned from their studies in Europe or America were scarcely welcomed at home, for the ruling men of the old school, though no doubt they believed in automobiles and machine-guns, had far less faith in ideal statesmanship, reforms and democracy, the last-named being specially suspect in their eyes.

And then in 1927, when it was least expected and from the least appreciated quarter, came the great turn of the tide.

Nothing, I suppose, can be more surprising and strange to us short-sighted and ignorant human beings than the course of history. A month ago Nanking was able to perpetrate an extremely peculiar and by no means attractive ten years' jubilee. In March 1927 the Communist troops from Canton reached Nanking, and the foreigners there had some anxious days. The foreign gunboats brought their guns into action to protect the retreat of the missionaries and consular staffs to Hsiakuan, and for a long time relations between Chinese and foreigners were very strained.

How is it possible that in these ten years the situation has so completely changed, that the relations in Nanking between Chinese and foreigners are now marked by an equality and a mutual understanding which has probably never before existed in China? The main factor is unquestionably the resolute campaign under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek for putting an end to Communism in China. It was on the crest of a Communist wave that Chiang was carried to Nanking, but it was not so very long before this

man's remarkable common sense taught him the necessity of settling accounts once for all with a movement which threatened to reduce the country, already sorely tried, to a condition of helpless chaos. During the first years of the new Nanking government many dangers threatened: Communism in the south and west, war lords of the detestable old type in the north, and then of course the ever-present danger of overmastering influence from the great Far Eastern Power, which is now known here as "our mighty neighbour".

The occupation of Manchuria in 1931 acted as a powerful cathartic on the dormant national feeling of the Chinese, and when in the following spring the Nineteenth Army put up a fine resistance to the Japanese at Shanghai the Chinese giant sat up wide awake and asked: "Is this possible, can we really show an instance of effective defence?" I do not wish to imply by any means that the military bravado, in itself of no great importance, shown by the Chinese at Shanghai in 1932 roused them to the great movement of renaissance which now sways the country. I think the true state of the case is rather that the defence of Chapei under a resolute and fearless general was one of the earliest and most conspicuous manifestations of the awakening national feeling. In general I have the idea that we ought to avoid measuring the political transformation of China by European standards. Chiang Kai-shek is certainly no Mussolini or Hitler, nor are the Chinese Europeans. Events occur here in a broader rhythm through a stirring of the national soul. Chiang is following the noblest traditions of his people in trying to avoid the use of force in his great work of unifying the recently conflicting provinces, while at the same time continually strengthening his armies. His tactics, which he adopted with complete success both in Szechuan and in

Kuangtung, are much the same as those of a skilful chess-player. He moves his pieces—divisions, generals and officials on whom he can rely—and then one fine day his contentious opponents in that particular part of the country discover that it will pay them best to accept Nanking's conditions.

During the five weeks I spent in Nanking I had excellent opportunities of studying the work of reorganization. I lectured in both universities, in the Women's College, in the Central Political Institute and in the Department of Industry ; also of course in the lecture-hall of the Geological Survey. I can say for certain that I learned far more myself during this course of lectures than was the case with my young audiences. What I found most interesting was the Central Political Institute, both for its own sake and more especially on account of the electrical vivacity of Liu Chentung, the director of this curious institution.

This man of forty has a very diversified training behind him. Apart from what he learned at home as a very young man, he spent seven years making himself familiar with social conditions in the United States, even getting employed as a labourer by American farmers. After that he devoted a year to a rambling tour through Europe, whose countries and capitals he got to know well, with the exception of Russia and Scandinavia.

Then after a period of activity in the Sun Yat-sen University at Canton he was appointed to the directorship of this Political Institute at Nanking, which by that time had already been well organized by the great Dr. Loo, now Rector of the Central University at Nanking. But under Liu's sway the institution has expanded to its present compass and diversity.

The object of the Central Political Institute is to train



young men for an official career. Considering the immense extent of the country it is obvious that this establishment by itself is insufficient for the task ; but the intention is to train here an *élite* of young officials to serve as examples of the standard the new government demands of its servants.

With a board of governors whose president is Chiang Kai-shek himself, the aims of the institute are very multifarious. Within the college proper the work is divided into the following seven departments : civil administration, diplomacy, jurisprudence, finance, economics, education and journalism.

Obviously this institution has been given special instructions to exercise its influence among the non-Chinese frontier peoples, partly through a Mongol-Tibetan school with three hundred pupils, and partly through affiliated schools in four towns on the borders of Mongolia and Tibet. The number of students is three thousand, with a teaching staff of eighty permanent and a hundred temporary instructors. Attached to the college is a research institute, possessing a staff of twenty-five research-workers in social and political subjects.

My entry into this Political Institute, when I lectured there on the main lines of Swedish history, was quite dramatic. Together with Liu, the Director, I came walking into the lecture-hall. Even as we approached a military word of command was heard, and as we entered the hall I saw six hundred students standing strictly at attention with their officers saluting us. All these young men were in uniform and the whole thing gave one the impression of a military college. When the lecture had been got over Liu and the undersigned sat down to a little interview, in the course of which the lively Director gave me the programme of the Political Institute. What mattered most in his

opinion was to break with the old mandarin spirit with its trading in offices and its peculations. The young men who were one day to be government officials were trained to punctuality, loyalty and honesty. Military drill was highly esteemed by Liu as a means of inculcating discipline and order from the start. When I think of the officials of former days, the opium-smoking old fogys who scarcely had the use of their feet and from habit and up-bringing rarely moved in a straight line, either physically or morally, I am inclined to agree with Liu. There can be no doubt that these well-set-up lads in their Spartan uniforms, as they stood there, clear-eyed and hungry for life, were the representatives of a new and more energetic generation.

Everyone seeking admission to the Institute must be an adherent of the Kuomintang party programme. They are all guaranteed an appointment in the government service, provided they pass their examinations with credit, and they are all subject to the critical attention of the Institute in the years that follow. A justifiable observation from headquarters in Nanking may lead to the dismissal of a former pupil, in whatever part of the country he may be serving.

When Chiang Kai-shek divorced his first wife and married one of the daughters of the extremely opulent Soong family it was laid down in the marriage settlement that he was to adopt the bride's Christian religion. She is a woman of pre-eminently strong qualities, who has created a syncretism of Christianity and Confucianism, which we may conveniently call The New Life Movement. We have here to deal with the Coué treatment of a whole nation. Every day everyone must take pains to live more cleanly, more honestly and more industriously than before. At first sight all this may appear a trifle naïve to a foreign observer, but the remarkable thing is that not only the Chinese them-

selves but the initiated foreigners take the movement perfectly seriously as a driving force in the country's spiritual rebirth. On the other hand, of course, a mocker may be found here and there who asserts that these fine ladies go out now and then on a solemn occasion and sweep a little bit of a city street clean, but that afterwards the old stinking idyll is allowed to resume its sway. I know a foreigner in Nanking whose attitude is very critical and who has pointed out with biting satire that, although no doubt the everyday dance at the International Club has to conclude at twelve o'clock by decree of these exalted persons, there exists at the opposite end of the capital a purely Chinese quarter where the revelry is kept going till daybreak. It is evident all the same that the restriction is felt a good deal by the Chinese *jeunesse dorée* of the capital. In the foreign quarters of Shanghai such restrictions are unknown, and there the dancing goes on till it is time for a bit of breakfast. And it is a common saying that in Nanking they follow The New Life Movement, but in Shanghai The Gay Life Movement.

In any case Nanking gives the impression of being a cheerfully peaceful and easy-going town. A lecture at the Rotary Club afforded me an opportunity of seeing the excellent terms on which Chinese and foreigners mix together. I should like to know if there are many capitals in the world where life is so smiling as it is in Nanking just now.

One of the causes of the easy festivity which pervades the city is the general youthfulness of official Nanking. Naturally in a régime which is only ten years old a large proportion of the officials can only be in their forties. The young flying generals with whom my secretary took her morning rides looked like Swedish lieutenants.

Hand in hand with this masculine youthfulness is the agreeable appearance of the women. Ten years ago the

young Chinese women looked quite ill at ease with their straight-cut fringes and their unsuccessful attempts to find a modern style of dress. Now all this has been set to rights. One would have to look far for such charming coiffures and such toilettes, at the same time discreet and highly suggestive. Everything is concealed, up to the tightly fitting neck-band. But still, it is so perfectly obvious that this slender and roguish type of womanhood was created in a moment of sunny humour.

## CHAPTER NINE

### CHIANG AND THE REDS

**B**EFORE the revolution Dr. Sun Yat-sen had lived for a time in England, and it was the intervention of the British authorities which once saved his life, when the Imperial Chinese Embassy in London had succeeded in securing the person of the dreaded revolutionary and it was the intention to allow him discreetly to disappear. The form of government which Sun wished to introduce in his native land after the overthrow of the Empire showed a good deal of affinity with English political ideas ; a nationalistically coloured democracy, one may perhaps call it.

But the events which preceded and brought about the Boxer rising of 1900, when China was divided among the diplomats into "spheres of interest" and each one helped himself to a slice of the great cake—the Russians taking Port Arthur, the British Weihaiwei, the Germans Tsingtao and the French Kwangchowan—all these things burned themselves into the revolutionary leader's mind like a scorching humiliation. The ignominious treaty of peace, which liquidated the Boxer rising by imposing on China a fantastic indemnity, was another thorn in the flesh of the Chinese patriot. When, later on, after the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty, the Great Powers put their confidence in Yuan Shih-kai, the traitor to the ideas of the revolution,

and granted him a huge "reorganization loan", Sun's attitude towards foreign Powers stiffened into a bitter condemnation of the "imperialism" which fettered the once so proud and mighty Chinese Empire.

When therefore in 1919 the newly established Russian Soviet régime, in its endeavour to win the gratitude of a foreign Power, made a very generous gesture in offering to restore all the territory taken from China by Tsarist Russia, to hand back to China the control of the Chinese Eastern Railway in Northern Manchuria, to renounce any claim to a share in the Boxer indemnity, to abandon all extra-territorial rights for Russian subjects in China and to give up all other special privileges which were incompatible with equality between the two nations, this was indeed a fragrant incense to the great revolutionary idealist.

Adolf Joffe, who was sent from Moscow to China for these negotiations, had little success with the Peking government. He then left for Shanghai, where he met Dr. Sun in December 1922, and the two agreed upon a manifesto which was to serve as a basis for an agreement between Moscow and Canton. This manifesto postulated as the condition for further negotiations that the main object of co-operation between Russia and China was the unification and national independence of the latter country. Joffe admitted that existing conditions did not favour the introduction of the Soviet system in China, which should be left to solve its problems according to the Kuomintang's three democratic principles.

In August 1923 Dr. Sun sent his Chief of Staff, Chiang Kai-shek, on a tour of investigation in Russia and provided him with letters of recommendation to Lenin, Trotsky and Chicherin, who was at that time People's Commissar for foreign affairs. Lenin was too ill to receive any visitors,

but Chiang met a number of other Soviet leaders. After four months he was back in Canton.

Meanwhile Leo Karakhan, formerly Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, had succeeded Joffe as the Soviet's representative in China. With his fluent tongue this much-talked-of "Black Prince" was an energetic agent of the new Russian régime and his arrival at Peking created a sensation among the diplomatic corps in that capital. Everything possible was done to prevent an understanding between China and the Soviet. But the offer made by the Soviet Union of equality between the two countries and the exchange of ambassadors was too tempting even for the Peking government, and in June 1924, Karakhan became the Soviet's first ambassador in China.

Now there appears on the scene another Russian adviser, who for some years was to exercise an immense influence in China. His name was Michail Borodin, alias Berg, alias Grusenbergh. Born in Russia but brought up in America, he was for a time at the head of a commercial college in Chicago. Under the name of Borodin he became a revolutionary agitator and was sent by the Third International to Mexico as a propagandist. He was afterwards transferred to Scotland, but the Scots did not appreciate him. He was arrested and deported. His next sphere of activity was Turkey, where he rendered valuable services to Mustafa Kemal Pasha.

He now called on Dr. Sun in Canton with a letter of introduction from Karakhan, explaining that he regarded the Kuomintang's three democratic principles as the only means of salvation for China, a declaration which gave him the key to the heart of the Cantonese revolutionary leader. Borodin soon succeeded in obtaining the Chinese Communists' admission to the Kuomintang party on condition

of their taking an oath of fidelity to its fundamental rules. But from the very beginning a certain doubt existed as to how far the Reds could be relied on.

As Chiang Kai-shek was returning from Moscow to China at the close of 1923 he met in the train General Blücher, who was on his way to Vladivostok, and selected him as his Chief of Staff in the projected Whampoa Military Academy, where Blücher served under the name of Galens.

Thus we have now brought on the stage some of the leading actors in the thrilling drama which may be entitled : "Chiang Kai-shek's life and death struggle against the Communists."

The military school at Whampoa outside Canton was organized in the main on the plan which Trotsky had worked out for the training of the Soviet's Red armies. General Blücher (Galens) was chief of the Russian instructors, and Borodin as adviser to Sun had a powerful influence on the work of the Military Academy. Wang Ching-wei, one of the most prominent of the revolutionaries, who always represented the Kuomintang's extreme Left, was one of the Chinese lecturers.

Chiang soon remarked that the Communists among teachers and pupils were going their own way and forming their own organization. An attempt to unite the Reds with the faithful adherents of the Kuomintang was unsuccessful, and when Chiang raised his first army corps, of which he himself took command, he chose only tried Kuomintang men as his officers.

After the commander of the cruiser *Chungshan*, Li Chi-lung, a former Whampoa cadet and a man of Communist tendencies, had openly sided against Chiang, the latter instituted on March 20th 1926 a purge of the Reds in Canton. The houses of Borodin and his associates were occupied by



Chiang's troops, and in addition to Li eighty persons were arrested. A group of the Communists favoured resistance, but the majority voted for submission to Chiang. Several of the Russians returned home, and the rest found their term of service and their authority curtailed. The administration of the Kuomintang was reorganized and the Communists were removed from all important posts. Thus Mao Tse-tung, who was afterwards to play so important a part among the Reds, lost his position as chief of the party's propaganda bureau.

The Communists never forgot the humiliation of this defeat. When a year later, on March 24th 1927, a Kuomintang army, led by a general of Radical views, occupied Nanking, they saw their opportunity of thoroughly compromising Chiang in the eyes of the foreign Powers. Murdering and plundering of foreigners was set on foot, in the hope that responsibility would be ascribed to the Commander-in-Chief, who at the time was on a voyage down the Yangtze river in a gunboat. As soon as information of the Nanking disturbances reached him on the river he changed his plans. Without landing at Nanking he proceeded at once to Shanghai and there issued a manifesto accepting full responsibility for the events at Nanking, regarding which an inquiry had already been instituted with the object of punishing all the guilty parties. Full security for the lives and property of foreigners was promised by Chiang, and his declaration, made at an extremely critical moment, was very favourably received by foreign opinion.

The Communists had now been brought down again in the second round, but they were far from being vanquished. The Kuomintang was split into two groups, each with its own government: one moderate and loyal to the programme, under Chiang in Nanking; the other, Radical

with a strong dash of Communism, under Wang Ching-wei in Hankow. Under pressure, on the one hand from the Japanese who barred his way northward at the Yellow River, on the other from Communist conspiracies, Chiang retired for a time from the political arena ; but when he returned at the close of 1927 and within six months completed his northern campaign and occupied Peking, he was stronger than ever, and the Communists were driven not only from Peking but also from Hankow.

The Reds had now been cleared out of the leading great cities—Peking, Shanghai, Nanking and Hankow—but they soon came back in a form even more dangerous to Chiang and his Kuomintang government in Nanking. In the autumn of 1927 the Communists began to establish Soviet régimes in several of the provinces of China, particularly Kuangtung and Kiangsi. In the latter province local misgovernment had created so critical a situation among the peasants that Soviet propaganda, with its promises of remedies for all evils, spread with a rapidity which surprised Nanking.

That same autumn the first Red army was formed, with a few hundred rifles, taken from the Kuomintang troops. Red propaganda spread like a forest fire over central China, and six years later, in October 1933, when at last Chiang succeeded in driving the Communists out of Kiangsi, the Red army had reached the figure of one hundred and eighty thousand men, though it only possessed a hundred thousand rifles, no artillery worth mentioning, no air force and a very limited supply of ammunition. Only one arsenal, at Juichin in Kiangsi, was for a time at the disposal of the Reds ; otherwise they obtained all their material by defeating and disarming the Kuomintang divisions which Chiang sent to destroy them.

At the close of 1930 Chiang sent a hundred thousand men to make an end of the forty thousand ill-armed troops which then comprised the total Red force. In January 1931 this punitive expedition was cut to pieces. Only four months later Chiang sent a second punitive expedition of two hundred thousand men, under the command of Ho Ying-chin, later China's War Minister. The Reds attacked group after group of Ho's troops, and after six Red victories in two weeks the campaign was decided.

A month later Chiang himself assumed the command of three hundred thousand men, but after five Red victories in five consecutive days, he retired.

In April 1933, Chiang launched his fourth campaign against the Communist armies in Kiangsi. In the course of the first engagement two of Chiang's divisions were disarmed. After Chiang's best division, the eleventh, had been destroyed, that war was ended.

For his fifth campaign against the Reds Chiang followed a plan worked out by General von Seeckt, for a time his chief German adviser. According to this a kind of Great Wall was to be built through seven provinces around the Red region. Blockhouses and defensive towers by the thousand, within machine-gun range of one another, were drawn in a narrowing ring around the besieged Communist armies. Nine hundred thousand men were kept in the field by Chiang during this encircling campaign. Sixty thousand Red soldiers and a million civilians were killed in battle or starved to death in the course of this vast operation, which probably has no counterpart in military history.

The Red generals now realized that their only chance of escape was to cut their way out and retire to more sheltered regions. Quite unexpectedly they fell upon the blockading

forts in Kuangtung and Hunan in October 1934 and took them by storm, till the way lay open to the south and west. Then began the Red armies' long and famous march to the north-west through Kiangsi, Hunan, Kueichow, Yunnan, Szechuan and eastern Tibet into Shensi and Kansu, which became their new home.

It was a strategic retreat, or ought we rather to call it a strategic advance—against Japan ; since the Reds have for years detested the civil war and dreamt of meeting the aggressor in the north ? This migration over a distance of more than six thousand miles, including several of the highest mountains of Asia and some of its greatest rivers, is an almost inconceivable feat of strength, the more so as it was attended by constant engagements with a far superior enemy. Altogether the march lasted almost exactly a year, and of its three hundred and sixty-eight days only one hundred were rest days, often disturbed by serious fighting, and in the two hundred and sixty-eight marching days the phenomenal average rate of twenty-three and a half miles a day was reached, in great part on unmade mountain tracks ! It is true that of the ninety thousand who started from Kiangsi only twenty thousand reached their new home in Shensi ; but their spirit was unbroken, as is shown by the succeeding great events, which contributed to bring about the present crisis between China and Japan.

There is much in the rapid transformation of China now in progress which is puzzling even to me, though I have behind me nearly a quarter of a century's intimate contact with this extraordinary country. And I will confess that I have had extremely foggy and to some extent quite erroneous ideas about the Chinese Communists. Actually the credit of being the first white observer to penetrate into the great north-western Soviet region of Shensi and

Kansu belongs to the American writer Edgar Snow, who in 1936 gave us definite information of the extremely remarkable political and military work that has been carried out by these Soviet régimes in out-of-the-way parts of the Chinese Empire. Granted that Snow's brilliant book *Red Star over China* is strongly anti-Kuomintang and pro-Soviet, it is so full of first-hand observations, carefully noted down and clearly related, that a moderately well-informed reader has no difficulty in picturing to himself the course of events.

In the first place it must be borne in mind that the Kuomintang has developed more and more into an upper-class party. It is not likely that in the beginning the father of the revolution, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, foresaw any such tendency. But Sun married one of the exceptionally gifted daughters of the "Soong dynasty", one of the richest families in China, and Chiang Kai-shek chose for his consort the most energetic of these sisters, while Dr. H. H. Kung, the present Prime Minister of China, married a third of the sisters, and the brothers Soong, particularly "T. V.", have acquired a far-reaching influence in State affairs. All this has contributed to attach the Kuomintang régime firmly to the camp of the well-to-do, the educated, the industrial magnates, the great merchants and the officials.

Chiang and his party have carried out an admirable work of reorganization in the course of a few years ; they have made roads and established flying routes, created well-disciplined armies, reformed the administration and made the country respected in the eyes of foreigners. But their measures of reform have everywhere operated from above downwards, and as yet they have scarcely done anything to remedy the crying grievances of the agrarians.

China is the world's foremost agricultural country, and

the Chinese peasant class, "Farmers of Forty Centuries" as an enthusiastic American agriculturist once called them, constitute the deep and fertile mould from which the rich civilization of China has grown up. This peasant is industrious and in his primitive way extremely skilful in extracting the richest crop from his little plot of ground. He has also a talent for local self-government, and left to himself he is the most peaceable and law-abiding creature under the sun. But he has always been the object of arbitrary exploitation on the part of those who ought to protect him, namely the officials. Under the empire, however, the extra taxation was kept within some sort of bounds, but during the almost continuous civil wars of the last twenty-five years the pressure of arbitrary taxation on the defenceless rural population has become more and more unbearable. To take a single example from my own abundant experience : in the spring of 1923, when I was travelling through Shensi and Kansu, the same provinces that Snow visited in 1936, the whole country was ablaze with flowering poppies. This unprecedented increase in the cultivation of the opium plant was forced on the peasants by the military authorities, since the opium crop represents a much greater money value than wheat, for instance, and thus affords an opportunity for greatly increased taxation. During the two years I was in those parts poppies were cultivated to such an extent that there was no room for the growing of sufficient cereals for food. The peasants were forced to sell their daughters, partly in order to decrease the family, and partly to obtain cash for buying wheat. In the town of Liangchow in Kansu, when I passed through it, there were several thousand girls for sale, belonging to poor peasant families who were unable to provide for their children.

Then if a drought occurred and brought famine, the value

of land sank to a mere song. Merchants and usurers in the towns sold their stocks of flour at fabulous prices and bought in exchange great tracts of land, which in the prevailing scarcity could be had for next to nothing. The peasants then became tenants on the fields that had once been their own.

It was in this wilderness of crying social wrongs that the Communists began their ploughing and sowing of an altogether new kind of seed. Short work was made of the great landowners who sat in the towns or fortified villages and gathered in their rents. Most of them fled as soon as it was rumoured that the Red troops were on the way, and their land was confiscated, to be divided among the landless agricultural labourers.

But the Red régime was by no means exclusively one of violence. Snow gives a most surprising picture of the cultural work which in the simplest forms, but sustained by enthusiasm, was carried out behind the front that protected the Soviet's civil administration and educational establishments from the Kuomintang troops. Within the regions occupied by the Red troops an entirely new form of government was set up, with its own officials, its own coinage, postal and radio communications, which in spite of all the raids organized by Chiang reached even as far as Shanghai.

Here schools were set up in which illiterates could acquire the elements of writing ; here the young were trained in dancing and singing, and a great number of small theatrical companies played pieces which in most cases took the form of propaganda, glorifying the ideas of the Soviet, condemning civil war and preaching war against the aggressors, the Japanese. For everyone who calls himself a Communist in China is violently anti-Japanese.

Local industries and handicrafts are also favoured and supported, and Snow gives a detailed description of his visit to an arsenal established by the Reds, which was chiefly occupied with repairs and with manufacturing ammunition.

Thanks to their drastic agrarian reforms and strict discipline the Red troops soon gained the confidence of the peasants, and the young men who were enrolled in the ranks were quick to adopt the slogan "The Red Army is the People's Army". The Soviet troops were greeted as liberators, and for the first time the agricultural population, till then apathetic, began to perceive ideals and objects worthy of an effort.

By redistributing the land and reforming the primitive rural communities the Red troops completely won over the peasant population to their side. Their intelligence service thus became far more effective, and in the course of years they carried out rapid and well-planned guerrilla operations which time after time entrapped the less mobile Kuomintang troops and led to their disastrous defeat. The quintessence of the Red tactics is to continue on a mobile footing as long as the campaign lasts, never to run the risk of a defeat, and thus only to attack when careful reconnoitring has made success certain.

The Kuomintang divisions with their more advanced mechanical equipment are better suited for stationary warfare in large units. On the other hand the Reds have brought guerrilla warfare to such perfection that they are prepared to depend entirely on the enemy for their supplies of arms, ammunition and other equipment. Now that war has broken out at last with the feared and hated Japanese, and the two Chinese groups have joined forces, they supplement each other in a very happy way.

If some day the war should end favourably to China, it



might perhaps be possible to carry out a really far-reaching reform through a synthesis of what is best in the Kuomintang and in the Reds. Even if we democratically minded foreigners are in every way attracted by Chiang's moderate policy of reform, we must acknowledge with Snow that the Reds of China also have claims on our sympathy, when in their agrarian policy they dig down to the foundations of Chinese society, intent upon restoring the land to the possession of the working peasant.

Chiang Kai-shek never succeeded in completely defeating the Reds, although in the course of five great campaigns he mobilized all his available forces to this end. He drove them out of the country south of the Yangtzekiang ; but up in the north-west a Soviet régime had consolidated itself by the time war broke out with Japan. The drastic reforms in the lowest classes of the people which the Reds have introduced wherever they have obtained a foothold, have made their position so secure with the peasant population that they could only be ousted by radical agrarian reforms instituted by the central government. The constantly repeated assertion by the Japanese that they are waging war against Chiang Kai-shek in order to extirpate Bolshevism in China is one of the most ludicrous of the propaganda lies by which world opinion is being misled at the present time. The truth is that during the great work of reorganization of the last ten years Chiang has been forced to live between the devil and the deep sea. On the one hand he had the continual intriguing of the great generals, besides the Reds, who shot up like a social epidemic where one least expected them ; on the other the never-resting aggression of the Japanese. If during these years of reconstruction Japan had left the Chinese in peace to work out their own salvation,

the Red agitation would certainly have been in process of liquidation long ago in the only really effective way, namely by an agrarian reform, initiated from above but going to the bottom of the question, with the object of providing the agricultural labourer with land and making his hard life secure. Chiang himself comes of peasant stock and knows full well where the shoe pinches.

When the war broke out the Red generals, hitherto hunted down like noxious animals, at once placed themselves under Chiang's command. This is one of the remarkable combinations of force against which the Japanese are now fighting with little understanding of the spiritual factors by which the opposition is sustained.

Presumably the Japanese war machine will continue to push before it Chiang's feebly mechanized divisions. But the country in rear of the Japanese armies, with the exception of the great cities and the railways, is now in the hands of the Red guerrilla troops and eastern China, to which the Reds never penetrated so long as Chiang held these provinces, is filled with Soviet communities.

## CHAPTER TEN

### THE SIAN EPISODE

WITH the autumn of 1934 there began for Chiang Kai-shek and his energetic consort a new, colourful and adventurous phase of their life : their great flying tours in the interior of China, to parts of the country which to them were comparatively unknown.

Actually it all began purely as an improvisation. Chiang and his wife, accompanied by "the Young Marshal", Chang Hsueh-liang, who had just returned from his tour of Europe, flew from Nanking to Loyang, an important military centre in the province of Honan, to open a new officers' school. As they were out they had the idea of going on to Sian, the capital of Shensi, and when there they decided to extend their journey to the province of Kansu. In this way the programme grew stage after stage, till on their return they had covered a flying distance of five thousand miles and visited eight provinces in the western and north-western parts of the country.

This journey marked a turning-point in the administrative centralization of the country. In old days it was quite exceptional for the head of the central government to visit distant provinces. The waste of time involved in journeys by litter, carriage or on horseback, was by no means suited to the old-fashioned mandarin, who discharged his functions only in his *yamen*. Even if in rare cases the will may have

been present, the time occupied, extending over weeks and months, prohibited any long journeys of inspection. Now the same distances could be traversed in a day or in a few hours. When the Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief in one and the same person dropped down from the sky week after week in one provincial capital after another, the masterful provincial magnates felt that Nanking had suddenly been brought to their very door. They welcomed Chiang with parades, receptions and banquets, but he replied by holding forth against opium, "squeeze" and foot-binding. In addressing the troops he enjoined courage, obedience, simplicity, cleanliness, honesty and helpfulness.

An original addition to these official sermons was provided by the propaganda carried on by Madame Chiang with the support of her husband. She was a Christian from childhood and, as we have said, she had prevailed on Chiang to adopt Christianity at the time of their marriage.

The missionaries were now summoned to the provincial capitals and the Chiang couple invited their aid in the realization of The New Life Movement which had become one of the points in their programme of reforms. The whole thing took the shape of a purity crusade both for the administration and for the life of the individual. No wonder Chiang and his wife won popularity among the missionaries and that the old-fashioned wire-pullers of the administration made anxious attempts to keep pace with the new order.

Where the provincial government had already arrived at good results of its own accord, praise was freely bestowed; but criticism was more common. At the same time Chiang discovered that he himself was learning more than the local mandarins. Only now did these distant provinces, with

their sparse population and their severe climate, become a living reality to him.

Shortly after their return to Nanking Chiang and his wife started on another long flight, this time to the central and south-western provinces—Kiangsi, Hupeh, Hunan, Szechuan, Kweichow and Yunnan. In some parts of these a regular cleansing process became necessary. In Yunnan Chiang attacked child labour in the tin mines, and in Kweichow, which he found to be the most backward province in the empire, the governor was deposed and expelled from the province. One of Chiang's henchmen was put in his place, and a thorough clean-up was set on foot.

But Chiang's greatest and most delicate task on this tour was the work of reform in Szechuan. This fertile province with its sixty million inhabitants, well fenced in behind huge mountain-chains, has been from of old a kingdom by itself in the background of the empire. "Szechuan for the Szechuanese" was the cry there, when this man from Chekiang came and proposed to recast everything in new moulds. The Szechuan generals, in their endless intrigues for power and money, had beaten all records in this country stricken with civil strife. In the twenty-three years that had elapsed since the revolution no fewer than four hundred and seventy-seven civil conflicts, great and small, had been fought out there.

The situation in Szechuan was very critical in 1935, when Chiang visited the province during his great south-western flight. The Communists, in the course of their great northward movement, were advancing in the western part of the province, so that Liu Hsiang, the governor, thought for a time of evacuating the provincial capital, Chengtu, thereby abandoning the immensely rich Chengtu plain to their

depredations. But Chiang had already taken counter-measures before his arrival. Nanking divisions marched up through the province and drove back the Reds towards the west. Officials chosen by Chiang were appointed to one post after another, step by step, without disconcerting the local big-wigs too much. Thus Chiang had secured considerable influence even before he came darting down from the clouds in person. The clean-up in this quarter culminated when Chiang established a training camp for the leaders of the province at the foot of Omei Shan, the Holy Mountain. Here he gathered together officials, professors and other men from important places and had them instructed in military and political science, in economics and in pedagogy. They were to get up early in the morning and start the day with gymnastics. With amazement the worthy gentlemen gazed through their horn spectacles at the new age.

It was certainly a daring game that Chiang played in Szechuan. Had there been a strong and resolute man among the Szechuanese it might all have ended in disaster. The reaction after Chiang's coup was in 1936 so powerful that civil war was threatened for a time, but was finally averted by an amicable settlement.

On the whole these flying inspections, in which the great leader from time to time ventured without escort into provincial cities deeply sunk in opium and corruption, must be regarded as dangerous ventures. Like the chivalrously brave Wu Pei-fu before him, Chiang had accustomed himself, relying on his lucky star, to go forward with reckless nonchalance, underrating the hidden forces that were working against him.

And then came the explosion at Sian.

When the wires spread over the world the first news of

Chiang's imprisonment, a wave of indignation swept through every country at the base treachery of this outrage. No words could be found strong enough to condemn Chang Hsueh-liang and his confederates. Against the background of these black villains shone the bright figure of the brave and taciturn Leader, who was not to be moved by any threats. The picture was a true one, but it only gave half the truth. The villains were not so completely black. In addition to the usual elements of personal ambition and political intrigue the action of the rebels was also inspired by impressive patriotic feeling. In mid-career of victory the great man was forced to halt and reflect ; during his days of imprisonment he learned that besides his own line of action there was another with equal claims to consideration ; although formally the victor he was obliged to bow, not to the peremptory language of the conspirators, but to the inflexible logic of events. Two mighty currents of patriotism, which till then had been trying to force each other aside, now flowed together in one channel. In Chiang's prison chamber at Sian the unification of China was accomplished under his will—perhaps against his will. But with this formation of an unbroken national front the armed conflict with Japan was only a question of months.

Where in the world's history can we find an event so charged with dramatic tension? The national hero imprisoned by a handful of rebels. The central government mobilizes all the resources of the country to put down the revolt. The prisoner directs his colleagues to delay any military action. His consort flies to his relief. And then the denouement : the prisoner is released and flies away in company with the leader of the revolt. What a drama ! A hundred characters in search of an author. Let us tell the story.

In 1931, when the Japanese occupied Manchuria by force of arms, Chang Hsueh-liang's retreating armies were driven through the Great Wall at Shanhaikuan into the province of Hopei, in China proper. These imperfectly disciplined troops were regarded as not much better than invaders by the Chinese. In the allocation of funds they were treated far less liberally than the new divisions which were in training outside Nanking. No wonder a listless spirit of discontent prevailed among the Tungpei (North-eastern) troops.

Furthermore, Chang Hsueh-liang had his numbers cut down from about a quarter of a million to one hundred and thirty thousand, and this force was ordered under his command to Sian, the capital of the province of Shensi, and charged with the duty of making an end of "the Red bandits", who had established a Soviet régime in northern Shensi and Kansu.

Not a single man among the Tungpei troops had any enthusiasm for this war of extermination against the Reds. It was not long before peaceful contacts came about, and then it was found that they had many interests in common. Both armies entertained a deadly hatred of the Japanese; the Communists on ideological grounds and the Tungpei soldiers because their country had been taken from them. Both armies were, to put it mildly, reserved in their attitude to Chiang Kai-shek and Nanking. Thus the two armies adopted a common slogan: No more civil wars! Armed resistance to the Japanese aggressors! Among the young Tungpei officers the cry was raised: Let us fight our way back to our old homes.

The Reds and the Tungpei soldiers did not know, or dared not believe, that Chiang was as desirous as they were of checking the Japanese, even by force, if this became



inevitable. They did not understand that Nanking, with its intelligence service, fully realized that China was not yet strong enough in a military sense to enter on a conflict with Japan. They did not understand that Chiang was simply biding his time, while arming.

Then the breach between Nanking and Sian was widened. To Chiang, who for ten years had exerted all his strength to crush the Communists, it was a question of prestige to sweep up "the remaining fragments", as he expressed it, intentionally underrating the power of the Reds. To the Tungpei army Japan was the enemy, not the Reds. To complete the picture it must be added that for a long time an old robber general, Yang Hu-cheng, had been quartered in Sian with forty thousand soldiers, known as the Hsipei (North-western) army. To a certain extent this rather questionable person was to appear as the tongue of the balance during the critical days at Sian.

In October 1936 Chiang flew up to Sian to organize the campaign against the Reds. He found the Tungpei troops unwilling to fight the Reds, with whom they had so many interests in common. The only possibility was to send up Nanking divisions for the anti-Communist campaign, a measure which was eventually to lead to the eliminating of the Tungpei army. The tension was extreme, the more so as a new ill-concealed Japanese advance was in progress in the north, in the province of Suiyuan. Chiang wished at all costs to avoid a general armed conflict with Japan. The Tungpeis and the Reds together wished to march against the Japanese.

Ten Nanking divisions, with field equipment, were waiting in Tungkuan, ready to advance into Shensi. Railway trains full of war material were unloaded at Sian, and orders were given from Nanking that Sian and Lanchow were to arrange

to receive a hundred bombing planes, to be used in wiping out the Reds.

Three events now followed in rapid succession, all calculated to increase the tension at Sian. The first was the signing of the anti-Comintern pact between Germany and Japan, with Italy's tacit recognition of the Japanese occupation of Manchukuo in return for Japan's recognition of Italy's conquest of Abyssinia. The Young Marshal, who at one time had been a personal friend of Count Ciano, foamed with rage on seeing how his country, Manchuria, was made a pawn in the game of international politics.

Seven respected citizens of Shanghai, a banker, a jurist, some professors and writers, had been arrested by Chiang's orders for anti-Japanese propaganda. Chang Hsueh-liang asked Chiang to release them, as they had certainly acted from patriotic motives. But Chiang turned a deaf ear.

One of Chiang's best generals, Hu Chung-nan, at the head of Nanking's First Army, was totally defeated far up in Kansu on November 21st by the Red armies. For weeks the Reds had done nothing but retreat, while Hu, entirely misinterpreting the situation, had penetrated farther and farther into northern Kansu. Then one night, after the Reds had lured Hu into a basin of loess surrounded by heights, they fell upon him from all sides. Two brigades and a regiment of cavalry were entirely cut to pieces and one regiment went over to the Reds.

It was in a thunder-laden atmosphere that Chiang, on December 8th, landed with his giant plane on the flying-ground at Sian.

Several hundred officers from the Tungpei and Hsipei armies met him and demanded a hearing. He referred them to Chang Hsueh-liang as the proper man to communicate their views to him.

During the next few days Chiang and Chang conferred with each other many times. The former desired war with the Communists, the latter armed resistance to the Japanese. They had reached a deadlock, beyond which their exchange of views could go no further.

On December 11th Chiang moved out to Hua Ching Chi, a bathing resort about fifteen miles from Sian, where he often stayed during his visits to Shensi.

At half-past five on the morning of the 12th Chiang heard rifle-fire in the vicinity, and it soon became clear that Chang's and Yang's troops had started a revolt against Chiang. The greater part of Chiang's bodyguard was shot down, and one of its officers urged Chiang to seek safety on the mountain. In doing so Chiang injured his back through a fall in the darkness, which made him an invalid for several months. He was soon discovered by the pursuing soldiers and a major from Chang's army brought him into Sian.

Here he received a visit from Chang Hsueh-liang, who tried to explain to him the reasons for his detention and the programme which the combined armies wished to submit to him. But Chiang cut short his statement with a few pointed words :

"As you call me Commander-in-Chief, I am your superior officer. To-day you can only treat me in one of two ways. If I am your superior officer, you ought to release me immediately. If, on the other hand, I am in the hands of rebels, you can kill me at once. Beyond this there is nothing to add."

At four o'clock in the afternoon of the 12th Chiang's imprisonment was known in Nanking. The government acted promptly and resolutely. Dr. Kung was chosen as head of the government during Chiang's absence and the

War Minister, General Ho Ying-chin, was appointed chief of the national defence and charged with organizing a punitive expedition against the rebels in Sian.

The programme of eight points by which the rebels sought to justify their action, aimed at bringing about the following :

1. Collaboration of all parties, including therefore the Reds, in the government.
2. An end of all civil wars.
3. Resistance, even by force of arms if that should be necessary, to further Japanese aggression.

On the very first day of Chiang's captivity the War Minister in Nanking received a telegram from the leaders of the revolt, in which they explained that they were only detaining Chiang in order to give him an opportunity of reflecting calmly upon the points of their programme, and they guaranteed his personal safety.

On the invitation of Chang Hsueh-liang, W. H. Donald, Chiang's old friend and now adviser to the Chiang couple, came on the 14th by air from Nanking to Sian and was able to report to Nanking that he had seen Chiang safe and sound.

Simultaneously with Chiang's detention a number of generals and high officials in his suite had also been placed under arrest, among them the Minister of the Interior in the Nanking government. Chang Hsueh-liang sent one of these generals, Chiang Ting-wen, on the 18th by air to Nanking, bearing a letter from Chiang to Ho Ying-chin in which Chiang requested that the projected attack of the government troops on Sian should be postponed for the present in anticipation of his release.

On the 19th T. V. Soong, head of the powerful banking family and Chiang's brother-in-law, flew to Sian and returned on the 21st together with Donald.

On the very next day, the 22nd, a fresh expedition by air was made from Nanking, and this time the company was specially representative, consisting of Madame Chiang, her brother T. V. Soong, Donald and Chiang Ting-wen.

In the course of the next few days an understanding was at last arrived at, which permitted Chiang to return from Sian. At four o'clock in the afternoon of Christmas Day Chiang left by air with his wife, T. V. Soong and Donald ; and at the last moment they were joined by the Young Marshal, the man who was officially responsible for the whole revolt. At twelve-fifteen on the following day the party arrived at Nanking, and Chiang was the object of unparalleled ovations. As early as the evening of Christmas Day, when it became known in Shanghai that Chiang had regained his liberty, the whole city was seized with a frenzy of rejoicing. During the whole thirteen critical days of his captivity the Nanking government had shown extraordinary firmness and self-possession. From all parts of the country assurances of loyalty and support poured in. The unity and dignified behaviour of the people on the occasion of this national calamity made a favourable impression all over the civilized world. Chiang's popularity within and outside China was confirmed by the news of the imperturbable dignity with which he had met the uncertainties of his imprisonment. China and her great leader had passed through this very serious trial with enhanced prestige.

These are the outward facts, about which there is no dispute. If we try to penetrate to the motives and the interplay of conflicting interests, our task will be more difficult. As the problem here is to *comprehend* this incident which affected the fate of China so profoundly, we must try to arrive at our own interpretation, basing it on the somewhat conflicting accounts furnished by different hands.

First a question : was Chiang in danger of his life during the coup at Sian? Undoubtedly. In the first place, at the opening of the incident out at Hua Ching Chi his life might easily have been exposed in the course of the indiscriminate firing. But even in Sian itself his life was far from safe, as appears from Chang having had him removed from his first place of detention to another where his person was more secure. Danger seems to have threatened chiefly from Yang Hu-cheng's men and from the younger officers of both the Tungpei and the Hsipei armies, who demanded that Chiang, in their opinion far too friendly to the Japanese, should be brought before some sort of popular tribunal, which was to condemn him. Regarding this point, if we are to believe Edgar Snow, whose account is given with much vivacity and consistency, the Red officers, who poured into Sian immediately after the coup, joined Chang in using all their influence to protect the life of the national Leader, whose dominating importance in the inevitable struggle with the Japanese was quite clear to them.

In this connection it is of interest to make the acquaintance of one of the Red generals, Chou En-lai, who, it is true, is not mentioned in Chiang's prison diary, but who, nevertheless, seems obviously to have been present at Sian during the latter days of the intermezzo and to have taken part in the negotiations.

Chou came of an old mandarin family and perhaps in more peaceful circumstances might have become by inclination one of the *literati* of the good old days. But the literary renaissance which swept over the country after the revolution of 1911 linked his interest to the social subversion which was to shake China to its foundations. After a brilliant career as a student in the Nankai University at Tientsin he was imprisoned during the students' riots of

1919, and then met a fellow-prisoner, a radical female student, who afterwards became his wife and comrade on the long march to escape from Chiang's armies. When released from prison he went to Europe, where he studied for two years in France, for a few months in England and for a year in Germany. In 1924 he returned to China and at once attached himself to Sun Yat-sen at Canton. There he soon became one of the leading figures in the Red section of Sun's adherents. Although from the outset he and Chiang had gone different ways, he nevertheless became chief of the political department of the Whampoa Academy and a confidant of Galens, now Marshal Blücher. Before long the breach between Chiang and Chou became complete, and before the Sian episode Chiang had set a price of eighty thousand dollars on Chou's head.

According to Snow Chou one day entered Chiang's prison cell at Sian. No doubt Chiang expected the worst from this encounter with his former subordinate of Whampoa days, but everything points to Chou's having been active in preserving Chiang's life and in seeking an understanding, more or less in agreement with the rebels' eight points.

We learn also from another quarter that ideal points of view played a part in the peaceful liquidation of the Sian affair. On the third day of Chiang's detention Chang Hsueh-liang came to his prisoner and said :

"We have read your diary and it has taught us the loftiness of your personality. Your loyalty to the cause of the revolution and your determination to bear the responsibility for saving our native land far exceed anything we could imagine. Your great fault is that you have communicated far too little of your ideas to your subordinates. If I had known a tenth part of what is written in your diary I should not have attempted this ill-considered action."

The present writer, in an article in *Svenska Dagbladet*, written while Chiang was still Chang's prisoner, once stigmatized the latter as the villain of the moment. After a careful consideration of the accessible documents I am compelled to modify this opinion. Chang is undoubtedly a weak and not very significant person, who would never have risen to fame had he not been his father's son. But time after time he has served what he saw to be the cause of China, and that at very serious and immediate personal risk. In 1928 he proclaimed himself to the Kuomintang as lord of Manchuria, in defiance of the most urgent representations of the Japanese, even then immensely powerful in Manchuria. In 1930 he decided the trial of strength between Chiang on the one side, Feng and Yen on the other, by sending his troops against Peking and frustrating the game of Chiang's opponents. From that day Chiang felt and showed profound gratitude to Chang. But by this action Chang broke entirely with the Japanese, who in the following year took revenge by driving him out of Manchuria by force of arms.

Now here in Sian it is probable that Chang was not the most active factor. Rather was he a façade behind which the real play of interests was carried out. When finally the further detention of Chiang was found to be too risky, or perhaps rather when a practical settlement was arrived at which saved the face of Chiang and the Nanking government, Chang jumped at the last moment into his late prisoner's aeroplane and accompanied him to Nanking; largely no doubt for the reason that his life would not have been safe if the hot-headed young officers of his own army and Yang's had called him to account for his ineptitude in letting the big bird fly away. In Nanking Chang was the guest first of T. V. Soong and afterwards of H. H. Kung,



Chiang's other brother-in-law. Then for about a year he remained Chiang's "guest", no doubt a pretty closely guarded form of hospitality, at the latter's old home, Fenghua in Chekiang. From the time of the Sian coup Chang was politically a dead man.

It has been said with a good deal of malice that T. V. Soong, the great banker, flew to Sian in order to settle the conflict of opposing wills by what the Chinese in their subtle phraseology call "shooting with silver bullets". That Chang should have allowed money to influence a decision which affected his whole prestige is not very probable, as he was already immensely rich. If a ransom remained in the hands of someone among the minor actors, Yang for instance, well, what of it?—that might be called a family affair of the Soongs. The great game involved quite other values.

With the peaceful liquidation of the Sian coup there was an end of all talk of exterminating the Reds by force of arms. The central committee of the Reds telegraphed the following offers to the Nanking government :

1. That in future the Red army should bear the name of The National Revolutionary Army and be under the direct control of the Nanking government.
2. That Sun's three fundamental principles should be conformed to within the territory of the Revolutionary Army.
3. That the said army should cease the confiscation of private property.

In return the Revolutionary Army demanded that the Nanking government should engage to put an end to all civil strife and concentrate all the resources of the nation upon checking Japanese aggression.

Thereby the understanding arrived at in Sian received

its confirmation in a way which saved the face of Chiang and the Nanking government. There is every indication that Chiang never gave any direct engagement to his opponents while at Sian. Nevertheless, both camps afterwards exerted themselves to form an unbroken national front.

After some months' rest to complete his restoration to health Chiang resumed his duties at the end of May 1937. On May 25th he left Nanking on board the gunboat *Chungshan* and proceeded to the "summer capital", Kuling in Kiangsi. Here he immediately instituted summer training courses for the higher army command.

Edgar Snow informs us that Chiang sent his private aeroplane to Sian and fetched Chou En-lai to Kuling, where the latter had conferences with Chiang and other members of the government.

This took place in June.

On the night of July 7th the first volleys rang out at Lu Kou Chiao.

## CHAPTER ELEVEN

### JAPAN'S CONTINENTAL POLICY

**A**N English writer, particularly well acquainted with the political problems of the Far East, has stated that strategically Korea plays the same part for Japan as Belgium for England, that of a bridge-head from which an offensive can be launched against the respective insular Power. At a distance of only one hundred and twenty-five miles this broad arm of the Asiatic continent reaches out towards vital parts of Dai Nippon. In the hands of an equal or superior military Power Korea would be a dangerous threat to Japan's national independence.

Once in the history of the East, China, or rather the great East Asiatic Empire whose capital was Peking, has played this part of an arrogant and aggressive military Power. In 1268 Khubilai Khan, intoxicated with the apparently boundless successes of his armies, sent an embassy to Japan, summoning the island Empire to acknowledge Khubilai's suzerainty.

The Great Khan in Peking had entirely miscalculated the national forces opposed to him. In 1274 and, after this first failure, again in 1281 he sent great armies of invasion to subdue Japan. Both times his troops succeeded in occupying a part of the southernmost of Japan's main islands, Kyushu; both times they met with such strong resistance that the attack was brought to a standstill, and

in both cases the adventure ended with a typhoon which destroyed a great part of the fleets returning to Korea.

It is significant of the history of East Asia that these attacks, the only ones made from the continent with the object of subduing the island Empire, were set on foot, not by the Chinese, but by a Mongol usurper of the throne of China. And yet time after time the Chinese dominions under powerful native dynasties, have acquired an extension that fully justifies the name the Chinese themselves give to their country : Chung Kuo, the Middle Kingdom. Under the Han dynasty, in the centuries around the beginning of our era, when the civilized world was divided between two Great Powers, the Roman Empire in the west and the Chinese Empire in the east, Chinese culture was diffused among the small Korean States, which were in a more or less loose relation of vassalage to China. Somewhat later the Japanese received the first impulses of Chinese culture through objects and experiences brought back by Japanese pirates who harried the coasts of Korea. In the third century A.D. many Chinese craftsmen came to Japan, and in the early part of the seventh century crowds of Japanese students flocked to Changan (now Sian), the brilliant capital of the mighty T'ang dynasty. During this period the Japanese received their higher civilization as a loan from China. Splendid temples and palaces were erected and decorated with artistic treasures, all in the Chinese style. Buddhism, derived from India and introduced from China, became the prevailing religion, and in connection with the temples asylums for the poor and schools for medical education were founded.

With the fall of the Mongol dynasty in 1368 there ensued a new epoch of association between China and Japan. The first Ming emperor sent an embassy to Japan in the follow-

ing year, and this led to a period of lively diplomatic relations. One of the Shoguns carried his amiability so far as to acknowledge the suzerainty of China over Japan, "to the eternal mortification of Japanese chauvinists in ages to come", as Bernhard Karlgren expresses it.

Two hundred years later the Japanese made their first entirely unsuccessful attack on the mainland. Hideyoshi, a violently energetic warrior and statesman with much of the mentality of the present-day imperialist dictators, formed a gigantic plan of penetrating into China through Korea and founding a world dominion on the continent of Asia. The existence of a well-trained and armed Japanese warrior caste, which after the forcible unification of the country was now at Hideyoshi's disposal, seemed to give the colossal scheme a prospect of success. In 1592 a Japanese force of two hundred thousand men was transported to Korea, and at first the invasion met with little resistance. But the repeated victories of a Korean naval hero over the Japanese maritime forces hindered the transport of supplies and reinforcements for the Japanese armies, which at the same time were being cut up by constant furious attacks of the Korean guerrilla bands. When, therefore, a well-equipped Chinese army advanced to the relief of Korea, the largely conceived offensive collapsed into a fiercely contested retreat. For a time Hideyoshi had to content himself with being proclaimed King of Japan with the recognition of the Chinese Emperor. But four years later he was again on the war-path, this time with an army of one hundred and fifty thousand. Chinese troops, however, drove the Japanese back to the south coast of Korea, and on his death-bed in September 1598 Hideyoshi gave orders for the withdrawal of the Japanese forces from the mainland.

Not till three hundred years later, in our own time, were

the Japanese to return, with greater success, to the realization of Hideyoshi's dream of a continental Greater Japan.

In 1853 a small American squadron reached the coast of Japan under Commodore Perry, who was commissioned to obtain a commercial treaty from the Shogun, the real ruler of Japan, and to use force for this purpose, if necessary. Perry carried out his difficult mission with great skill, tact and firmness, and this expedition, in itself of no great importance, had the most far-reaching effects. The Japanese were now fully convinced of the white man's technical superiority; the mediæval feudal power of the Shogunate was brought to an end, and with the restoration of the imperial régime in 1868 the rapid expansion of Japan's modern history begins. When once the Japanese were convinced that their ancient chivalry and their policy of isolation could not longer resist the encroachment of the white men's machine civilization, they resolutely set themselves as excellent pupils to learn their arts, so as to be able to meet the white peril with its own weapons. The Westerners and the rapidly degenerating Manchu court at Peking little guessed that a fully modern Great Power was in process of formation in the eastern islands.

In 1876, by using the pressure of a squadron, the Japanese had succeeded in concluding an agreement with the formerly hermetically closed Korea, whereby Korea undertook to receive a Japanese mission, to open certain ports to Japanese commerce and to grant the Japanese ex-territorial rights.

In the conclusion of this agreement the Japanese behaved as though they were treating with an independent State, whereas the Koreans themselves insisted that they were under Chinese suzerainty.

In consequence of this treaty Japanese advisers were, in fact, appointed to the Korean court and Japanese instruc-

tors to the army. But the process of modernization which the Japanese tried to carry out was far too precipitate in the eyes of the Koreans, and the Japanese legation at Söul was twice burnt down, in 1882 and 1884, amid dangerous rioting. In the year 1885 a treaty was concluded at Tientsin between China and Japan on the subject of Korea. Both Powers undertook to withdraw their troops from that country and not to send troops there in future without notifying the other signatory Power.

But in the following ten years, while Japan's modern military power grew rapidly, tension between Japan and China also increased. Both parties had again sent troops to Korea, and by the beginning of 1894 Japan felt strong enough to demand of the Korean government the expulsion of the Chinese forces. At the end of July it came to open hostilities, after a transport carrying Chinese troops had been sunk by the Japanese.

To all appearance China possessed on the outbreak of war naval forces in which the Japanese were lacking, namely, modern armoured ships ; but it soon turned out that their ammunition was useless owing to pecculation, and a similar state of things existed in other departments of the Chinese defensive forces. The result was that after a number of defeats on land and the loss of a great part of her fleet China was obliged to sign a peace dictated by Japan. China recognized the independence of Korea and ceded to Japan Formosa with the Pescadores and the southernmost part of Manchuria with the fortress of Port Arthur. In addition, Japan was to receive an indemnity of two hundred million taels.

The result of the war was a great triumph for Japan, who at once took her place in the international ranks as a modern military Power. But the new Great Power was

soon to experience the set-backs of the international play of interests. Russia, who at this time was aiming to acquire an ice-free harbour on the Pacific, saw her plans thwarted by the cession of southern Manchuria with its good harbours and its strong fortress to the Japanese. Russian diplomacy succeeded in obtaining the co-operation of France and—curiously enough—also of Germany in giving Japan the “advice”, backed by a naval demonstration, to renounce her acquisition of Manchurian territory “in the interest of the peace of the Far East”. Exhausted militarily and financially, Japan had to swallow her mortification. But she did not forget.

There now ensued an intensive tug-of-war between Japan and Russia for predominance in Korea. This tension culminated in October 1895, when the Japanese Resident in Söul organized a coup against the Korean court, in the course of which the Korean Queen and her ladies-in-waiting were killed. The Korean King and Crown Prince took refuge in the Russian legation, where they remained for two years.

Meanwhile, Russia was extending her position in Manchuria, successfully exploiting her action in favour of China on the conclusion of peace with Japan. Russia thus obtained from China a concession for the construction of two railways of immense strategic importance ; one through northern Manchuria from Transbaikalia to Vladivostok, another from Harbin to Dairen and Port Arthur. China also conceded the right of guarding these long lines of railway with Russian troops. And finally China leased to Russia the very tract—the southern point of Manchuria with Port Arthur and Dairen—of which Russia, by her diplomatic action in 1895, had deprived the victorious Japan.

These immense political advantages, which Russia had



won without a blow in a part of East Asia regarded by Japan as her sphere of interest, induced the Island Empire to make an appeal to arms. After Japan had succeeded in January 1902 in concluding an alliance with the British Empire, the war followed at the beginning of 1904. Against the European Great Power Japan was also victorious. At sea almost the whole of the Russian navy was destroyed, Port Arthur was taken after a protracted siege, and the Russian armies were driven northward beyond Mukden. But when these results had been attained, not only Russia but also Japan was in urgent need of peace. Through the mediation of the American President, Theodore Roosevelt, a peace was concluded at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, which, though far from giving the victors all they desired, nevertheless brought Japan not only an immense enhancement of prestige, but also extremely important territorial acquisitions, while Russia's access to the Pacific was again confined to the frozen harbours far to the north. There was an end of all Russian influence in Korea, and the Japanese took possession of the southern point of Manchuria with the harbours and fortresses constructed by the Russians.

At this time, too, Japan took the first steps towards incorporating Korea as part of the Japanese Empire. After an attempt to induce the Western Powers to intervene, the Korean King was forced to abdicate. The Marquis Ito, for decades the leading statesman in Japan, was appointed Resident in Korea. After Ito had been assassinated in October 1909 by a fanatical young Korean and a serious revolt had been suppressed by force of arms, there ensued a formal annexation of Korea, which in 1910 was incorporated in the Japanese dominions as the Government of Chosen.

When the World War broke out in 1914 Great Britain,

in accordance with her treaty with Japan, requested this ally to undertake the occupation of the German possessions in the Chinese province of Shantung. And with the support of a small British force Japan duly proceeded to besiege the fortified German port of Tsingtao on the south-east coast of Shantung. This German fortress capitulated in November, and the Japanese then occupied the German railway from Tsingtao to Tsinan, as well as the German coal and iron mines in Shantung.

The great acquisitions of territory made by Japan, first in 1904 in the war with Russia and then ten years later through the Shantung campaign, were pieces carved by the sword out of the Chinese Empire, but China was not consulted in either case. Japan now wished to secure her gains both in southern Manchuria and in Shantung, and this was done in January 1915, when the Japanese Minister in Peking submitted to President Yuan Shih-kai the much-debated document known as "the twenty-one demands". These were divided into five groups, the first of which concerned Shantung, the second Manchuria, the third the iron mines and iron works in the Yangtze valley and the fourth harbour construction on the Chinese coast. What made the whole of this transaction so detestable to the Chinese and so suspicious in the eyes of foreign Powers was the fifth group, which was not only designed to convert China into a vassal State under Japan, but was at the same time an encroachment on the interests of other Powers—among them in particular Japan's ally, Great Britain—in China. That the Japanese were themselves conscious of the international risks involved in this objectionable group, no. 5, appears from the fact that the Japanese envoy in presenting the document tried to coerce Yuan into silence and that it was only later, and bit by bit, that Tokyo admitted the truth.

The end of it was that the Japanese withdrew the fifth group with the exception of one point, and that the remainder was carried by means of a Japanese ultimatum to China on May 9th 1915, a date which the Chinese have remembered ever since as a "day of national humiliation".

With this action the Japanese undoubtedly consolidated their territorial gains, especially in Manchuria. But their whole procedure, with its absurdly excessive demands which violated the rights of third parties, and with the smoke-screen in which the Japanese tried to conceal it all, gives us one of the most flagrant proofs of the lack of finesse which is inherent in Japanese diplomacy. Its indirect effects can scarcely have been foreseen by the Japanese. This hole-and-corner action, designed to affect unfavourably even the Chinese interests of Japan's powerful ally, made the English disinclined to renew the treaty with Japan. It was perhaps still more serious for Japan that this day of national humiliation roused the previously somewhat indifferent youth of China, especially the students, to a consciousness that their neighbour out in the ocean was China's most dangerous enemy. From the spring of 1915 we may date the spiritual renaissance which, under great leaders like Hu Shih and others, has created the new Chinese national feeling, which is the basis of the stubborn resistance the Chinese are now opposing to the Japanese invasion. The *literary revolution* led by Hu Shih, which put an end to the ossified classicism of two thousand years and introduced *Pai Hua*, the vernacular, as the written language of the masses, had already begun by about 1919 to forge the dangerous intellectual weapons by which the educational auxiliaries of the guerrilla armies are now endeavouring in all the villages in rear of the Japanese to train the youth of the countryside in all forms of resistance to the enemy.

China's entry into the World War in 1917, following in the footsteps of America, came as the result of diplomatic representations from the European Allied Powers, but much against the wishes of Japan, since it was clear that in the future peace negotiations China, as one of the Allies, would have a say in the disposal of the former German possessions in Shantung. And, in fact, the Chinese peace delegation refused to sign the treaty of Versailles as a protest against the stipulation that Germany ceded all her rights in Shantung in favour of Japan. At the Washington conference of 1921, through the mediation of the United States Secretary of State and the chief of the British delegation, an agreement was arrived at between Japan and China concerning Shantung, whereby Japan undertook to renounce political claims in Shantung, only retaining the economic advantages which had resulted from her military action against the German possessions.

We now come to the events surrounding Chiang Kai-shek's great march through China from Canton to Peking in the years 1926-8. In the spring of 1927, when Chiang was proceeding northward from Nanking along the railway line from Pukow to Tsinan, the capital of Shantung, Chang Tso-lin, the ruler of Manchuria, who was then established as "war lord" at Peking, became anxious in the face of this new danger from the south. He managed to persuade the Japanese, for the protection of their countrymen in Tsinan, to send a force to that city which barred the way to Chiang's offensive against Peking. Through skilful manœuvring within his own party, and by combining tact with firmness in dealing with the Japanese at Tsinan, Chiang succeeded by the spring of 1928 in continuing his march to the north. But the young Kuomintang general, who had received his military education in Japan and till

then had been *persona grata* with the Japanese, became after this episode a dreaded unifying force in the national rebirth of China.

When Chiang, leaving the Japanese force at Tsinan behind him, crossed the Yellow River on his march towards Peking, old Chang Tso-lin felt that his time there was up. On June 4th he boarded a train which was to convey him to his Manchurian capital, but, as has already been told, on arrival at Mukden a mine exploded under the train with such violence that Chang's car was shattered and the old gentleman himself expired a few hours later. The instigators of this outrage were never discovered in spite of all investigations, and those interested must be left to more or less probable conjectures.

Chang's son and successor, Chang Hsueh-liang, gave his adherence to the Kuomintang, and thus the Manchurian provinces joined in the national rallying movement—a state of things which was highly displeasing to the Japanese.

When Feng Yü-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan launched in 1930 their last and most dangerous revolt against Chiang, the "Young Marshal" decided the contest by placing himself on the side of Nanking in September and sending troops against Peking.

The Japanese had threatened Chang with destruction if he sided with Chiang this time, and exactly a year later, in September 1931, the Japanese Kuangtung army (the army of occupation in southernmost Manchuria), which in the course of years had been gradually strengthened, made good this threat.

On September 18th 1931, a year to the day after Chang Hsueh-liang, disregarding the very serious representations of the Japanese, had thrown in his lot with Nanking against Feng and Yen, Mukden was occupied by Japanese troops

with but slight resistance, and in the course of the next three months the occupation of the whole of Manchuria was completed with great determination. On February 18th 1932 the creation of the new State of "Manchukuo", which in reality was entirely under Japanese control, was announced by proclamation.

At that time Chiang Kai-shek was fully occupied in putting down fresh disturbances in the interior of China, and any armed resistance to the Japanese in Manchuria was out of the question. In her need China appealed to the League of Nations. After a brilliant statement of her case, made by the experienced and respected Chinese statesman, W. W. Yen, the League gave a practically unanimous vote for China against Japan—a benevolent gesture without any real effect. A commission of investigation sent out by the League under the chairmanship of Lord Lytton adopted a tolerably Platonic line. A Chinese writer interprets the reaction of Chinese opinion to the League's powerlessness in these words: "At this time the League of Nations had not yet revealed its impotence and want of backbone."

The occupation of Manchuria had reactions in China which had not been foreseen by the Japanese and which were probably regarded by the Japanese military clique with supercilious indifference. The students' agitation against Japan flared up again with unprecedented violence. The youth of China awoke to a realization of the danger from the north-east.

The boycott of Japanese goods, which had always been a telling weapon in the hands of the Chinese populace, this time assumed violent forms, especially in Shanghai. In January 1932 it led to an armed collision between the Japanese marines stationed at Shanghai and the Chinese Nineteenth Army. On this occasion the Chinese offered a

tough resistance, which took the Japanese entirely by surprise and caused the soldiers of the Nineteenth Army to become China's national heroes and the favourites of foreign opinion in Shanghai. The Japanese marines proved themselves of little use in the trench warfare which was now being waged on the outskirts of the great seaport. Not until reinforcements to the number of sixty thousand men had arrived from Japan was it possible by an encircling movement to compel the Nineteenth Army to make a rapid and orderly retreat.

The fighting at Shanghai in the spring of 1932 brought no territorial gain to Japan. But a Chinese force had proved to the astonished foreign spectators that it could hold up for months the assaults of the constantly reinforced Japanese. And again there followed an ideal reaction to which the Japanese paid little attention. The Chinese learned that man to man he was just as good a fighter as the previously dreaded Japanese. The soldier's profession, till now despised in China, became the most popular in the country. A great number of young men from the best families in the land entered the officers' schools. The Chinese populace began to count upon meeting the invader on the field of battle. China's ideal mobilization started in the spring of 1932 in the trenches outside Shanghai.

## CHAPTER TWELVE

### FROM LU KOU CHIAO TO THE YELLOW RIVER

**D**URING the latter part of 1931 the Japanese, as we have seen in the last chapter, had completed their occupation of Manchuria, and they employed the following year in consolidating this vast acquisition of territory ; a consolidation which was marked among other things by their appointing Pu Yi, the last Manchu Emperor, once expelled from Peking, as Regent of the land of his ancestors, on March 9th 1932.

At the beginning of 1933 the Japanese took the next step towards the goal they had set themselves : the control of North China. In the course of an easy campaign, singularly discreditable to the incompetent Chinese provincial governor, they occupied and incorporated with the new State of Manchukuo the Chinese province of Jehol, a buffer zone between Manchuria, Inner Mongolia and the province of Hopei, in which Peking is situated. The conquest of Jehol placed Hopei in an extremely precarious position. The eastern part of the province projected as an isosceles triangle between the sea and Jehol, and the old imperial capital now lay at a distance of no more than forty-three miles from foreign territory. Not only along the Mukden railway, which enters Hopei from Manchukuo at Shanhai-kuan, but also from the important frontier pass of Kupeikou



the Japanese could now descend upon Peking at their pleasure.

In May of the same year (1933) the Japanese troops entered Hopei, the easternmost corner of which they occupied as far as the Luan River, and they continued their advance to the neighbourhood of Tungchow, a town not far to the east of Peking. In order to end this state of uncertainty the Chinese made an agreement with the local Japanese command at Tangku on May 31st, providing for the demilitarization of a zone in eastern Hopei. Within this frontier zone, which reached up into Inner Mongolia, two petty "autonomous" governments were established by Chinese renegades with the goodwill of the Japanese authorities, one in eastern Hopei, the other in northern Chahar, a border district between northern Hopei and Inner Mongolia.

On their side the Chinese government had formed a "political council for Hopei and Chahar", as a defensive measure and as a medium for negotiation with their powerful eastern neighbours. In constituting this council it was necessary on the one hand to find men who were acceptable to the Japanese military leaders, but who were on the other hand not so pro-Japanese that the elementary claims of China would be entirely set aside. Nothing could be more significant of the impossible situation created by the Japanese tactics of crumbling the passive resistance of the Chinese bit by bit than this heterogeneous political council, the members of which no doubt inwardly cursed the impossible task allotted to them by fate, while nevertheless doing their best in the circumstances to serve their unhappy country. The chairman of the political council was General Sung Cheh-yuan, who was at the same time in command of the Twenty-ninth Army, which at the out-

break of hostilities formed the Chinese garrison in the Peking district. That the blood-pressure was rising day by day in the rank and file of this army obviously did not make General Sung's task any easier.

From a purely military point of view the situation around Peking had become untenable. Taking their stand on the peace protocol after the Boxer rebellion at the beginning of the century, the Japanese had gradually strengthened their garrisons around Tientsin and Peking. According to the spirit of the protocol foreign troops were to be posted along the Peking-Mukden line to the extent to which the safety of foreigners and particularly of the Peking legations demanded. But now, when one of the foreign Powers alone reinforced its garrisons to the growing dissatisfaction and distrust of the natives of the country, this influx of Japanese forces became an endless screw which increased the already extremely critical tension to a point at which an explosion became inevitable. At the outbreak of war Japanese and Chinese posts around Peking were so inter-mixed that the defenders could not form a united front, and therefore their defence soon collapsed before the superior mechanical equipment and victorious offensive spirit of the Japanese.

While the situation around Peking became more and more confused and weakened, both politically and militarily, government circles in Nanking grew increasingly convinced that an end must be made of endless concessions. An ultimatum, which the Japanese Ambassador had presented in 1936 to the Foreign Minister in Nanking, was rejected by the latter. The Japanese withdrew after leaving the document on the Foreign Minister's table, but on returning to the embassy he found it had got there before him, delivered by a Chinese express messenger.

In the autumn of 1936 an advance was made from the "autonomous" province of Chahar into the westward province of Suiyuan, where the Chinese were still masters. The Japanese declared that they had nothing to do with this military expedition, but the Mongolian irregulars who conducted the attack on Suiyuan were supplied with fighting planes and other modern equipment, the origin of which was well known. One of China's best younger generals, Fu Tso-yi led the defence with success and inflicted a decisive defeat on the invaders at Pailingmiao.

\* \* \* \* \*

The author of this book may claim the doubtful honour of having brought to light one of the two apples of discord over which the tension was finally released in open conflict.

Some months after my arrival at Peking in 1914 as geological adviser to the Chinese Government, I had the great good luck to come on the track of an extensive but till then entirely unknown ferriferous formation in the mountain tracts between Peking and Kalgan.<sup>†</sup> The first ore-field investigated by me contained no more than a little over ten million tons of a fairly rich and easily smelted hematite ore. Later on my friend and colleague, Professor E. T. Nyström, found a far larger group of about fifty million tons, and taking them all together, the Lung-Yen ores, as I called them, totalled pretty nearly one hundred million tons.

The ore-fields discovered in 1914-15 were somewhat difficult of access, as they lay high up among the mountains. In the spring of 1918, when the price of iron in the world's market had risen to dizzy heights, the Peking government sent me again to these districts with instructions to start the mining of these ores immediately. I possessed since



*Japanese troops fording the Yungting river. The man by the side of soldier No. 2 is a press photographer, holding his camera high above his head*



*Japanese troops fording a river in North China*



1914 a geological clue, not yet followed up, which led to a fairly staggering discovery. Only about three miles from the Peking-Kalgan railway I came upon a new ore-field of fourteen million tons in easily accessible surroundings, and in a couple of months mining was in operation. Forty thousand tons were sent by rail to Hanyang on the Yangtze River and were smelted in the furnaces there to the marked satisfaction of the metallurgists. Then came the armistice in November 1918, and iron prices dropped catastrophically. An unfinished ironworks near Peking was never completed, and the Lung-Yen ores continued their sleep of many thousand years undisturbed, till the Japanese came and set things going.

To General Sung Cheh-yuan, already oppressed by all sorts of anxieties, the Japanese army command formulated two demands. The first was the construction of a railway from Tientsin to Shihchiachuang, where the local line from Taiyuanfu, the capital of Shansi, connects with the Peking-Hankow line. The other was the opening of the Lung-Yen field for export to Japan. As this rich and well-situated iron-ore field was about the only considerable source of iron ore the Chinese had left, since the Japanese had seized the great ore-fields in Manchuria and in the Yangtze valley, it was not surprising that the Chinese kicked in desperation at the proposal.

As regards the projected Tientsin-Shihchiachuang railway, this was undisguisedly a strategic line and nothing else, designed to serve an attacker coming from Mukden-Shanhaikuan.

Then how did poor General Sung act? In no other country would anything of the sort be conceivable, but in China it was quite in accordance with time-honoured diplomatic tactics, as a means of gaining time. Seized

with an all-transcending sense of the duties he owed to the memory of his ancestors, he proceeded to the family tomb in Shantung and stayed there appealing to the great dead ; stayed till the first fateful rifle-shots rattled through the July night at Lu Kou Chiao or the Marco Polo Bridge, as Westerners usually call the massive stone bridge over the Yung-ting-ho, just outside the south-western corner of Peking.

\* \* \* \* \*

From Fengtai, one of the most important Japanese military posts near Peking, a detachment, furnished only with practice ammunition—according to the Japanese version—had advanced on the night of July 7th close up to the Chinese post at the Marco Polo Bridge. As the Japanese, operating in the dark, did not answer the Chinese challenge, the Chinese officer in command opened fire, as we are told, without any loss on the Japanese side. It is true that a Japanese soldier was missing, but he afterwards turned up safely. Obviously the whole affair was in the beginning so insignificant that it might easily have been adjusted with a little goodwill on both sides.

On the following day, however, the Japanese demanded permission to make a house-to-house search in the walled town of Wanping, which is situated near the Marco Polo Bridge. Finally, though unwillingly, the Chinese agreed to admit a couple of Japanese officers. While these were negotiating with the Chinese authorities inside Wanping, shots were exchanged on two sides of the town with casualties to both forces.

In the evening negotiations were opened between the mayor of Peking, General Chin Teh-chun, and the Japanese command. These proceeded for several days, but were rendered increasingly difficult by repeated engagements,

among them a Japanese attack on Wanping on July 10th with six hundred men, supported by four tanks and twenty-seven guns. The negotiations were further obstructed by the fact that the Japanese quickly sent reinforcements, partly via Shanhaikuan and Tientsin, partly from Kupeikou, from which place a motorized force reached Peking in a short time. On the other hand, Chiang Kai-shek had moved a couple of his Nanking divisions by rail from Hankow to Paoting, a considerable town eighty-seven miles south-south-west of Peking.

By and by General Sung also arrived and took his place on the stage with all kinds of rather colourless proclamations. Tension increased, while both Powers sent reinforcements in the direction of Peking. The real crisis came in the three days July 27th to 29th. General Sung declared on the evening of the 27th that he must reject the Japanese demands, and on the following day he proceeded to Paoting. On the same day (the 28th) the Japanese command announced that all possibilities of a peaceful solution were exhausted and that it only remained to punish the Chinese troops. In reality, even before that day, the Twenty-ninth Chinese Army had lost about five thousand men in various engagements around Peking.

In Tientsin also sharp fighting occurred on July 29th, and here for a moment the situation was critical enough for the Japanese.

On the same day Chiang Kai-shek issued an announcement at Nanking in which he took the responsibility for the military situation in North China. He declared that the Chinese people did not desire war, but that they would not yield if it was forced on them by Japan.

The local defence in Hopei was singularly weak and aimless. From this theatre of war, which brought little glory



to China, it may suffice to note a few dates, marking the loss of important places :

On July 29th began the Japanese occupation of Peking, which was accomplished without any fighting worth mentioning. By August 8th the occupation of the old capital was complete and secured by a garrison of three thousand men.

By July 30th the Japanese were complete masters of Tientsin and of its port Taku.

On August 2nd a Japanese mechanized brigade of four thousand three hundred men with six hundred cars arrived at Changsintien via the Marco Polo Bridge.

On August 20th the Japanese occupied Kalgan, the gateway to Inner Mongolia.

On September 13th they captured the important town of Tatung in northern Shansi.

On October 3rd the town of Techow, on the border between Hopei and Shantung, was lost to the Japanese.

On October 10th the Japanese occupied Shihchiachuang, the junction of the main line Peking-Hankow and the narrow-gauge railway to Taiyuan, the capital of Shansi. Only three weeks later, on October 30th, the Japanese stormed the Niantzekuan pass, regarded as impregnable, which gave them an open road to the Taiyuan plain. The provincial capital fell on November 8th after extremely bitter street-fighting.

Almost the whole of Hopei and the great plains and railways in Shansi were at this time in the hands of the enemy. What a strange contrast between this debacle in the north and the obstinate resistance with which the Chinese on the outskirts of Shanghai met the attackers during these same months.

And yet it is true that if the defence had been sufficiently

prepared, under united and vigorous leadership, northern China should have been able to offer a very different resistance from that which actually took place. I am in a position to discuss these questions with detailed topographical knowledge, as I have travelled all over the two critical areas and even mapped a good deal of the natural northern line of defence.

About thirty miles to the north of Peking one comes to a difficult mountain tract, through which winds a narrow pass, the Nankou pass. The railway from Peking to Kalgan makes its way up this valley, where the gradient is so steep that special locomotives have had to be built, and these take a few cars at a time. At the top of the pass at Chinglungchiao the line goes through a tunnel and then runs out on to a plateau, the Huailai plain, which with a few unimportant contractions continues to the north-west as far as Kalgan. On every side this fertile plateau is bordered by almost impenetrable mountains. A few well-equipped divisions of the Nanking type, supplied with sufficient motor transport for rapid movement on the inner lines, should have been able, if they had had time to prepare the defence of the mountain passes, to hold and repulse an enemy many times stronger than themselves. And so long as this undefeated Chinese army of—let us say—a hundred thousand men had stood its ground on the Huailai plateau with the possibility of moving at a suitable moment either southward to the Peking plain or northward towards Inner Mongolia, the mobility of the Japanese would have been greatly limited in every direction. It was by no means fortuitous that the Japanese delayed their southward march from the Marco Polo Bridge until they had removed the rather feeble threat, as it proved to be, from the Nankou pass.


How this was effected is one of the most interesting operations of this war.

General Liu Yu-ming, governor of the province of Chahar, where Japanese influence was predominant, had at first refused to allow the 89th division access to the Nankou pass, which this crack division, trained at Nanking, had been given orders to defend. When at last access was permitted, there was no longer time to construct adequate field defence works.

On August 11th the Japanese began their advance on Nankou. First they swept aside the weak Chinese posts at the foot of the mountains and bombarded the railway workshops with the co-operation of armoured trains and tanks. The Chinese brigade which defended the pass had at its disposal only light mountain guns, while their opponents made use of a heavy howitzer as well as eight 12-centimetre guns, besides field artillery. The Nanking troops, however, put up a furious resistance, and on August 18th considerable Japanese reinforcements were sent up to the pass. Violent rainstorms filled the Japanese trenches and hindered the co-operation of the air arm. In spite of the reinforcements the offensive came to a standstill.

North of the mountainous tract of which we are speaking, up on the Mongolian plateau events had developed in the middle of August in a way very favourable to the Chinese. Mobile Chinese corps had made an advance through Changpei far to the eastward against Jehol, where part of the Manchukuo troops watched their opportunity to revolt against the Japanese. But at one stroke the whole situation was changed. On August 22nd Japanese forces appeared at Kuyuan and captured Tushihkou on the northermost part of the Great Wall. These troops pro-

PLATE VI



*Chinese soldiers relieving the front line in Shansi*



ceeded southward and occupied Huailai, directly in rear of the Nankou pass. On the 25th Kalgan was occupied, and the remarkable thing is that these places, which were "defended" by local troops, were taken practically without fighting. In the nick of time the 89th Nanking division, which had so successfully defended the Nankou pass, managed to withdraw westward under constant attacks from four Japanese bombing squadrons.

What then was the new factor which between the 22nd and the 25th of August suddenly reversed the whole situation? To all appearance it was the much-discussed mechanized Japanese brigade which at the beginning of August was operating around Peking to mop up straggling Chinese units. After that this active and effective brigade disappears for a couple of weeks, but we may not be far wrong in guessing that in the hour of emergency it was brought up between Kupeikow and Nankou in order to attack Kalgan from the east. The whole operation was a bold masterstroke of the Japanese army command; but it remains to be seen how far Liu Yu-ming was in collusion with the Japanese.

A similar tragic story, only on a much larger scale, was enacted in the province of Shansi, which constitutes a natural fortress of vast dimensions. Shansi means the land west of the mountains, and for two thousand years it has lain well protected behind its heights.

Ever since the revolution of 1912 "the model governor", General Yen Hsi-shan, has been in control. As early as 1916, during my first journey in Shansi, I saw everywhere traces of his good rule: no bandits, no opium. Time after time I returned to this well-governed and peaceful province, and with all my happy memories of General Yen I thought, when the war began, that he might be one of the corner-

stones of the national defence. Now, however, his capital has fallen. Everything seems to point to the two main passes, Niangtzekuan on the east and Yenmenkuan on the north, both formidable natural fastnesses, not having been strengthened sufficiently and in time with artillery positions, machine-gun posts, trenches and blockhouses. For otherwise it is impossible to understand how the Japanese could have advanced as rapidly as they did through these wild defiles, where small but well-armed and entrenched forces ought to be able to defy almost any enemy.

The loss of the Shansi plain is also to be deplored from another point of view. As a result of the weakness of the Chinese aerial defence armies exposed on the treeless plains, as for instance around Shanghai, have suffered cruelly under the mass bombardment of Japanese planes over their positions. In Shansi, if the defence had been organized in time, whole divisions might have taken up entirely bomb-proof positions in caves within the great loess deposits, a hundred and fifty feet deep, which cover almost the whole province. Hundreds of thousands of people have lived from time immemorial in these dry and healthy caves. In the dark and narrow ravines which everywhere traverse the loess plateaus the troops would have been able to move freely without a hostile airman having any chance of discovering them. And if only Shansi could have been held, this position behind the mountains would have prevented the Japanese from reaching the Yellow River along the Peking-Hankow line of railway.

How is it to be explained that these splendid opportunities for defence slipped out of the hands of the generals of North China, so that in four months their provinces became the spoil of the enemy? Western observers may find the situation difficult to grasp, and I must confess it did not

PLATE VII



*Chinese troops marching on a mountain path in Shansi*





become fully clear to me until I had been able to view it in a historical perspective, though a short one. The truth is that the national unity, which Chiang had succeeded more or less in consolidating down in the south, was in these parts still very far from being achieved.

Let us now look at the men who were responsible for the collapse in the north.

Farthest off we had at Kalgan General Liu Yu-ming, governor of the Chahar province. He tried at first to prevent Chiang's 89th division from taking up a defensive position in the Nankou pass, and afterwards he stabbed this brave and successful defence in the back by abandoning Kalgan and the Huailai plateau to the enemy without a blow. He may be dismissed as a traitor pure and simple.

Then we have General Sung Cheh-yuan, in command of the Twenty-ninth Army, which on the outbreak of hostilities was stationed at Peking. He was the buffer that was to absorb the pressure of the Japanese, as it manifested itself before the war broke out. We ought perhaps to observe that three full weeks elapsed between the nocturnal salute at Lu Kou Chiao and the outbreak of war on July 28th-29th. These three weeks were employed in the traditional manner for diplomatic manœuvring. The Japanese did not strike at once, as they hoped that Sung, who was to be reckoned as more or less an associate of theirs, would yield diplomatically and retire militarily. And General Sung for his part hoped—for what?

Then we have General Yen Hsi-shan, the "model governor" of Shansi. As late as in 1930 he had led the most dangerous of all the risings against Chiang. With all his remarkable merits as a civil governor he was not a man to depend on, either politically or as a soldier.

Finally, we come to the governor of Shantung, Han

Fu-chu. He was to begin with one of Feng Yü-hsiang's subordinate officers and thus came from a school of the strictest discipline. But being married to a Japanese and having very palpable Japanese political connections, he was reluctant to draw the sword. The Japanese spared his province in the most obvious way, so long as there was a probability that he would throw in his lot with them. But he was never able to come to a decision. The great events were too much for him ; and so he went to Hankow, only to face the firing squad which Chiang had ready for him.

The truth regarding the campaign in Hopei and Shansi is now made clear. On account of the threat from Yen Hsi-shan on the west and Han Fu-chu on the east Chiang would not take the risk of sending his main forces up to Hopei.

Therefore his choice fell upon engaging the Japanese at Shanghai.

## CHAPTER THIRTEEN

### GOOD-BYE TO PEKING

*November 1937.*

ONE November morning the *Tsinan* anchored outside the Taku bar, as the water was so low that this relatively small British steamer could not go up to Tientsin. Not till the next high tide would a tug-boat take us up to the town. We started at seven in the evening, but it took us ten whole hours to reach the quay at Tientsin. That this nocturnal trip was so comparatively pleasant was due to a benefactor who wishes to remain incognito, as he was a traveller of very special importance. He was not only one of the most prominent business men in the Far East but at the same time a story-teller of the highest rank, and the peals of laughter which filled the smoky little cabin after his ridiculous yarns still ring in my ears.

Tientsin had all the appearance of a great Japanese camp. All the Concessions swarmed with soldiers and officers ; lorries with supplies for the troops or soldiers in full field equipment. The streets full of Chinese going about their daily work, apparently in profound peace, calm and unmoved by the new order of things. As I dashed about in my taxi I could easily tell the boundaries of the Concessions by the uniforms of the Chinese policemen, of British, French or Japanese cut.

The three-forty-five train to Peking. I have not sat in so packed a compartment for many years ; half the number would have filled it to overflowing. My next neighbour was a young Japanese press photographer, enormously proud of his new camera. On the other side of him sat a journalist with all the hotel labels of Europe on his suitcase. The European persisted in conversing with the Japanese in English, and during the three hours' journey it never struck him that the Japanese did not understand a single word. Those who are acquainted with the mighty men from the eastern islands know that if a Japanese is at once embarrassed and polite he bows all the time, and if he is young and strong and is wedged in like a vice between his neighbours, the bowing becomes a rapid succession of jerks. When this convulsion is repeated for the third hour on an average three times a minute, the old gentleman on his right gets train-sick at last and goes out into the corridor.

An instructive company on this over-crowded train ! Apart from a sprinkling of Americans, Russians and other white men, the Japanese and Chinese are about equal in numbers, sitting quite peacefully side by side and often doing one another little favours of politeness.

But how unlike ! The Japanese gathered in active little groups with their heads stuck together over statistical hand-books, periodicals and maps, chief among them my friend Tsen's excellent map of China on a scale of 1 : 1,000,000. The energetic agents of the present moment, just arrived from their island home, with inquisitive eyes sucking in the strange dusty landscape which slowly fades away in the winter twilight. Eager men whose hands quiver with keenness to take up the work to which they have the honour to be called. Vigilant men, on the watch not only

against foreigners but against each other just as much, afraid of not being able to do as well or better than their companions.

And the Chinese ! The children play as usual, clear-eyed and rosy-cheeked, without a suspicion of the far-reaching change that has affected their future. The women talk of what has occupied their whole interest for five thousand years : the new generation, which in never-failing abundance continues to issue from their fertile wombs. But the men, young and old alike, sit there polite and calmly reticent, drinking their tea and cleaning their pipes, an imperturbable, timeless crowd with its roots in far-off centuries and with an assured confidence in the future, based not on bombing-planes and machine-guns but on the ineradicable vitality of a race which bows in silence under the blows, to rise again in the fullness of time. The only one of the world's Bronze Age cultures which survives in an unbroken succession, many times subjugated but never annihilated ; a culture which was already two thousand years old when during the T'ang dynasty the Japanese received their first baptism of civilization from the Chinese. As they sit now, these gentle, placid men, side by side with the new conquerors, so sat their ancestors in Chien Lung's time behind their shop-counters or in their *yamens*, calmly biding the time, which came at last, when the glory of the Ching dynasty should waste away through inbreeding and degeneration. So did their forefathers follow the plough under the Yuan dynasty, waiting for the savage military power of the Mongols to ebb away and be lost in the sands of Gobi. So sat the experienced craftsmen of the Sung dynasty, letting the storm from the north blow itself out above their heads. The victorious armies came always from the north-east, and always their conquests

came to nothing, when its tempestuous wave had rolled sufficiently far over the sand.

But here I am in the corridor of the train meditating on Chinese history, while the powerful lights of Fengtai, the big shunting station, the most advanced military post of the Japanese at the beginning of the war, fall upon the train. A few minutes more and we plunge back into the darkness of night, till the train skirts the Tartar wall and arrives at the terminus of the Mukden railway in Peking.

The whole of the almost endless platform under the wall, leading to the station of the Hankow line far, far away, is now a military camp. Rows of piled arms, huge stacks of equipment, soldiers on the move and soldiers in waiting groups. The Chinese and we few foreign travellers slip silently past the knots of Japanese soldiers and their masses of baggage.

The surroundings of the Wagons Lits Hôtel show no change, but outside the Japanese Embassy the military posts are protected by sandbag barricades, which seems a rather superfluous precaution, considering how many weeks the whole city has been occupied by the Japanese army.

Then I reach the Grand Hôtel de Pékin. Funnily enough I am assigned room No. 304, which during the visit of the Swedish Crown Prince in the autumn of 1926 was an extremely discreet Chinese police station to ensure the safety of the exalted travellers. I wonder what the aristocratic lady of the Swedish royal suite, who one day went with me into No. 304 and let the Commissary have our unvarnished opinion about a somewhat bungled affair, would have said if she could have seen how the royal apartments just opposite now looked. The doors stood open, busy voices were heard within and dusty orderlies hurried

in and out. The Grand Hôtel de Pékin was entirely given up to the conquerors.

When a little later I came down to dinner the lobby was full of Japanese, who were just pouring in after their day's work. Officers in high fur collars and shaggy caps, dusty boots and jingling spurs, orderlies struggling with bundles of food and huge thermos-flasks. Civilian clerks, as dusty as the soldiers, many with beards which had been allowed to grow wild in this foreign country where there was no time to shave. I can see these clerks hard at work making inventories of all movables in the Forbidden City, in the Summer Palace, in the temples on the Western Mountains, listing the railway rolling-stock, the machinery of coal mines and iron works, to say nothing of the masses of things to be noted down in all the *yamens*, in university, library and museums. Everything was to be entered in the books, and it was all to be done rapidly and systematically; such was the idea I got from conversing with three Japanese I met in the train.

As I entered the dining-room and saw these men in their dusty boots and ragged beards I thought for a moment that the once fashionable hotel had been turned into barracks. For here in the small dining-room I had once had the honour of sitting at table with the Swedish Crown Prince and Princess, with members of the Chinese Government and with notables belonging to the scientific world of Peking. But then I saw in the middle of the room, sitting alone at his table, a Japanese dressed in a black kimono, elegant and self-possessed, and I realized that this was only a transitional phase. Soon the hotel would again receive a distinguished public—but a different public! The American tourists, the dance-loving attachés from the legations and the dignified, taciturn Chinese would be in



a minority. A new age has forced its way in. I feel that now I have definitely arrived at the "journey's end". Two days more in Peking and I shall have settled my affairs. Then home.

A few days later. Good-bye, Peking! The morning train is taking me back to Tientsin. As I sit looking out over the frozen winter landscape I note a very interesting detail which escaped me as I travelled up in the dark on Saturday evening. Every station is full of Japanese soldiers in field equipment, and on the station roof they have built a little platform on which a sentry stands looking out over the plain. At Langfang, the big half-way station, this platform was actually protected with sandbags, and outside the village I saw three military aeroplanes ready to take off if anything happened.

This preparedness in the middle of an open treeless plain, far behind the fighting lines, was rather remarkable. Fortunately I knew a man in Tientsin whose business it is to know everything. That evening I went to see him and asked for an explanation.

"You see," he said, "the Peking plain, which had never before seen a Communist, is now full between the railway lines of plundering Red bands whose tactics consist of falling suddenly upon the weaker Japanese posts in order to supply themselves with arms and ammunition. How much damage these wild guerrilla bands can inflict on the Japanese remains to be seen. One thing is certain, the local inhabitants are suffering terribly, on the one hand from the Reds' depredations and on the other from the severe Japanese reprisals."

And now I am sitting safely in my cabin on board the comfortable British coasting steamer *Shuntien* on the way south to Shanghai. I have plenty of time for reflection,

and it feels good to have done with Peking. I was there in the sunny time for foreigners, when the hotels were crowded with agents of all sorts. If the walls of the Wagons Lits Hôtel could tell their story, what a chequered tale of mining and counter-mining, of honest work and international bluff, intrigue and love, laughter and tears it would be !

Actually the sight of Peking was the most painful to an old friend of China like myself. The warships and fleets of transports, the trenches and the roar of guns, the bombing raids and the great conflagrations in Shanghai were full of excitement and rapidly changing interest. Even the smoking ruins and the refugee camps retained something of war's grim dynamics.

But the dead water behind the defeat is terrifying. Of course things will soon be put straight : we can trust the new men for that. Perhaps the Manchu Emperor will take the Mukden train back to the Forbidden City. Perhaps the worthy old Wu with a resigned sense of duty will lend his name to the formation of a cabinet which will satisfy the demands of the new age.

As I have said, order will be restored, an order protected by bayonets and the pistols of the police. In due time, too, a new dawn will come for nationalist China, when the long line of development has completed its cycle. But meanwhile there is a long darkness ahead of the youth of the country, which during the last twenty years has risen in a renaissance so many-headed but so full of vitality.

The last few months have dealt hardly with the country's foremost seats of learning. The Peiyang University at Tientsin is a heap of blackened ruins. The great Central University in Peking is a barracks for Japanese troops.

I have by me at this moment the October number of

*Tien Hsia*, one of the reviews of *Young China*, and I read in it of the young literary Communist, Miss Ting Ling, who saw her friends and comrades fall before the firing-squads of the Nanking government, but who nevertheless preached from the headquarters of the Red army at Yen-anfu co-operation with Nanking against the Japanese. Voices of this kind are of course doomed to silence, to say the very least. All the intellectual movements which have hitherto flourished freely in the sunshine will have to work underground, in the secret societies so dear to the Chinese.

Good-bye, Peking! The wind blows cold over North China. It is a happy feeling to have a soil which I can call mine, and a native land which has been built up into a sound and solid social structure. May we be able to defend this precious Swedish inheritance, so that our children need never feel the pressure of an invader's heel.

## CHAPTER FOURTEEN

### THE FIGHT FOR SHANGHAI

**I**N many cases, while an armed conflict is still in progress, the motives are not apparent which led one or the other of the two opposing States to any given decision regarding the course to be followed in planning the campaign. Not till years after the conclusion of peace does the vast documentary material become available, making it possible to trace the relation of cause and effect behind the directly visible events. During the progress of the war the interested spectator must have recourse very largely to more or less well-founded guesswork.

One question, still under debate, is this : why was the conflict, which in the first place only concerned North China, extended in such a way that for some months Shanghai became the main theatre of war ?

To a European view it seems natural that an armed conflict between China and Japan must be total ; that the aggressor, Japan, must strike at all vital points the possession of which would hasten a decision. But out in the East it is not so simple ; for political reasons the aggressor may prefer to limit his attack, in order, for instance, to avoid friction with the Western Powers who have important interests in China. From this point of view it appears very probable that Japan preferred for the present, as her immediate objective was North China, not to touch Shanghai, which is the citadel of the other Great Powers.

On these assumptions it is a likely guess that the Chinese decided to make Shanghai a theatre of war of the first order. As we have already seen, Chiang Kai-shek did not venture to engage his crack divisions to any great extent north of the Yellow River, but on the other hand, it was a vital matter for him to use them in such a way as to give the weak and hard-pressed provincial troops in the north a relief from the overwhelming pressure of the Japanese armies of invasion. In order to achieve this nothing lay nearer to his hand than to try to expel the Japanese garrison at Shanghai, very weak at the outbreak of war, or in any case to draw upon himself Japanese forces of sufficient strength sensibly to ease the pressure north of the Yellow River.

In the spring of 1932 the Nineteenth Chinese Army on the outskirts of Shanghai had for two months brilliantly held up Japanese troops amounting towards the end to sixty thousand men. Now Chiang was tempted to do the same on a bigger scale. Directly under the eyes of the sympathetically interested foreigners he here held up for three months a Japanese army of invasion which, when at last the Chinese retreat began, numbered about a quarter of a million men.

There were at the same time two political inducements which weighed heavily with Chiang in choosing the outskirts of Shanghai as one of the battlefields. From the very beginning the Japanese transformed that part of the International Settlement which lies north of Soochow Creek into a base for their military operations. Obviously a proceeding like this might easily lead to complications between Japan and the foreign Great Powers—a situation which the Japanese would do all they could to avoid, while the Chinese prayed with all their hearts that fate might bring at least one of the Great Powers into the war on the side of China.

Then there was another circumstance, perhaps the most important of all. Shanghai was the seat of the Inspectorate General of Maritime Customs, controlling the export and above all the import duties, the Chinese Government's chief source of revenue. And what is more, Shanghai, the fifth city in the world, the gate through which most foreign goods entered China, was the place where the Customs revenues trickled most plentifully into the treasury of Nanking. We are quite justified in saying that the war around Shanghai was a struggle for China's Customs revenues.

What started the war at Shanghai was a series of incidents of the kind which always occur when two strongly antagonistic armed forces stand watching one another. It is true that the peace treaty of 1932 provided for a demilitarized zone outside the northern section of the International Settlement; but just inside this northern section of the foreign city the Japanese had established a base for their marines, whose presence was a constant menace in the street-life of Shanghai.


The most serious of these incidents that preceded the great concentrations of troops occurred on the afternoon of August 9th 1937, when Sub-Lieutenant Oyama and a Japanese rating were shot down in the vicinity of the Hungjao aerodrome. What exactly happened will never be cleared up, but it seems pretty plain that the Japanese officer acted very incautiously in approaching indiscreetly an area of such military importance in the prevailing state of political tension. On the other hand, the Chinese sentries probably exceeded their orders in killing the Japanese. Apparently a fight took place, as one of the Chinese sentries was also reported killed.

During these critical days (August 9th to 11th) both the

contending parties strengthened their forces at Shanghai. Four Japanese cruisers and seven destroyers ascended the Whangpoo and landed a thousand marines, bringing the effective Japanese force on land up to three thousand three hundred men. On their side the Chinese army command began on August 9th, or 10th at latest, to send large numbers of troops by rail to Shanghai, and on the night of the 11th the North Station and Kiangwan, both places on the outskirts of the great city, were occupied by the 87th and 88th divisions ; that is, between twenty and thirty thousand men. For an understanding of the peculiar situation which now rapidly developed, it should be added that the sections of the International Settlement not in possession of the Japanese were guarded by relatively small British and American forces, to which an Italian contingent was added later. The French Concession was very resolutely protected by French troops. It was to the interest of both Japanese and Chinese not to come in conflict with these foreign forces and, apart from one or two bombing catastrophes and some boundary clashes, the European and American troops did succeed in protecting the foreign communities during the whole three months of hostilities on the outskirts of Shanghai. At the commencement of fighting the Japanese tried to keep up the fiction that they were only protecting their part of the International Settlement, while the Chinese insisted that the naval and military base which the Japanese had established in the northern section of the Settlement was an infringement of its neutrality ; a point of view which may be regarded as unassailable.

After various skirmishes on the 13th both sides attacked from the air on the 14th. Two Japanese seaplanes attacked the Hungjao aerodrome, while the Chinese bombers tried

PLATE VIII



*A picture taken on August 14th 1927 showing the immense crowds on Garden*





to hit the Japanese flagship *Idzumo*, which was moored quite near the Japanese Consulate General.

An event which overshadowed all other happenings on that "Bloody Saturday", at any rate in the interest of foreigners, was the double catastrophe within the non-Japanese section of the International Settlement. Between four and five in the afternoon two Chinese planes each dropped a bomb, one on the traffic circus at the junction of the Avenue Edward VII—Yu Ya Ching Road and the Boulevard de Montigny, the other at the corner of Nanking Road and the Bund. The effect of the first-named explosion was terrible; it has even been suggested that it was a world's record in the destruction of a civil population in aerial warfare. The traffic circus was filled with refugees trying to get away from the district occupied by the Japanese. The bomb made a huge crater in the street paving. The destruction was so appalling, wreckage of falling houses, paving-stones and exploding motor-cars were so intermixed with fragments of human bodies that it was never possible to calculate the exact number of casualties. One thousand and forty-seven persons killed and three hundred and three wounded are thus minimum figures.

Two of the city's big hotels suffered severely from the Nanking Road bomb: the Cathay Hotel and the Palace Hotel, which face each other at the end of that road. Here the number of victims was over two hundred, including more than one hundred and forty-five killed. Almost all the victims of these two explosions were Chinese, but among the few foreigners were some well-known persons.

The Chinese army command published an explanation of what had happened, to the effect that the pilots had been wounded by Japanese anti-aircraft shells and that the bomb-racks were damaged, so that their releasing was quite

involuntary. This interpretation did not satisfy the opinion of the foreign colony. The unparalleled catastrophes in the midst of a neutral population and one favourably disposed to the Chinese naturally created a feeling of panic, which expressed itself in arrangements for the speedy evacuation of British women and children to Hong Kong and of American women and children to Manila. In addition considerable reinforcements were summoned for the foreign troops who guarded the two districts under foreign administration.

On Monday the 16th the Bund was again shaken by a violent explosion, but this time it was a question of a resolute Chinese attack on the Japanese flagship *Idzumo*. Screened by a tug a Thorneycroft torpedo-boat came slowly down the river. Suddenly she increased her speed, swung round towards the Japanese cruiser and fired one of her torpedoes, but without causing serious damage. Again, on a much later occasion, a desperate attack was made on the *Idzumo* with a floating mine, towed by a small number of swimming soldiers. But the Japanese warship was now surrounded by torpedo-nets and the mine exploded without reaching its object.

For about ten days, reckoned from the 14th, less than four thousand Japanese were opposed at Shanghai to more than twenty thousand Chinese troops. That the latter did not succeed in their repeated attempts to throw the little Japanese landing-force into the river must have been due to a great extent to the protection given by the fire of the numerous Japanese warships to their hard-pressed compatriots ashore. Sometimes the situation of these Japanese contingents was very critical, and on at least one occasion the Chinese came near to splitting them into isolated groups and forcing them towards the river. On the other hand, the Japanese gun-fire was very effective against the two

Chinese divisions, which were inferior in artillery and according to their own account had already lost by the 18th a quarter of their strength.

On Friday, August 20th, there was great activity in the air, concentrated partly on the Hongkew district, the Japanese headquarters, partly on Pootung on the east bank of the river, where the Japanese fighting planes tried to spot some troublesome Chinese batteries. At 6.40 p.m., while an artillery duel was in progress across the river, a shell burst on the deck of the American flagship *Augusta*, killing one seaman and wounding eighteen.

On Monday, August 23rd, under cover of fire from the warships, fifty thousand newly arrived Japanese troops were landed at Woosung near the river-mouth. At the same time General Ivane Matsui, formerly Governor of Formosa, assumed command of the land forces at Shanghai, which was thus characterized by the Japanese government as a theatre of war of the first order. Even earlier than this very considerable reinforcements had arrived at Shanghai from Nanking. During the whole of the fighting around this city the Chinese command tried to balance the weaker technical equipment of its troops by a superiority in numbers of two or more to one.

Immediately after 1 p.m. on this day (the 23rd) two very large bombs (each about a quarter of a ton) were dropped from a great height, estimated at fifteen thousand feet, on the centre of the foreign district. One of them hit the American naval store, only forty yards from a building temporarily occupied by the British Consulate General. The bomb penetrated three floors and fell to the ground in pieces without exploding.

The other bomb fell close to the biggest department store in the city, that of the Sincere Co., and did great damage

to the buildings. One hundred and seventy-three persons were killed and five hundred and forty-nine injured.

It was never made clear which of the opposing forces was responsible for this fresh tragedy in the middle of the foreign city. The evidence on which the Chinese tried to lay the blame on the Japanese was not regarded as altogether convincing.

Attacks on the lives of neutrals now came in rapid succession ; one of them in circumstances which gave rise to an international sensation of the first order. At seven o'clock on the morning of August 26th the British Ambassador, Sir Hughe M. Knatchbull-Hugessen, accompanied by the military attaché and the Embassy's financial adviser, left Nanking by car for Shanghai, where the Ambassador wished to consult the officer in command of the British troops and leading men of the British colony. His two companions were Lieut.-Colonel W. A. Lovat-Fraser and Mr. E. L. Hall-Patch. Lieut.-Colonel Lovat-Fraser drove the Ambassador's car, in which Mr. Hall-Patch also sat. A baggage car followed, driven by a Chinese chauffeur. Both cars carried British flags, which, however, only measured 18 × 27 inches.

At 2.30 p.m., when they were fifty miles from Shanghai, Colonel Lovat-Fraser became aware that the car was being fired on from the air. He and Mr. Hall-Patch got out of the car, and they now noticed that the Ambassador was severely wounded and unable to move. While they were debating what was the best thing to be done another aeroplane came and dropped a bomb, which fell in a rice-field close to the cars. Both the Englishmen were flung by the blast into another rice-field. As soon as they regained consciousness they drove at top speed to Shanghai and deposited the wounded Ambassador at the Country Hospital.



*Randall Gould Photo*

*A Chinese soldier examining a comrade who has been killed by a bullet.*



The manoeuvre of the Japanese radio station in attributing what had happened, in a first broadcast in English, to "outrageous Chinese soldiery" created a bad impression internationally, as the Japanese nationality of the attacking aeroplanes had been fully ascertained by the two Englishmen in official positions who accompanied and took charge of the wounded Ambassador.

On Monday, August 30th, another attack on neutral lives was made from the air. The American steamer *President Hoover*, belonging to the Dollar Line, which was to call at Shanghai on the way from Manila to Hong Kong in order to take off American refugees, was attacked at the mouth of the Whangpoo by Chinese fighting planes, which evidently took her to be a Japanese transport. Three bombs fell near the steamer and showered her with splinters, and a fourth hit her on the port side, making a hole in the upper deck twenty feet in diameter. Seven men of the crew were wounded, one of them fatally. In this case the guilty party acknowledged the fatal mistake immediately and without the slightest evasion and offered suitable reparation.

When the fighting around Shanghai began in the middle of August it was at first confined to a local effort on the part of the two Chinese divisions which were then stationed by the North Station to drive the small body of Japanese marines out into the river from their base in the northern section of the International Settlement. But in proportion as both sides were heavily reinforced, the front was extended to the north, mainly owing to the Japanese having succeeded after prolonged and bitter fighting in occupying the point of Woosung at the mouth of the Whangpoo and silencing its batteries. By degrees the whole western bank of the river from Woosung up to Shanghai came into the hands of the



Japanese, thanks largely to the superior fire of the Japanese warships anchored in the river. But the Chinese troops dug themselves in a few miles from the bank, where the Japanese naval artillery was less effective. Under the direction of the commission of German officers, whose chief was General von Falkenhausen, the man who for several years had assisted Chiang Kai-shek in creating his new armies, fully up-to-date field-works were constructed here, the bomb-proof nature of which to some extent lessened the vulnerability of the Chinese defence to the superior Japanese artillery and bombing-planes.

At first there were many defects in the leadership of the Chinese troops. Divisions from Kwangsi, a province which has taken an honourable part in China's defensive war, arrived at the front full of eagerness to meet the hated aggressor at last. Untrained in modern trench warfare these soldiers dashed forward in mass formation against the Japanese lines in an attempt to break through thanks to their overwhelming numbers. After their first sanguinary lessons the new-comers soon adapted themselves to the methods of the war of positions, and the Chinese soldier's many good qualities, his tenacity and endurance, combined with his fatalistic self-sacrifice, rendered him an adversary who time after time forced the Japanese generals to express an appreciation of his unexpectedly stubborn defence.

Here the Chinese were fighting directly under the eyes of European and American officers, who again and again described the Chinese soldier as fully equal to his opponent in personal courage and constancy. But the more skilful leadership of the Japanese troops, their superior technical equipment and the strength derived from an offensive tradition of half a century, slowly pressed the Chinese front to the westward in the course of extremely severe engage-

ments, while at the same time the fighting line was prolonged up the Yangtze River, till from two hundred to two hundred and fifty thousand Japanese were opposed to double that number of Chinese on a front of twenty miles, which reached from Chapei and the North Station in a north-westerly direction over the plain of the delta to the bank of the Yangtze at Liuho.

Such is the situation as we turn the page to the next chapter.

## CHAPTER FIFTEEN

### THE BURNING OF CHAPEI

LATE in the evening of October 15th we left Hong Kong on board the Italian passenger steamer *Victoria*, and on the evening of the 17th we entered the Yangtze River. There was no sign of a war in progress. The lights were burning along the coast, and a couple of tramp steamers peacefully poured out their smoke over the calm reflecting surface of the water. At nine-fifteen a Shanghai pilot-boat came alongside, and steered by the pilot the great steamer slowly glided up to her anchorage by some islands off Woosung. We were told that at eight o'clock on the following morning a tender would take us up to the Customs pier in Shanghai.

When I came on deck about seven on the 18th the first signs of a state of war were visible : two Japanese destroyers and an aircraft-carrier, on which two seaplanes were just landing. The tender lay waiting by the *Victoria's* side, but it was getting on for nine before the masses of baggage belonging to the *Victoria's* two hundred passengers were transferred to the little steamboat, and the apparently endless string of travellers had crawled down the accommodation-ladder.

And then began the trip up the Whangpoo in the sunny autumn morning. Our rather heterogeneous company had been joined by a party of Italian marines, but no restraint

was put upon us. Zeiss glasses and cameras were in active use. As we passed one Japanese warship after the other, often at very close quarters, each side took a good look at the other. Here and there a Japanese bluejacket gave a little tentative wave. The whole thing had a holiday air, which was thoroughly enjoyed by everyone on board the tender.

Naturally our attention was directed in the first place to the Japanese men-of-war, which lay anchored at intervals up the river. At some distance off the Woosung point lay a big rusty hulk, presumably an old armoured vessel, and around her some ten transports. Besides these I counted, as we steamed up, three aircraft-carriers, three cruisers, ten to fifteen destroyers and seven river gunboats, which on the outbreak of war were brought down from their stations in the Yangtze ports. At the Hongkew quay we also saw two hospital ships, one of them a big white passenger steamer, the *Asahi Maru*.

Our first sight of the mainland was the Woosung peninsula with its old Chinese batteries, now silenced and shot to pieces. For that matter every building in this part that had existed before the war was shot to pieces or burnt down. I had seen this shore in May, as we travelled up to Szechuan, a flourishing, well-developed district, full of industrious people. Now it was all an endless heap of rubbish.

But a new and extremely animated element had here taken the place of the peaceful Chinese population. At a short distance above Woosung began the huge dumps of Japanese army stores ; cases and bales of goods lay stacked over vast areas, and around them there was a swarm of soldiers, motor-lorries and horses. Farther up we saw the motor-road that runs along the river-bank filled with a double stream of lorries. But behind this picture of new pulsating

life lay the ravaged country with its ruins and its cornfields, which as lately as in May had looked like well-kept gardens, now abandoned and choked with weeds. And a little higher up the river I noticed how the Yukong wharf, the pride of the Chinese, a part of their dream of Greater Shanghai, which had only been opened in the spring, was now partly destroyed and was being used by the Japanese fleet for discharging and storing supplies.

And then at last, when off the Japanese Consulate General, we saw the *Idzumo*, the Japanese cruiser serving as flagship. She was not exactly a youthful beauty with her forty summers on her back, this *Idzumo* that had lately won such fame as the seemingly invulnerable target of the Chinese batteries on the Pootung peninsula and of nightly attempts to blow her up made by a few Chinese desperadoes. But her real popularity was achieved when the Chinese gunners' inability to hit her had become a byword and the following *bon mot* passed from mouth to mouth. A lady of the foreign colony one day asked her husband what was the safest thing to do with her jewellery in these troubled times. "Deposit it aboard the *Idzumo*," was the reply.

Well, here we are back in Shanghai after six months in the interior of China. And this time I have taken up my quarters on the eleventh floor of the twenty-two-storeyed Park Hotel, which being situated close to Soochow Creek and Chapei gives a splendid view of the fighting in progress.

It is to a city changed in almost every respect that I have returned. The river, which in the spring was full of steamers and junks, now lies empty and abandoned, apart from some battered wrecks and a few laid-up steamboats. The quays, usually buzzing with life and hurried activity stare at us with empty eyes. The Pootung side, where the

great commercial firms have their warehouses, is lifeless with burnt-out gaps among the blocks of buildings. Banks and shops have had their windows and doors protected with planks or sandbag barricades, and the brave placards "Business as usual" are only an attempt to conceal the stagnation which has fallen upon pretty nearly every commercial activity. Office staffs are reduced, salaries cut down, and many of the weaker firms are faced with bankruptcy. So there is no doubt the business community of Shanghai is feeling the effects of the war that rages only a few hundred yards from us.

Looking out to the north over Soochow Creek and Chapei from our rooms in the Park Hotel we have at a distance of not much more than half a mile the scene of the hardest fighting. Rifles, machine-guns and trench-mortars mingle their voices night and day, so that it takes a night or two before one learns how to sleep to the tune of this lullaby. There is hardly room for artillery in this street-fighting, but the predominant note in the noise is that of the bombing-plane. At first I didn't quite see the joke of it, as I sat at my typewriter and heard one dull report after another, giving one the illusion of thunder-claps. But it was not long before the air bombardment of Chapei became a matter of routine, which did not always draw one to the window. If one was really lucky with the Zeiss glasses one could see when the big bird dropped its dangerous egg, and then a huge cloud of black dust rose among the houses, at the same moment as the thunderclap reached our post of observation. After that, as a rule, it was not more than a quarter of an hour before a great cloud of black smoke and red tongues of fire ascended from the point of fall.

On October 23rd we had our famous fellow-countryman from Canton, Colonel Olivecrona, as our guest for lunch,

and before taking the lift down to the dining-room we visited the fourteenth floor, where there is a wide space of window directly facing the North Station, which the Chinese were trying to defend and the Japanese to capture at all costs. It was like a regular parade : three planes wheeled round in one and the same circle time after time, and when they reached a certain point, always the same, on their course, a bomb was dropped ; after that they circled round again till they were back at the spot aimed at.

The Japanese bombers mostly fly by day, when their aim is far surer. The unfortunate Chinese troops are ill provided with anti-aircraft guns, so the Japanese can bombard them with impunity as much as they please. And I have seen nothing of Chinese pursuit-planes on this part of the front.

Some Chinese aeroplanes, which do not venture out in the daytime, are often up at night. Their objectives are the warships in the river and the great stores which the Japanese have on the western shore. But when the Chinese airmen come sweeping through the darkness things get lively. Searchlights play in every direction and the short sharp reports of the anti-aircraft guns rattle in the ears of a sleepy traveller. Every night is illuminated by the red glare of burning houses, and a loathsome choking atmosphere of smoke lies permanently over the city.

But from October 20th it was already becoming clear to foreign military observers that the Chinese, who for two and a half months had so persistently maintained their contact with Shanghai, would soon be forced to retire. By degrees the front line had assumed a fairly fantastic shape, owing to the obstinacy of the Chinese in holding on to Kiangwan and above all the North Station ; and as the object of the Japanese—to tie the mouth of the sack by storming the

PLATE X



*Effect of a bomb in Hongkew, Shanghai*

[Facing p. 170





junction of Tazang—became clearer day by day, retreat was finally inevitable. Since Saturday, October 23rd, the Japanese attack on Tazang had proceeded with constantly increasing intensity, and when on the 26th a rapid encircling movement brought Japanese forces up in rear of the Chinese troops who were stubbornly defending the village, the order was given to evacuate Chapei and the North Station.

The night between the 26th and 27th was one of the most disturbed Shanghai had experienced, particularly for us in the Park Hotel, who were living high up in the air and in close proximity to the violent street-fighting. For once the Japanese bombers joined in the work that night : air-bombs, guns, trench-mortars, machine-guns and rifles, every means of destruction this powerfully mechanized enemy had at his disposal was let loose in a rain of explosives, fire and steel over this quarter of the city that had been tortured for months and was now doomed to destruction.


On the morning of the 27th the firing ceased ; the Chinese divisions which, deeply dug in, had held up the Japanese for more than two months, had slipped out during the night under cover of darkness, and in the opinion of European and American officers on the spot the retreat was accomplished with exemplary regularity and was so dogged and complete that the Japanese found simply nothing in the way of military supplies. In order to cover the retirement the late defenders set fire to the town. From dawn on the 27th throughout the whole day we saw from our lofty look-out fire after fire flare up and spread, till we had before us a continuous front of fire the length of which was estimated by different observers at from four to six miles. I cannot even guess at the depth of this conflagration, and it is quite likely that here and there in the sea of fire there were islands

which escaped destruction ; but it appears probable that four square miles would be a very cautious estimate of the urban area that was wiped out by the fire. As this was one of the most thickly populated quarters of Shanghai, it has been conjectured that something like a million people lost their homes, even if large numbers had fled at an earlier stage from this inferno of street-fighting.

When at last night descended upon this day, which surely no dweller in Shanghai will forget, then and not till then did we see the full extent of this abominable destruction. The glowing wall of fire stretched all the way from north-north-east to west-south-west, reckoned from our point of vision ; part of it quite near, part on the north-west disappearing behind Soochow Creek. Fortunately enough the wind carried the immense volume of smoke to the northward during the whole of that critical day ; otherwise the foreign city would have been in immediate danger, and we should certainly have been smoked out of our swallow's nest.

There is no doubt that night of the burning of Chapei will be reckoned as one of the great conflagrations in the history of the world. On me personally the sight of the unparalleled zone of fire made a strangely nauseating impression. My thoughts were split up into tens of thousands of little pictures of all the poor, thickly clustered homes where only a few months ago an industrious and peace-loving population went about its daily work. Where are they now, all these small tradesmen and workers who have lost all ? How many old people, pregnant women and little children were left to be roasted to death among the glowing ruins ?

What is it really worth, this wonderful machine civilization, if it has no inherent force to prevent a destruction



like this? Will it never be possible to create an international power, not talk and resolutions which are not worth the paper they are written on, but a power higher than war, a power that treats the aggressor as society deals with a man-eating tiger or a dangerous criminal?

On the forenoon of the 27th our Zeiss glasses could already make out the Japanese soldiers busily engaged in occupying those houses along the creek which had not been burnt and hoisting the Japanese flag on their roofs. But on two warehouse buildings, situated close together, the Chinese flag still floated, and in spite of all the efforts of the Japanese it remained there till the morning of Sunday the 31st. This is one of the most picturesque episodes in the heroic Chinese defence of Chapei, a deed which will certainly live for all time in popular story. Some smaller units had been left behind to cover the great retreat. One of these, a battalion of five hundred men under the command of a colonel and a major, had not been given the order to evacuate its position in the International Saving Society's warehouse and while waiting for this order they held their ground, a small remnant exposed on three sides to the decimating fire of the Japanese, until the Saturday night. On the side of the creek they were directly in contact with the British troops on guard, who fraternized heartily with these heroes for four unforgettable days, when every morning we turned first of all to see whether the two Chinese flags still fluttered defiantly in the breeze.

On the Saturday night an intensive bombardment was opened on the two warehouses, and by morning they were on fire. Not till the buildings had thus been made untenable did three hundred and seventy Chinese soldiers surrender to the British military authorities. The firing on that Saturday night had its perils even for us foreigners. A

number of houses were hit by stray bullets, among them the editorial office of the *North China Daily News*, the leading foreign paper, where three Chinese among the editorial staff were wounded.

## CHAPTER SIXTEEN

### THE FALL OF NANKING

ON October 31st 1937, General Matsui, the Japanese Commander-in-Chief at Shanghai, granted an interview to a representative of the Italian paper *Corriere della Sera*. In the course of it he made a statement which mystified the public but soon proved to be a forecast of a new and decisive Japanese action. The Japanese, who for two and a half months, under the exulting eyes of the foreigners had suffered the disgrace of failing in all their attempts to break through the Chinese line of defence, had seen at last that a great effort was unavoidable to put an end to the deadlock.

General Matsui's declaration to the Italian journalist was to the effect that within ten days not a single Chinese soldier would be found in the neighbourhood of Shanghai. And he added rather caustically that the Brussels conference, which was just about to meet, would be rendered entirely superfluous by the operations of the Japanese troops. And from that day the Japanese forces between Shanghai and Nanking worked according to a time-table which never failed.

At five in the morning of November 5th the Japanese fleet began to land troops on the north shore of Hangchow Bay, north-east of Chapu, fifty miles south-west of Shanghai. The first contingent landed seems to have consisted of

marines, but on the following day it was known already that the movement was taking place on a large scale under the protection of four cruisers of the *Natori* type. From forty transports thirty thousand men were put ashore.

Time after time the Japanese had made earlier attempts to land troops, now on the Pootung peninsula east of Shanghai, now on the south bank of the Yangtzekiang beyond Liuho, but had always been repulsed. Even though this landing in Hangchow Bay was on a very different scale, it is remarkable that it was so easily accomplished. To the west of Shanghai, in the direction of the great Taihu lake, there are extensive marshes and small lakes. The Chinese had large forces stationed to the north-east, north and south-west of the point of landing; namely two divisions on the Pootung peninsula, considerable reserves behind the defensive lines at Shanghai and important forces at Hangchow. If these had been under resolute leadership and if their fire had been approximately equal to that of the Japanese, the relatively small landing-force, which moved with venturesome rapidity northward in the direction of Sungkiang, might easily have been pushed into the lake district and the result might have been a Chinese Tannenberg victory, which at that moment would have had an almost incalculable effect on the whole course of the campaign. There has even been a talk of treachery to explain the absence of effective resistance during and after the landing. But it is possible that the fault lay in the frequent changes in the Chinese command on the Shanghai front. Until September 26th General Chang Chi-tung had command of the Chinese forces at Shanghai: Before the outbreak of war he was chief of the Military College at Nanking and was thus familiar with the country between the capital and Shanghai. On the day mentioned he was succeeded by General Chu Shao-



liang, who for four years had held a command far up in north-western China and was strange to this theatre of war. But two days before the landing of Japanese troops in Hangchow Bay the command on the Shanghai front was transferred to General Chang Fa-kuei, a militarist of the old school. The whole thing is another of the numerous examples in this war of political influences being allowed to override purely military interests.

The Japanese troops which were landed to the south-west of Shanghai on November 5th moved northward with phenomenal rapidity. Within twenty-six hours they had reached the south bank of the Whangpoo River, twenty miles from their landing-place. The river was crossed without delay, and the important town of Sungkiang was surrounded. On the night of November 7th the railway line between Shanghai and Hangchow was torn up on both sides of Sungkiang. So as not to be taken in the rear by this new threat from the south the Chinese right wing at Shanghai was compelled on the night of November 8th to withdraw to the westward, and on the morning of the 10th the Japanese forces at Shanghai established contact with the troops from Hangchow Bay. The steady withdrawal of the Chinese, which had been covered by numerous counter-attacks, was now on the point of degenerating into a disorderly flight. In an attempt to check the threatened catastrophe a fourth Chinese Commander-in-Chief now arrived in the person of the famous Kuangsi general, Pai Chung-hsi, and took up his headquarters at Kashing immediately to the south-east of Lake Taihu.

During the first half of November masses of Japanese troops and military supplies poured into Shanghai, and the number of Japanese soldiers within that area, which till now had not exceeded one hundred and forty thousand,



*The Whangpoo river, showing a great fire on the Pootung side, caused by a bomb*



rose rapidly to two hundred thousand. And now things soon developed in a new way, disastrous to the Chinese, which shows how little sense they really had of availing themselves of the defensive possibilities of their own country. Among its many-sided preparations for this complicated campaign the Japanese High Command had transported from home to Shanghai a large number of shallow-draught, motor-driven fishing-boats, which were now brought up to Lake Taihu by the river and creeks. Armed with light guns and with a crew of thirty men these motor vessels, which appeared by the hundred both on Taihu, the great central lake, and on the Yangtzekiang, formed a new means of offence, unforeseen by the Chinese. How differently this campaign might have resulted if the Chinese had provided their water-ways in time with a lightly armed motor flotilla. As it was, the inland waters, which ought to have been an obstacle to the Japanese, became convenient links in their communications. The consequence was that the strongly fortified "Hindenburg Line", constructed under the direction of the German military advisers from Liuho on the Yangtze, through Taitsang and Quinsan to the lakes near Soochow, was never manned. The old Mukden divisions, which at one time had clamoured to be led against the Japanese, revolted when they should have occupied the defensive line; and the flight became contagious, while the Japanese air force, now unopposed, continually harassed the retiring Chinese divisions with its bombs and machine-guns.

At dawn on November 19th the Japanese advance-guard marched through one of the city gates into Soochow in pouring rain and with the hoods of their waterproof capes over their heads, without the sleepy Chinese sentries seeing who they were.

As early as November 13th a Japanese detachment had landed at Paimaokow on the south bank of the Yangtze between Liuho and the Fushan fort, and after support from the fleet this shattered fort was occupied on the 20th.

The strongest Chinese fortress on the Yangtze River below Nanking was the fort of Kiangyin, the approach to which was blocked by sunken steamers and junks. The bombardment of the fort by the Japanese fleet and aeroplanes began on the 23rd, and on the following day the fortifications were also invested by land troops. After furious shelling, which culminated on the 27th and 28th, the town of Kiangyin fell on the 29th into the hands of the Japanese. The fort itself, almost completely destroyed by persistent bombardment from the river and from the air, was not evacuated till December 2nd.

The Japanese troops in the Shanghai-Nanking area had now been raised through reinforcements from home to a quarter of a million. The advance on the capital was conducted on three lines: the right wing proceeded by Kiangyin and Chinkiang, near the Yangtze River; the centre by Soochow and Wusih, and an extremely mobile left wing, strongly supported by the motor flotilla on Taihu, advanced south and west of that lake by forced marches, partly on Nanking, partly on Wuhu, farther up the Yangtze-kiang.

Sharp engagements took place around the town of Wusih at the northern end of Taihu. The town was reached by the Japanese on the 23rd, but the Chinese made repeated counter-attacks, till on the morning of the 25th the town came into the hands of the Japanese.

Far down to the south at Kwangteh, west of Taihu, the Chinese defence seems also to have hardened in the first days of December. The Chinese claim to have retaken

the town twice. But after these episodes of stiffer resistance the flight continued towards Nanking. Fully aware of the collapse of the enemy's defensive, the Japanese flying columns operating to the west of Taihu now dropped all consideration for their wings or communications. The rate of march was extraordinarily high and by December 5th an advance-guard was only two and a half miles to the south of Nanking.

On December 6th preparations for the attack on Nanking were completed, while the Chinese systematically destroyed hangars and stores of petrol and ammunition, which they were unable to save. Early in the morning of the following day (the 7th) Chiang Kai-shek flew to Nanchang, the capital of the province of Kiangsi, leaving the defence of the capital to a veteran of the revolution, General Tang Sheng-chi.

About midday on the 9th an aeroplane dropped a letter from General Matsui to the Commandant of Nanking, in which General Tang was advised to surrender the city without resistance by noon on the following day, December 10th.

As no reply was received from General Tang, the bombardment of the city from the air and from the ground began at 1.30 p.m. One by one the gates of the city were taken, and by the evening of the 13th the occupation was complete, after nearly the whole of the Chinese garrison had been transferred to the north bank of the Yangtzekiang.

Shortly before the army occupied Nanking the first Japanese war vessels arrived off Hsiakuan, the port of Nanking on the river.

During the tension and disturbance which prevailed in the lower course of the Yangtze River, just before the occupation of Nanking by the Japanese, certain events occurred which involved extremely serious aggression on the part

of the Japanese military forces against not only merchant vessels but also warships belonging to neutral nations.

The first of these incidents took place on December 5th close to the town of Wuhu, thirty-seven miles above Nanking. The British gunboat *Ladybird*, with a convoy of British merchant steamers, was attacked at 11 a.m. by war-planes belonging to the Japanese Navy. Direct hits were made on the Jardine steamer *Tuckwo*, which was destroyed by fire, and on the Butterfield steamer *Tatung*, which was so badly damaged that she had to be run ashore. The captain of the *Ladybird* and an officer of the *Tatung* were wounded by bomb splinters.

On December 12th, the day before the capture of Nanking, the *Ladybird* was again under fire for several hours, both from the air and from field batteries. One of the crew was killed and two officers were wounded. Later the British flagship *Bee* arrived and was also fired on. When Admiral Holt and the British military attaché went ashore to protest, the Japanese commanding officer, Colonel Hashimoto, remarked that he certainly realized it was a mistake to fire on neutral warships, but that his orders were "to fire on any vessel in the river".

On the same day, farther down the river, in a section which had been indicated by the Japanese Commander-in-Chief as a safety zone, the British gunboats *Scarab* and *Cricket*, with a convoy of merchantmen, were exposed to three successive attacks by Japanese bombing-planes. But in this case the British warships opened fire with quick-firers and machine-guns.

The most serious of all the events of that day was, however, the sinking of the gunboat *Panay* of the United States Navy, which was convoying three vessels belonging to the Standard Oil Co. The first attack was made by three heavy bombing-

planes, which made a direct hit, leaving the *Panay* in a sinking condition. Then followed six light bombers, which dived low and rained bombs and machine-gun bullets on the vessel. When it became necessary to abandon the sinking gunboat, the ship's boats carrying the survivors, among them several wounded, were attacked by warplanes and by motor launches, which raked them with machine-gun fire, fatally wounding an American. Altogether three foreigners were killed and fifteen wounded, many of them very seriously. Among the passengers on board the *Panay* were the second secretary of the American Embassy and two Italian journalists, one of whom was killed.

The first Japanese reports of these events were very misleading, and the reluctance of the Japanese military authorities to collaborate in a real investigation contributed to intensify the bitterness already felt in the United States and in Great Britain.

Most sensational of all the actions resulting from these attacks on neutral vessels was President Roosevelt's demand that the Emperor of Japan should be informed of the serious view taken by the Chief Executive of the destruction of the American war vessel *Panay*. This unusual action may have helped to make it clear to the Japanese military authorities that a repetition of what had happened might have serious consequences for Japan.





## CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

### THE STRUGGLE FOR HSUCHOW AND HANKOW

ON December 9th, as we have seen, when General Matsui stood with his army before Nanking ready to attack the city, he caused a circular letter to be dropped from an aeroplane, addressed to General Tang Sheng-chi, the Chinese commander in the capital. In it he exhorted the Chinese forces to surrender the city without resistance and added in this connection :

“ Though harsh and relentless to those who resist, the Japanese troops are kind and generous to non-combatants and to Chinese troops who entertain no enmity to Japan.”

After a declaration like this one would suppose that the

army led by General Matsui would show humanity to the civil population after the fall of Nanking and would make haste to establish order in that great city, rich in historical memories, which was now dependent on the magnanimity of the victor for its welfare.

The foreign Red Cross workers, for the most part of American and German nationality, who had braved the horrors of war and remained at their posts in the internationally organized safety zone set apart for non-combatants, bear witness on the one hand that the evacuation of the Chinese troops was accomplished without any excesses worth mentioning, but that the arrival of the Japanese army was nevertheless awaited with joyful anticipation, as it alone was capable of re-establishing order in the chaos which necessarily accompanies the retreat of a defeated army.

The greater, therefore, was the consternation, horror and indignation, not only among the civil population of Nanking but above all among the foreigners who, in order to protect the two hundred thousand refugees in the safety zone, had stayed in the city and during the ten days following the departure of the Chinese troops were forced to witness one of the most atrocious crimes in the history of the world.

During my stay in Shanghai at the beginning of 1938 I was already in possession of a report, written in the form of a diary by one of the foreign Red Cross workers and giving his immediate impressions of the unprecedented outrages which these foreigners were compelled to witness in the course of their self-sacrificing work. The document in question had been given to me as confidential material, which I was only at liberty to use in a summarized form.

But before I had reached this point in my manuscript I came across a volume, *What War Means: The Japanese*

*Terror in China* (published by Victor Gollancz Ltd., London 1938), in which the *Manchester Guardian's* China correspondent, Mr. H. J. Timperley, has collected a number of eye-witnesses' written accounts of Japanese atrocities which they have seen in widely separated parts of China. The first of these terrible documents is the very diary from Nanking which I have just mentioned and from which I may now quote freely, since it has appeared in print.

According to the estimate of one of the German members of the committee for the safety zone no fewer than twenty thousand women were raped by Japanese soldiers during the weeks following the capture of Nanking. When I mentioned this figure to one of my Chinese friends in Shanghai he said quite calmly: "Yes, my younger brother's two sisters-in-law threw themselves into the river after their treatment by the Japanese."

It must be noted that the cases of rape recorded by these foreigners occurred almost exclusively within the safety zone, many of them in the houses and compounds of the mission schools, which were transformed into protected areas under the direct supervision of the foreigners. What happened out in the city beyond the protected zone will never be revealed.

This violation of women, faced with the fear of death at the brutal hands of the enemy, was of course in itself extremely revolting; but in many cases the aggravating circumstances were even more loathsome. Girls of no more than eleven, as well as old women of seventy-two and seventy-six, fell victims to the men's savage lust. In the middle of the seminary compound, in broad daylight and in the presence of several spectators, seventeen soldiers raped one and the same woman successively. In another case *thirty-seven* soldiers in succession raped a single victim.

On the same day (Friday, December 17th) the most bestial of all these outrages was noted. A woman had her five months' old baby lying beside her when she became the victim of one of the brutes. As the child disturbed him with its crying he deliberately smothered the little creature.

Robbery, looting, torture, murder, rape, burning—everything that can be imagined was carried out from the very beginning without any limit. Modern times have nothing to surpass it. Nanking has been almost a living hell.

\* \* \* \* \*

All who have been soldiers or who have performed compulsory labour pass to the rear. Your lives will be spared, and you will be given work if you thus voluntarily come forth.

Of some three thousand men massed together on the tennis-courts below Swazey Hall, between two and three hundred stepped to the rear. This episode is vouched for by three foreigners whose names are given and by many Chinese members of the University staff.

On the following morning a man came to the University Hospital with five bayonet wounds. He had been taken in one of the groups from the tennis-courts to a place where one hundred and thirty Japanese soldiers had despatched five hundred Chinese captives by way of bayonet exercise. On recovering consciousness he found the Japanese had gone, and managed to crawl away unseen in the course of the night.

On Thursday, December 23rd, the diary notes the following :

At noon a man was led to headquarters with head burned cinder black—eyes and ears gone, nose partly, a ghastly sight. I took him to the hospital in my car where he died a few hours later. His story was that he was one of a gang of some

hundred who had been tied together, then gasoline thrown over them and set afire. He happened to be on the outer edge so got the gas only over his head.<sup>1</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

But it was not altogether in vain that the women of Nanking had sacrificed their bodies to the lust-maddened Japanese soldiery; retribution came in due course. The victorious General Matsui was recalled—"to take up another command". We may suppose that his recall was due not so much to the excesses committed in the conquered city under the eyes of the victor, as to the opportunity that was lost in those two weeks while the Japanese army was amusing itself in Nanking.

If General Matsui, immediately after the capture of Nan-

<sup>1</sup> The story of Japanese atrocities in China is far too diversified for its various aspects to be even alluded to here. If in this footnote I mention a single other instance, it is in order to point out, not so much the revolting brutality of their perpetrators as their failure to understand, or at all events to take account of, the spiritual reaction which these acts have brought about in the Chinese people. What I wish to add in this connection—referring the reader for details to Timperley's book—is the systematic destruction of all Chinese industry in the Shanghai district, as well as in other areas occupied by the Japanese. For weeks after the occupation of Shanghai—and it was the same in the case of Nanking—one saw day after day fresh conflagrations sending up their dark smoke round the horizon. What happened here was the destruction on a large scale of Chinese property, preferably industrial establishments. In addition to this, all objects of iron, brass and copper contained in such establishments were systematically removed and shipped to Japan.

How is all this to be reconciled with the Japanese assurances, many times repeated not only by the government in Tokyo but also by the Japanese generals in China, that Japan was only making war on the anti-Japanese Kuomintang government, but by no means on the Chinese population, with which it was desired to establish a lasting peace and collaboration for the benefit of both nations?

No, these gross and revolting atrocities show that the Japanese, whom we must admire as mighty warriors and self-sacrificing patriots, are poor judges of the strength of the spiritual movements which are becoming intensified in the minds of the Chinese as the war progresses.

king, had continued the pursuit of the flying Chinese troops and, with the support of the Japanese fleet, had rapidly advanced up the Yangtze River, it is conceivable that he might have obtained a speedy decision ; for there is no doubt that the Chinese defence was thoroughly disorganized in the weeks immediately following the fall of Nanking.

But owing to the long rest in Nanking and a further pause to give the Chinese government time to consider and sue for peace, events took a course scarcely foreseen by the Japanese General Staff. Chiang and his government gained a respite enabling them to establish themselves at Hankow and there organize continued resistance.

Already, during the latter part of 1937, Chiang had obtained a firmer grasp of events in southern Shansi and northern Honan, where the Japanese advance was checked and in some places gave way to local Chinese victories. An important addition to the fighting strength of the Chinese regular army was provided by the Red troops, now known as the Eighth Army. In the defence of central Shansi this army, with extreme ferocity and fearlessness, had held up and harassed the Japanese around the Yen Men Kuan pass. Afterwards great bodies of the Red soldiers filtered through the Japanese lines and the mountain passes on to the plains of southern Hopei and northern Honan, where to this day they are a scourge to the Japanese, destroying their lines of communication and overwhelming weak posts.

\* \* \* \* \*

I would now ask the reader to look at the general map of China at the end of this volume. The first thing to notice is the main north-and-south railway line which runs northward from Pukow, just opposite Nanking, and crosses the Yellow River at Tsinan, continuing from there to

Tientsin. On the borders of Kiangsu, Anhui and Shantung, quite near the Grand Canal, this main line is crossed by another very important railway, the Lunghai line, which runs from Haichow on the coast due west to Sian, the capital of Shensi, following the south bank of the Yellow River part of the way. These two great railways, the Tientsin-Pukow line and the Lunghai line, intersect at Hsuechow, the town which during the first half of 1938 was the centre of long and extremely hard-fought engagements, in which the tenacity of the Chinese time after time compelled the respectful admiration of their technically superior opponents.

What then were the circumstances which made it possible for Chiang Kai-shek, a few months after the demoralizing catastrophe at Nanking, again to offer a resistance which obliged the Japanese to collect all the forces then at their disposal in order to compel a favourable decision?

The prolonged resistance of the Chinese was certainly due in part to the defence of Hsuechow being in the hands of Li Tsung-jen, one of the celebrated Kuangsi generals. It has also been conjectured that the German military advisers were here allowed to influence the operations more directly than was the case in the campaign between Shanghai and Nanking.

But most important of all, the Chinese command was able in the Hsuechow campaign to bring up the new divisions which had been trained somewhere in western China, probably in Hunan and Kuangsi, and which by this time were ready for service in the field. These were in certain respects crack troops, containing many students and young men of the Chinese intelligentsia, who had devotedly volunteered for service. These troops, moreover, were provided with arms which till then had only been available in small

quantities, such as heavy artillery, and their success with this more ample technical equipment shows what the Chinese armies might have accomplished if only they had been more or less equal to the Japanese in war material.

In order to understand the somewhat peculiar situation round Hsuehchow we must refer once more to the map. The whole northern bank of the Yellow River was in the hands of the Japanese, and thanks to the vacillating attitude of the governor of Shantung, Han Fu-chu, they had been able to cross the river at Tsinan and to occupy that town. From here they pressed southward towards Hsuehchow by several roads, but Chinese irregulars tore up the railway and harassed their communications. From the Yangtze-kiang other Japanese army groups advanced northward from Pukow, opposite Nanking. Hsuehchow was thus threatened by the Japanese from both south and north.

The nearest base of the Chinese was Chengchow, an important railway junction at the intersection of the Peking-Hankow and the Lunghai lines. From this point their rear was open both westward into Shensi and, most important of all, southward to Hankow, whence came all their chief supplies.

The strategical position of the Chinese was not without great risks, as at several points to the west of both Hsuehchow and Chengchow the Japanese might attempt a penetration to the south bank of the Yellow River, which would jeopardize the Chinese communications to the rear in a disastrous way.

We may therefore reasonably ask why the Chinese clung with such stubbornness to this railway junction, where they were pressed by the enemy on three sides. Behind it all there was again, as so many times in this war, a political factor which made Hsuehchow one of the great prizes to be held by the Chinese and captured by the Japanese. The



latter established, first in Peking and much later in Nanking, local governments, composed of third- and fourth-rate Chinese who were willing to work under the orders of the Japanese generals. These puppet governments, whose impotence was evident from the first, signified less than nothing, so long as they were local shadow-administrations. If, on the other hand, the Japanese troops obtained possession of the whole Tientsin-Pukow railway, the two local administrations might be united into something which would assume the appearance of a Chinese central government. This was the issue.

The original plan of campaign of the Japanese General Staff aimed at cutting the Chinese communications far to the west by forcing the Yellow River at its sharp bend where the provinces of Shansi, Shensi and Honan meet. As early as March, however, before the local government had been established in Nanking, it had become evident that the Chinese still possessed so important forces in the mountain tracts of Shansi, threatening and in many cases cutting the Japanese communications, that the passage of the Yellow River could not be carried out.

In these circumstances the only course left to the Japanese was to try to throw the Chinese back from Hsuchow and thereby from the Tientsin-Pukow line by a converging attack on Hsuchow itself from the south, north-east and north.

Evidently the Japanese had undertaken this operation also with insufficient forces, for between March 20th and April 6th the Chinese command succeeded, by bringing up new mechanized forces and heavy artillery, in gaining the initiative. The hottest fighting took place round a little town called Taierhchuang, north-east of Hsuchow. To the general public this name was unknown, till the Chinese



*From the war in North China. Japanese officers observing the bombardment of Chinese positions*  
[Facing p. 192



## STRUGGLE FOR HSUCHOW AND HANKOW 193

won a local victory here. But for several years the Military College of Nanking had used this very ground for its tactical exercises.

For a couple of weeks extremely severe engagements raged in and around this town, which was reduced to a heap of ruins. Here for once the Chinese were sufficiently supplied with artillery, and the effects of their fire are picturesquely described by a Japanese correspondent of the *Asahi* (April 7th) :

The Chinese artillery is firing not only from the south side of the canal ; a number of their shells come from an entirely unexpected quarter.

On Tuesday Chinese mortar projectiles came suddenly from a place two and a half miles south of Yihhsien. The Chinese mountain guns must have worked round behind the Japanese lines. We now hear machine-gun fire as well and the rattle of rifles. A considerable Chinese force must be in the neighbourhood. It seems to be the Chinese tactics to swing round in rear of the Japanese whenever opportunity offers. It is like chasing flies.

On Monday twenty-one Chinese fighting-planes attacked the Japanese trenches. Their raid was very irritating. The breeze is warm and pleasant with the scent of flowers, wheat and tea, but hard fighting rages around us.

It is believed that two Japanese brigades were almost entirely annihilated in the stubborn and violent engagements at Taierhchuang. For a moment it looked as though Li Tsung-yen, the Chinese commander, was on the eve of a really great success, a rolling-up of the whole Japanese front. That the Japanese themselves were uneasy appears from the fact that the Japanese officer who acted as spokesman for the benefit of the foreign newspaper men in Shanghai and who usually overflowed with news, "was without information from the front in southern Shantung" during the three most critical days. In Tokyo an extraordinary

council of war was summoned to find a solution of the critical situation. In Hankow the victory of Taierhchuang was celebrated with an enthusiasm never shown before ; but Chiang, who always seems able to keep his balance, warned the cheering crowds " that it is not yet time for triumphs, as the future is still full of dangers ".

He had good reason to give this warning. Hardly had the Japanese command realized that the troops locally available were insufficient for the prosecution of the Hsuehchow campaign when reinforcements were collected both from the north (Tientsin) and from the south (Nanking). This concentration of the Japanese divisions available in China against Hsuehchow was carried out rapidly and with such recklessness that certain sections of the occupied territory were deprived of most of their garrisons to a hazardous extent. Thus it happened that Nanking, which had been taken by storm a few months earlier, saw Chinese guerrillas coming from the south close under its walls.

The Japanese now quickly resumed the initiative, which for a couple of weeks had slipped into the hands of the Chinese, and it soon became clear that a critical situation was rapidly developing for the Chinese troops massed in the Hsuehchow region.

The Japanese have themselves asserted that it was part of their plan of campaign to exhibit a relative weakness during the Taierhchuang operations in order to decoy to Hsuehchow the greatest possible number of Chinese divisions, which were then to be the object of a wide encircling movement. It is by no means improbable that such was actually the case, since everything points to the Japanese having tried here to inflict on Chiang such crippling losses as might lead to the early peace so eagerly desired by Japan. The great encircling movements were carried out independently

of the railways both from the north and especially from the south, along existing roads leading to a point west of Hsuchow where the Lunghai line was cut on May 17th, while on the same day from a hill five miles west of Hsuchow Japanese artillery began to fire on the town. Two days later Hsuchow was occupied. Before that Chiang Kai-shek had commenced the retreat towards Kueiteh, a station on the Lunghai line, about midway between Hsuchow and Kaifeng, the capital of the province of Honan.

On May 20th a representative of General Hata, the new Japanese Commander-in-Chief, announced that a quarter of a million men belonging to forty Chinese divisions had been surrounded. On the 24th the number of prisoners had sunk to thirty thousand, and, all things considered, it appears probable that the Chinese troops had given one more instance of their astonishing aptitude for stealing away during a retreat, whether they managed to escape from the encirclement or disappeared suddenly, arms and all, to come into action later in the new form of guerrillas, after the Japanese had advanced beyond the district.

Amusingly enough the Chinese and Japanese papers claimed one after the other that their armies had won a "Tannenberg victory" in the Hsuchow region. That of the Chinese occurred at the beginning of April round Taierhchuang; that of the Japanese in the latter half of May. The former failed in their object of driving back the Japanese front, the latter in surrounding the enemy's main body, which slipped out of the enclosing movement in the decisive phase. But Taierhchuang had given the Chinese a much-needed stiffening of their morale, while the Japanese had got possession of the whole Tientsin-Pukow railway.

The Chinese retreat from Hsuchow along the Lunghai

railway could offer little resistance to the pursuing Japanese troops—with one remarkable exception. At Lanfeng, a place not far to the east of Kaifeng, a Japanese division under the command of General Doihara was surrounded at the end of May by superior Chinese forces and for a time its position was so critical that supplies were dropped for the isolated division from Japanese transport planes. But the Chinese striking force was not sufficient to make an end of Doihara before fresh Japanese troops arrived to relieve him. Possibly the resolute Chinese attack on this particular division was one of the many political side-issues of this war. For Doihara himself had been for many years China's enemy number one, and his capture dead or alive would have been greeted with unexampled rejoicing. Before the Japanese coup in Manchuria in 1931 he had been the most active political agent there for several years, undermining Chinese influence in every way and by every means. Everything that the Chinese fear and execrate in their powerful eastern neighbours, their underground machinations as well as their open aggression, was concentrated in this man's name.

When at the beginning of June the Japanese forces threatening Kaifeng approached the railway junction of Chengchow, the situation of the Chinese armies was very critical. Retiring before a superior and ever-active enemy, the tired-out Chinese divisions, shattered by months of fighting round Hsuechow, were unable to offer an effective resistance on the open loess plain round Chengchow.

Then to the help of the hard-pressed Chinese there came an old friend—and enemy—of this strange loess country: "China's Sorrow", the Yellow River. After a long course through deep rocky ravines the river emerges not far to the west of Chengchow on to the immense alluvial plain which,

broken here and there by mountain ranges, forms the whole coastal country of China from Peking to Shanghai. Charged with enormous quantities of the finely divided loess dust, the river has dealt destructively with the plain during all the three thousand years of Chinese history, constantly overflowing its banks and changing its course, so that its mouth was now to the south, now to the north of the mountainous Shantung peninsula.

The more civilization has succeeded in hemming in the savage and capricious giant within protective embankments, the more rapidly has the precipitation of sediment within this enforced channel raised the bed of the river, till in parts of the very district of which we are speaking it stands from twenty-three to twenty-nine feet higher than the surrounding plain. And we must further take into consideration that the river, which at its lowest level flows only at the rate of about twenty thousand gallons a second, may be swelled to a seething flood of five million gallons a second at its high summer level, when fed by the melting of the snows in Tibet.

During a flood season failure to supervise the embankments is enough to produce a catastrophe. But if in addition to this a desperate gang of soldiers should plunge their spades into the river-bank, they could let loose in half an hour a disaster on a gigantic scale.

How it happened is not known for certain. The conflicting armies accuse one another, while at the same time blaming the river. In any event the break occurred at the end of June in the Kaifeng-Chengchow region. Enormous masses of water poured in over Honan, Anhui and Kiangsu, seeking a passage down to the valley of the Huai river. Wide tracts of rich agricultural land were devastated and the population fled as best they could. But for some weeks



the river formed an insuperable barrier between the two armies. The Chinese were given a respite to reorganize their defence, and the whole Japanese plan of campaign had to be revised.

In this way the operations were transferred from the neighbourhood of the Yellow River to the Yangtzekiang, and the next object of the Japanese offensive was now Hankow with its sister cities of Hanyang and Wuchang, the point of intersection of the Yangtze River and the longest railway line in the country, Peking-Hankow-Canton.

I will not weary the reader with a detailed topographical account of this campaign, which began on June 12th with the capture of Anking, capital of the province of Anhui on the north bank of the Yangtzekiang, rather less than half-way from Nanking to Hankow. Let us content ourselves with indicating some of the main outlines of the vast operations which were brought to a conclusion on October 25th, when the motorized and mechanized Japanese advance troops entered Hankow, already for the most part evacuated by the Chinese.

During these four and a half months of the Hankow campaign the Chinese defensive system was subjected to its hardest ordeal of fire, and there can be no doubt that the Chinese powers of resistance, their leadership and their technical resources were far more efficient at this time than at Shanghai or Hsuechow. The Japanese realized here from the first that they had to deal with an enemy firmly resolved to a stubborn resistance in field fortifications prepared in advance, and from the very beginning of the operations they brought up all their offensive resources, among them in particular a great number of lighter naval vessels, which operated against a whole system of successive river booms, the lowest of which, at Matung, below Kiukiang, was

reached as early as the middle of June. The important river harbour of Kiukiang was captured on July 26th, but after this there followed a month of relative inactivity, due to the intense summer heat and consequent epidemics of dysentery, cholera and malaria.

After the capture of the outlet of the Poyang lake the Japanese offensive branched out in three directions : strong columns making for the capital of Kiangsi, Nanchang, attacked the Chinese positions at Teian, which had long been defended with great tenacity ; another column was directed due west in order to cut the Hankow-Canton railway, and the third group worked its way in conjunction with the fleet up towards Hankow. Among the obstacles which the Chinese had thrown across the river at various points one was of so original a nature that it deserves special mention. At Tayeh, a little below Hankow, are situated the richest iron mines of the Yangtze region, worked for many years by the Japanese. The Chinese now dumped the accumulated stores of ore in a line across the river. The high specific gravity of the material ought to have made the dam resist the pressure of the river better than it did.

While these complicated operations were taking place on the south bank of the Yangtzekiang, a column was advancing along the north bank of the river. Here the Chinese carried out a series of great counter-attacks, which resulted in considerable losses of ground on the part of the Japanese, losses the recovery of which cost them a week's fighting with newly arrived reinforcements.

Far up in the north a Japanese column advanced westward from Hofei towards the Peking-Hankow railway, which was cut in the middle of October through the occupation of Sinyang.

According to a military expert these operations constitute the greatest undertaking in the military history of Japan, far greater than any phase of the Russo-Japanese war. He estimates that two million soldiers took part in this campaign, four hundred thousand of them on the Japanese side.

A writer in *Oriental Affairs* considers that the great numerical superiority of the Chinese explains why the Japanese, in spite of all their encircling operations, have never been able to force a Sedan or a Tannenberg. With their powerful mechanization they are able time after time to break irresistibly through the Chinese defensive lines, but hitherto from a purely military point of view they have never succeeded in fully reaping the fruits of victory.

\* \* \* \* \*

So Hankow had fallen. But the ten months which had elapsed between the fall of the capital on December 13th 1937 and the occupation of Hankow on October 25th 1938 had given the Chinese command time to make important industrial preparations for the withdrawal of the defence to the western parts of the country. Arsenal with all their machinery have been transferred to Szechuan. New strategic roads have been made, and railways are also under construction in the south-west provinces. The capacity of the coal mines has been multiplied, and all mineral deposits which serve the prosecution of war are being intensively exploited.

Hand in hand with this industrialization of western China there is a transference to these provinces of younger, intelligent men of specialized knowledge. The upper-class Chinese who are now left in Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai and Nanking are in great part superannuated men who have done service in their time, but can now only be used

as façades for Japanese enterprise. The young progressive China whose acquaintance I made in Nanking during the first months of 1937 is now working in Chungking, Chengtu and Kunming to give technical or administrative support to the defence of the country.

## CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

### GUERRILLAS

HE was only six months in my service during the winter of 1924-5, the little student of geology, and I can still see him as plainly as if I had parted from him yesterday. He had none of the formal elegance which usually marks the educated Chinese. His voice was harsh, his words were few, and the young man's appearance was nothing to boast of.

But as my private secretary he worked assiduously and faithfully. He came and went quietly and silently. Whatever he undertook was properly done. But we lived in different worlds, and only once or twice did he shyly and hesitatingly open a crack of his temple door.

He was a Communist. The Anfu clique among the highest officials, who shamelessly sold the interests of their country to the Japanese, the growing impotence of the government and the whole atmosphere of stagnation, confusion and helplessness which characterized Peking in those years, had caused this violent reaction in the young. These students believed that only by extreme measures could a new seed be sown in this parched soil. When my student occasionally spoke of their work, their studies and propaganda, he was warmed up by a religious feeling such as one might encounter in a second-adventist or a convert to the Oxford Group Movement.

I sometimes discussed Chinese Communism with my wise and experienced friend Ting. His attitude to the movement was then entirely hostile and he stressed in particular that the Communists' attack on the right to own land, and their systematic destruction of title-deeds to land, pointed the way to sheer anarchy. It was the son of a peasant family who spoke thus. The instinct that the ownership of land is the only sure thing in existence was deeply rooted in him.

Afterwards, on my next visit to Peking in 1927, I had a terrifying glimpse of the dangerous depths of Communism (see the next chapter). A Red terror, possibly a general massacre, was the imminent danger which was averted on that day by the firm hand of the Peking police.

In August 1933 Ting visited Stockholm in the course of a European trip. From Sweden he went to Russia, where he had been commissioned by his government to study the mineral resources of the Donetz basin and the social conditions of the country. On his return from Russia he wrote me a letter in which he summed up in his concise fashion what he had seen of the Soviet régime. He gave it as his opinion that it was a hard life of severe privations, but that a new generation was growing up in the belief that this was the best one could get out of existence, a new type of young Soviet workers with hand and brain, who were all for the new régime.

When I came back to China in 1936 Ting had been dead for a year, but one of the first papers that came into my hands was a lecture he had given shortly before his death. In it he spoke of the little band of geological students who had joined the Red troops in Shensi, and declared that these self-sacrificing young men, among them my little secretary, were inspired by the strongest patriotic feelings

and willing to give even their lives in helping to save the country from the dangers by which it was threatened.

This acknowledgment on Ting's part was an example of his passion for coming out with the truth, cost what it might. In the minds not only of the foreigners of Shanghai, to whom he was speaking, but of the then all-powerful Kuomintang government, his appreciation of the Communist students was the very worst thing he could have said.

Up in Hsikang in the summer of 1937 I saw on every hand traces of the Red army which in the previous year had passed through the country like a swarm of locusts, leaving nothing edible behind it.

But then on my return to Shanghai I came across Edgar Snow's *Red Star over China*, and in the study of that remarkable book I obtained for the first time an idea of the true inwardness of the Communist movement. In the first place it became clear to me that the Red army was not merely a plundering and burning horde. It is only against enemy troops and the great landowners, who in their opinion have usually come by their estates unjustly, that they appear with rifle in one hand and torch in the other. Whereas they come as liberators to the poor rural population, to whom they parcel out the great estates on the principle that the land belongs only to him who tills it with his own hands. It is true that the former Red troops have now given an undertaking to the Kuomintang government that so long as the war lasts they will stop this redistribution of agricultural land; but the Communist ideology is still associated with them, and in this way they have no difficulty in constituting themselves the friends and protectors of the poor working folk of the villages. A knowledge of this fact is indispensable if we are to understand the power which the Red troops exercise over the minds of the rural population.

It follows from the social aims of the Reds that their military activity is only a part of their work. They are in addition organizers, teachers and propagandists. Whenever they reach a new district they set up their own civil administration and levy taxes, which in spite of the state of war are, as a rule, more lenient and above all better adjusted than the inhuman exactions of the old-time mandarins' unprincipled creatures. In addition the Red troops introduce their own coinage, establish small arsenals and give instruction and advice for the improvement of industries suitable to the district. For all these very varied fields of activity they carry with them trained instructors, who travel about the Soviet territories to direct the education of the people.

One of the first tasks is to establish schools in which people of all ages—a very large proportion of them entirely illiterate—may learn to read and write. The writing taught is a selection of the innumerable and complicated Chinese characters, and the texts for reading aloud are not classics, as formerly, but easily intelligible summaries of the new doctrines, practical advice and accounts of the Red troops' wonderful victories over their mortal enemies, the Japanese.

An original and potent element in this intellectual work is the instruction in plastic gymnastics and dancing, and the training of small theatrical companies which travel from place to place giving short performances, sometimes grotesquely humorous, sometimes blood-curdling in their seriousness, to show how the savage enemy takes the peasant's cattle and corn, rapes his women and burns his house, till the Red heroes arrive as the liberators of the afflicted people. The peals of laughter, the scorn, the indignation and the tears which these simple performances call forth



must be viewed against the background of the monotonous and bitterly hard life which the country folk have been forced to lead from time immemorial. It may well be that these Red propagandists are the first strangers who have ever shown a benevolent interest in the poor villagers.

Thus far Edgar Snow, who was the first to open my eyes to the depth and breadth of the mission of Chinese Communism. When this chapter was already completed in its first version there came to Stockholm a British Red Cross worker, who from the third month of the war until June 1938 had lived among the Red guerrilla troops and seen their method of dealing with the enemy at first hand. His account was so strongly impressed with the belief that the Red irregulars would finally be the power which will wear down the nerves and fighting spirit of the Japanese and thus in the last round restore freedom to China, that I found it necessary to revise this text, although with the reserve which is natural to me I do not venture to go so far in the belief in the final victory of China as my valued informant, whom I will discreetly call Mr. R.

\* \* \* \* \*

If we now pass on to an attempt to give the outlines of the work the guerrilla troops have carried out hitherto, it may be convenient to take as our starting-point the share of the Eighth (that is, the former "Red") Army in the defence of the province of Shansi. At the beginning of the war the Eighth Army advanced from its base at Yen-an in central Shensi into Shansi to co-operate in the defence of this strategical key province. As we have already shown, the local provincial troops gave a very poor account of themselves, and most of the resistance encountered by the Japanese, at times extremely tenacious, came from the

Nanking divisions in southern Shansi and from the Eighth Army in the north. The Japanese themselves have testified that the engagements around the Yenmen Pass, thanks to the extraordinary endurance and amazing tactics of the ex-Red troops, were among the most trying experiences of the whole war.

Miss Agnes Smedley, an American journalist who has become an apostle of the Chinese Reds, states that the 5th Japanese division lost three thousand men in its fighting against the Eighth Army at Pinghsingkuan. According to the same authority the Eighth Army destroyed by the middle of November 1937 one thousand Japanese motor-lorries and twenty-one fighting-planes, besides capturing a thousand horses and mules, fifty machine-guns and some field-guns, as well as quantities of rifles, ammunition, medicine and other stores.

After these initial successes the Eighth Army was split up into a number of commandos, some of which remained in Shansi to organize a new administration in the province and to continue the guerrilla warfare on their own special lines.

But a great number of these ex-Red commandos went east through the mountain passes which divide Shansi from Hopei. Some halted on the escarpment itself, west of the Peking-Hankow line, but many descended into the plain, where they established a semi-Red administration, of which a great deal was heard.

Those commandos which stopped on the west of the railway line have for months made this connecting-link of the Japanese advance on the Yellow River extremely unsafe. That the Japanese offensive was for a long time halted at Changte in northernmost Honan was due in great measure to the irregular Chinese forces swarming like wasps around

the Japanese army, while other guerrilla bands farther to the north continually tore up the railway, which was the Japanese army's only line of supply. For weeks at a stretch a regular race went on between the guerrillas, who tore up the line by night, now here, now there, and the Japanese labour battalions, who repaired the damage by day. Once at least the guerrillas were bold enough to storm and occupy the great town of Paoting. They only held it for a day or two, but the victory bulletin of the Japanese, saying that they had successfully expelled the Chinese from Paoting, was drawn up without regard to the methods of the guerrillas. They never try to hold a town on the railway line against the superior heavy artillery of the Japanese. By a surprise attack they make themselves masters of the town for a day or a few hours and hastily empty it of all military stores for which they have use, afterwards burning the remainder before evacuating the place.

We now come to the ex-Communist guerrilla commandos which debouched on the broad plain between the Peking-Hankow and the Tientsin-Pukow lines. As a convenient starting-point I will ask the reader to refer back to Chapter Thirteen, in which I describe what I saw in November on the railway line between Peking and Tientsin. The man who solved for me the riddle of the Japanese sentries was Mr. W. V. Pennel, editor of the *Peking and Tientsin Times*.

Mr. Pennel, as a contributor to Woodhead's excellent monthly review *Oriental Affairs*, from his outpost in Tientsin has had unique opportunities of gathering information from all sorts of travellers and thus following the remarkable political and military events which have taken place during the past year on the Hopei plain. To give an idea of this I append some extracts from Pennel's reports :

May 1938. From January 10th to 15th last there was held at the headquarters of the Eighth Army on Wutaishan, the holy mountain in Shansi, a meeting of 155 delegates from more or less Communist organizations, including Mongols, Tibetans and Mohammedans, besides a great number of Chinese. Many of the most active forces in these organizations were university students and other young men who had been expelled from their studies or offices when the Japanese occupied Tientsin and Peking. At this conference a régime was established for Shansi, Chahar and Hopei, which was recognized by the Kuomintang government in Hankow. This local government has its own postal service and its newspapers. Considerable sections of the three provinces—that is, all districts which do not border on the railways and the great cities—are subject to this régime based on the guerrilla troops.

The pro-Japanese government in Peking is now trying to counteract this more or less Communist self-government. But the *gendarmérie* imported from Manchukuo is not to be depended upon. On March 14th a force of these gendarmes revolted south of Paoting, killed their commanding officer and took to the mountains with all the military stores they could lay hands on and large quantities of provisions.

As we know, the Japanese are particularly interested in the cotton crop of Hopei, a rich one in normal conditions. In order to restart the cultivation of cotton the pro-Japanese Peking government imported a million pounds of Korean cotton-seed; but then the guerrilla régime prohibited the growth of cotton and ordered wheat to be sown instead to ensure the food supply of the population and of the guerrilla troops.

Guerrilla attacks have been reported over the whole region. Even Tientsin has been threatened at times. The former mayor of Tientsin, Hsiao Chen-ying, is now one of the leaders of the guerrilla corps operating on the border between Honan and Shansi.

June 1938. Inhabitants of the towns in North China which are now occupied by the Japanese received a shock when at the beginning of May the papers announced that the Red troops had made extremely rapid progress in bringing order out of chaos and that they now have a fully effective régime covering seventeen districts with its capital somewhere in the heart of the province. Within this area banditry has

been completely eradicated, the arming and training of both sexes up to the age of fifty is being carried out with a thoroughness never known before in these parts. A Communist military academy gives three months' courses, arsenals are at work and hundreds of elementary schools have been opened.

On the outbreak of war a large consignment of steel and war material happened to be on the Puto river in the middle of the province. All this was conveyed to a great mechanical workshop near the Red capital. Here rifles, hand-grenades, land-mines and pistols are now being manufactured. Professors of chemistry are assisting the Reds in the production of explosives to be used against the railways.

Radio stations exist in several places, and a local telephone system with nearly four thousand miles of wires. Every one of the seventeen districts has its newspaper. The school-books are violently anti-Japanese. There is no longer much talk of Communism. The slogan is: Death to the Japanese. The Kuomintang flag and the Soviet hammer and sickle are flown together, the latter under the former.

There is a propaganda corps for women and a pioneer organization for the young. Small boys are used as spies with the best results, and the intelligence service works admirably, even in towns which have a Japanese garrison.

The Reds claim to have captured a great quantity of spoil in their many raids, including even field-artillery and siege-guns.

Mr. Haldor Hansen, correspondent of the Associated Press, has just returned from a long journey to the Red area. He has visited fifty towns and villages, among them the Red capital. He brings back lots of extraordinary information, as well as many photographs taken by himself.

This news came as a shock. That a Red Nationalist régime has been successfully built up right under the noses of the Japanese is almost incomprehensible.

\* \* \* \* \*

According to Mr. Pennel guerrilla activity in Hopei was intensified during the weeks of the Changkufeng affair (July 11th to August 10th 1938). Trains between Tientsin and Shanhaikuan were derailed, and guerrilla bands from Hopei penetrated even into Jehol. If it had come to a real

war between Russia and Japan, the situation of the Japanese in Hopei and Manchukuo would soon have become very critical ; but after the conclusion of the Changkufeng affair several new Japanese divisions arrived at Tientsin, and a campaign was started with the object of ending the Red control in central Hopei.

The Red centre in the plain of Hopei was raided by a Japanese punitive expedition, and the guerrilla headquarters in the mountainous and very difficult Wutaishan area of eastern Shansi was occupied by another Japanese force operating in this area from the end of September to the end of October. Since then the Japanese have tried to throw a blockade cordon round the Wutai area in order to prevent the entry of war material.

Undoubtedly there was a marked set-back of guerrilla activities in northern China after the great stimulus they received in the summer from the Changkufeng affair in northern Manchukuo. Still, strong guerrilla forces are constantly at work all over the area, as evidenced by the very significant fact that the Japanese have begun the construction of concrete blockhouses for the protection of the trunk railways in northern China, as well as between Nanking and Shanghai. The guerrillas in their turn have recently adopted a new practice of pulling down the city walls within the areas occupied by them, in an effort to allow the Japanese less shelter when they eventually return in force. On the whole the temporary raiding of guerrilla centres does not amount to very much, as the basic principle of guerrilla tactics is withdrawal in case of attack.

Although guerrilla warfare under Red leadership is best organized in the northern provinces, it is now spread over the whole of that part of China which is nominally occupied by Japanese troops. From Shanghai there are frequent

reports of fighting on the outskirts of the city, and it is well known that for a moment the Hungjao aerodrome was in the hands of guerrillas. On the Pootung peninsula minor campaigns have been fought, during which the Japanese allowed no communication across the river between Shanghai and Pootung. The English colony in Shanghai learned in a tragic way that it was really a question of fighting and not of night manoeuvres, as the Japanese tried to make out, when early in the morning of August 21st 1938 the young son of Major P. H. Keys, who was sleeping in the open air on the roof of his father's house was killed by machine-gun bullets aimed at the Japanese post near the Rubicon Road.

The essence of guerrilla tactics is to obtain through spies full knowledge of the enemy's dispositions and to attack suddenly and with fortuitous superiority when an enemy convoy or outpost is entirely unprepared. What this is like in practice may be gathered from the following summary of a description published in the *Pacific Digest* of June 1938 and written by Zenichi Oda, war correspondent of the leading Japanese news agency, Domei.

We are at Chufu in Shantung, the birthplace of Confucius, at 10 a.m. on February 13th. The writer and some other newspaper men and press photographers have been invited by the local Japanese command to accompany some officers to Tsouhsien, ten miles south of Chufu. The three captains drive in a small saloon car and the newspaper men together with a dozen soldiers in a motor-lorry.

When they had gone half-way they passed a small village, and on rounding a corner both cars came to a halt. Hand-grenades were now thrown on both vehicles, while rifle fire rained on them from a tower-like house of two storeys. Soon both cars were on fire and the surviving Japanese,

many of them wounded, succeeded in crawling into a house, where they lay hid till relief arrived some hours later.

The whole affair was over in a short time, without anything that could be called fighting. "Eight persons were killed and the rest wounded, except three. We lost two cars, nine rifles and three thousand cartridges."

\* \* \* \* \*

The visitor to Stockholm whom I have discreetly introduced as Mr. R. was working until June 1938 in a district near the Yellow River, which was the scene of intense and widespread hostilities. He has travelled far afield, sometimes in regions where the Japanese had garrisons in walled cities, sometimes among the Reds, and occasionally he was in Hankow and met Chiang Kai-shek and his wife.

He was convinced that the Red guerrillas were destined to be the power which in the end would decide the war and bring about a free China.

He told me that the peasants possessed arms in abundance, Mauser rifles of German and of local manufacture, and rifles taken from the Japanese. He confirmed the view that the guerrillas are perfectly prepared to operate without any fixed base, depending entirely on the enemy for renewing their supplies of arms and ammunition.

When I spoke of the incredible atrocities committed by the Japanese soldiers in Nanking, he said: "It's the same everywhere; no matter where the Japanese appear they outrage the women and take the peasants' corn to feed their horses. This is splendid propaganda for the Red guerrillas!"

I must have looked puzzled at this.

"You see," he explained, "when the war moves into a new district, the peasants are indifferent to begin with. But



when the Japanese soldiery rape their women and their little children have to starve so that the big Japanese horses may have the corn, then the hour has come for the Red guerrillas to start training the peasant boys. After a time, when the local population has learnt the tricks, the Red instructors move on to the next village to open a new course."

His description of the tricks by which the guerrillas outwit the Japanese and gather rich spoils with the least possible loss to themselves, seems to show that this form of warfare is eminently suited to the cunning Chinese and that it must be excessively trying to the Japanese psyche.

An American officer named Carlsson, of Swedish parentage and Swedish-speaking, has travelled for several months in the districts controlled by the Red guerrillas in Honan, Shansi and Hopei. He returned impressed by the military results obtained by these irregulars. In his view the United States Army would have to adopt guerrilla methods if an enemy were to invade North America. His report has aroused so much interest with the United States General Staff that four junior American officers have lately entered the Chinese guerrilla regions for further study of the subject.

I think we may safely agree with Mr. Pennel and Mr. R. that this social and military movement, which is spreading like forest fires behind the Japanese fronts over the interior of China, is one of the most extraordinary phenomena which this vast and in many ways unique war has to show.

At the present moment it looks as if Chiang Kai-shek's retreating divisions were losing the war, while the Red guerrillas, continually occupying new ground as the Japanese leave it to them, are winning it. What kind of crop will one day ripen on the wastes now swept by the Red fires of war?



66 Bloody Saturday 39 in Glasgow (A. m. 1. 1. 1972)



## CHAPTER NINETEEN

### THE WAR AND THE GREAT POWERS

WHEN the fighting at Shanghai had only been in progress a couple of weeks the French troops carried out a little act of bravado which provoked much amusement. When the Japanese very arbitrarily shut off the district of Hongkew for military reasons, the French garrison had in one of the warehouses of that quarter a consignment of the *vin rouge ordinaire*, without which the French soldier can never be really content. Weeks went by, and the *poilus* got fearfully thirsty. The French authorities then applied to the Japanese command, requesting permission to fetch their wine. The Japanese answered that unfortunately this could not be given, from military considerations.

The French commandant then took the matter into his own hands. Early one morning he sent four vehicles, namely one fully manned armoured car, two lorries and then another armoured car, which drove at full speed over Garden Bridge between the Japanese sandbag redoubts and, before any resistance could be rallied, reached the wine store. For a quarter of an hour Hongkew was a swarm of dazed and bewildered Japanese officers. The Frenchmen were there, and it was hardly worth while to make a first-class political affair of a few casks of wine; so the four French vehicles were allowed to drive back across Garden Bridge unmolested.

In the final phase of the Shanghai campaign, when it was a question of expelling the Chinese troops from Nantao, the Japanese command made an application to the French Consul-General, who is the chief authority in all that concerns the French Concession. It was enquired what attitude the French authorities would adopt to a march of Japanese troops through the Concession to Nantao. The answer was in the true Gallic spirit: the Concession would be defended in the same way as any other piece of French soil.

These anecdotes, amusing as they are, can only be regarded as little chips floating on the stream, which now with the force of a torrent threatens to sweep away the Westerners from the positions they have appropriated for nearly a century in China, enjoying privileges the possible loss of which fills them with apprehension.

Nothing has been more destructive of the white man's prestige in the Far East than the impotence, sinking to zero, of the League of Nations. Manchuria, Abyssinia and now China are the great milestones on the League's road to charitable oblivion. But home-staying Europeans, who still busy themselves in leisure hours with this deplorable emasculate, unfortunately have no knowledge or understanding of the catastrophic effect the League's fiasco has had on the position of the white man in the Far East. The damage, of course, falls hardest on those Powers which still try to keep up an appearance on which, however, no one ventures any longer to rely. Germans and Italians, the great masters of the art of propaganda, never neglect an opportunity of letting the East Asiatics know how they realized in good time the ineffectiveness of the Geneva tribunal.

In this connection it may not be without interest to relate a conversation I had in December 1936 with a pro-

fessor of the Chiaotung University in Shanghai. We happened to be talking of the antagonism between Chinese and Japanese, and he predicted that war might break out at any moment. He foresaw the whole Chinese tactics of a slow retreat towards the interior of the country while endeavouring to avoid Japanese encircling movements ; in fact, everything that has happened and is happening. And he concluded with these words : " And when we enter upon the inevitable trial of strength with Japan, we do so with a clear understanding of the situation on one point. We know that we cannot hope for any assistance from the Western Great Powers. We have thoroughly learnt the lesson of Manchuria and Abyssinia."

The European and American business men in the Far East have also learnt another lesson from Manchuria. As a consequence of the occupation of 1931 the Japanese have consistently aimed at establishing a Japanese trade monopoly in Manchukuo. The trade in fuel oils gives us a striking instance of the purposeful nature of this proceeding. Freedom of trade in these commodities has been practically suppressed, in spite of the fact that in this particular case Japan had against her one of the world's most powerful international trading organizations, both as regards capital and political influence.

Now the question which overshadows all others in the minds of foreign business men in the Far East is this : what is going to happen to trade in China after the conclusion of the present great military conflict ? Japan's diplomatic agents, and sometimes even her exultant generals and admirals, assure the world that the rights of third parties will be respected in every way, that Japan's victorious arms will protect the interests of foreign Powers, etc., etc. But no European or American merchant on the spot entertains

any illusions as to what is in store. Quietly but inflexibly Japanese influence is making its way in quarters where an internationally controlled administration previously existed. In the Chinese departments such as the Customs and the Post Office, where formerly Europeans held directorships, Japanese influence is now being steadily strengthened. All industry and all commerce in the occupied areas is being reconstituted so as to render Japanese interests dominating. This state of things is brought about by force of conquest, and as far as the Japanese can carry their arms they proceed according to the slogan, "Asia for the Asiatics"—or perhaps rather, "China for the Japanese". A great commercial centre like Shanghai, the fifth city of the world, owes its growth, not to any particular love of the Chinese for foreigners, but to the fact that China, which is above all an agricultural country, needs the foreigners' goods and even desires their presence as a counterpoise to the unrelenting encroachment of the Japanese. For these reasons the foreign commercial community was able to develop and flourish, so long as the Chinese were more or less masters in their own country. With Japanese suzerainty over the whole of China or parts of it, foreign trade will shrivel up; since the Japanese, as in Manchukuo, consider that a steadily expanding Japanese industry is capable of satisfying the needs of the Chinese market, a market for the subjugation of which they are now exerting all their strength and which, in the event of final victory, they will treat as their exclusive property.

No Westerner with a knowledge of the import of what is now taking place in China harbours any illusions about the transference of power that is proceeding. Let us now see what attitude the various Western nations have adopted to the great conflict between China and Japan.

First, then, we have a group consisting of Japan's two associates in the Anti-Comintern Pact, Germany and Italy. Before the war, during the phase, unfortunately so brief, when a new China was being built up, these two States took the lead in the reconstruction of China's defensive forces. The formation of the new Chinese air force was directed partly by Italian, partly by American instructors. The creation of Chiang Kai-shek's new army was to a great extent the work, gratefully acknowledged by the Chinese, of a numerous staff of German officers, some of whom had won fame in the World War. When the war broke out General von Falkenhausen was at the head of the German military commission. Previously, as German military attaché in Tokyo, he had acquired a knowledge of the Japanese army, which naturally was a great advantage in his new post at Nanking. There seems to be only one opinion, that von Falkenhausen and his staff of German officers accomplished a very praiseworthy task in the strengthening of the Chinese defence. During the fighting at Shanghai it was reported that Falkenhausen himself and a number of his countrymen were present at the front and that the laying out of the strong defensive line Chapei-Liuho, which for over two months defied the constant assaults of the Japanese, was carried out in great part according to the instructions of the German officers.

After the runaway retreat from Shanghai and the capture of Nanking the German commission was criticized in certain quarters for failing to get the retiring Chinese army to halt at and defend the much talked-of "Hindenburg line", from Liuho by Taitsang and Quinsan to the great lakes, with the tenacity it had previously shown. But these critics have overlooked the fact that the German officers were only advisers without direct command. They may be given



great credit for the fortification of the Hindenburg line ; that the flying troops afterwards revolted and slipped away through that line is a calamity for which we must blame the constant changes in the Chinese command and other subversive tendencies which for a time disorganized the defensive power of the Chinese. Considerable influence is also attributed to von Falkenhausen and his men during the operations around Hsuchow, where for a couple of months the Chinese defence was conspicuous for a stubbornness which at times took the form of local offensives.

At the end of May the German officers were recalled by orders from the highest quarter in Berlin. Their number at this time is variously reported as one hundred—forty— or twenty. This great disparity may be partly due to the fact that some of them remained behind, on account of their Jewish birth or other circumstances which rendered their native country not very attractive. The Japanese raised a memorial to them in declaring that the Chinese army had lost twenty-five per cent. of its fighting strength through the departure of this handful of foreign officers. It is reported that the German military commission has been to some extent replaced by Russian advisers, and that the Chinese government has also made enquiries in France as to the possibility of appointing military experts.

During the last months I spent in the Far East I saw many proofs that even Italians and Germans were following the Chinese struggle for national liberty with sympathy and appreciation. It was quite another matter that on account of their anti-Russian treaty with Japan the governments of Rome and Berlin, as the war developed into a life-and-death struggle, were increasingly at pains to show a friendly attitude to Japan ; doubtless with a view to obtaining exclusive commercial advantages, at first in Man-

chukuo and later in an eventual Japanese protectorate over China. But I have direct evidence that the large and prosperous German commercial community in Shanghai was greatly disturbed by certain pro-Japanese utterances, insulting to the Chinese, that had come from authoritative quarters in Germany. It is pointed out that it was scarcely necessary, while the struggle was still undecided, to risk the favourable position which the German commercial community after twenty years of hard work has succeeded in recapturing, starting from the lowest ebb of German business interests in the Far East that resulted from the World War.

Passing now to a survey of the American attitude to the great events in China, we must bear in mind in the first place the policy of isolation, dictated by profound disappointment which has swayed the leaders and public opinion in the United States ever since the World War. The Americans entered that great struggle with a high heart in the simple faith that they were going to "make the world safe for democracy". Their honest idealism was ill rewarded, and now as a result of the Versailles treaty they see a Europe overgrown with all kinds of political weeds, as repulsive as the devastation of war.

It is therefore not surprising that on the outbreak of war in China the Americans ordered the evacuation of United States citizens from the interior of the country and in other ways tried to keep outside the conflict as far as possible.

In September 1937 the American Ambassador in Nanking took a step which gave rise to violent criticism on the part of the Chinese, and very unfavourable comment among his own compatriots.

On September 19th Vice-Admiral Hasegawa, commanding the Japanese naval forces in China, delivered a warning to the foreign Powers that from twelve noon on September

21st the Japanese naval air force would open an intensive bombardment of Nanking and its surroundings, and that therefore the missions of neutral Powers, their consular officials and private nationals should take up safer quarters, and that foreign warships anchored off Nanking should proceed farther up the river.

The Russian, British, German and Italian embassies remained at their posts, but on the evening of the 20th the American Ambassador and his staff went on board the gunboats *Luzon* and *Guam*, which took up a position in the middle of the Yangtze river. Chinese, European and American circles were pretty well agreed that this proceeding was a *faux pas* on the part of the American representative. On the other hand, it must be pointed out that in these same September days, when the diplomatic *gaucherie* took place at Nanking, the American guard at Shanghai was reinforced by one thousand four hundred and thirty-five men, who afterwards in very critical circumstances rejected with dignified firmness any interference of the belligerents with the maintenance of order within the American military section of the International Settlement. Afterwards, in January, when the *Panay* catastrophe occurred on the Yangtze River a little above Nanking, President Roosevelt intervened with a surprising initiative, wherein, to the immense consternation of the Japanese, he emphasized the equality of the American Chief Executive with the sovereign of Japan. The Americans, whose tradition it is to go to war when a vessel belonging to their navy or having United States citizens on board is sunk contrary to international law, considered the *Panay* episode too unimportant to be made a *casus belli*. But it seems probable that the *Panay* and *Ladybird* affairs postponed the great Japanese campaign against Canton by nearly a year.

Now we come to the great sphinx, Soviet Russia. As we have seen in the preceding chapters, relations between the Soviet and China have been very variable, while between the Soviet and Japan a firm and unchanging hostility has prevailed. Sun Yat-sen, that old idealist, thought it would help him in his struggle against imperialism if he called in Russian advisers. But Chiang Kai-shek with his remarkable scent for realities soon found that a dangerous yeast had got into the Chinese social dough. For that matter he was not the only one who made short work of the Soviet agents.

On April 9th 1927, when the present writer went to the Russian consulate in Peking to have his passport *visé*, he was a witness of some extremely dramatic proceedings. The gate of the consulate was shut, and there was nobody there but a young Russian girl, pale as a sheet, who tremblingly declared that it was shut, shut, shut. Full of strange forebodings I went on till I reached the main entrance of the Russian embassy. This too was closed, but the fat and genial Chinese porter stood at the gate and explained that nobody could come in. He happened to recognize me, and as at that time I was reckoned as at least fifty per cent. Chinese, his smile broadened.

“*An laoyeh*,” he said; “there’s things happening here to-day. Go along the street to the embassy annexe, then you’ll see the devil and all!”

Never in my life have I seen anything like it. Chang Tso-lin, who at that time was master of Peking, had got word through his political police that the annexe of the Russian embassy was a resort of Russian and Chinese Communists, who were hatching great subversive plans together. And early in the morning of the 9th the Dutch Minister, who was the doyen of the *corps diplomatique*, received a call

from two of Chang's officers, who informed him that a Communist plot had been discovered, that it was localized in the annexe in question and that it aimed at making an end of all foreigners, in particular the foreign legations.

And then at nine o'clock precisely, as my lucky star led me to this interesting spot, the thunder-clap burst on the Russians. A long row of lorries, packed with Chinese policemen armed to the teeth, rolled up to the gate of the annexe, which was instantly forced, whereupon a flood of policemen poured into every corner of the place. The Communists were not at a loss. Buckets of petrol stood in readiness, the inflammable liquid was flung all over the rooms and lighted to destroy all dangerous printed matter and other compromising objects stored in this Communist centre.

Into the thick of the smoke and flames went the leading squad of Chinese police with their chemical extinguishers. And in a little while the fire was got under. Then the evacuation started; Russian and Chinese Communists promiscuously, all with their hands tied behind them, were pitched like logs into the lorries, which drove off as soon as they had got their load. It was a regular roundabout of wagons coming and going, many of them loaded with automatic pistols, light machine-guns and hand-grenades, besides parcels of propaganda literature scorched at the edges. It was reported that among the partly burnt documents plans were found, afterwards published in facsimile, according to which on a certain night at the end of April the wall of the Russian section of the legation quarter was to be blown up from the inside to make way for the great body of Chinese Communists in the outer city; then the legation quarter was to be cleared of all that was not Communist, while the same drastic proceeding was to be





effected throughout the city—which had been elaborately divided into cells, each with its chief executioner. Yes, no doubt we all had a narrow shave that time.

Well, that was just a colourful episode from the past. About the same time as Chang Tso-lin was carrying out his purge of Peking in the north, Chiang Kai-shek and the other Kuomintang groups were getting rid of the Russian advisers in the Yangtze valley. But the Communist ferment was still alive in the Chinese body politic. For years in succession Chiang employed all his military forces in defeating China's Red armies. In this he was only half successful, and when the conflict with Japan seemed inevitable, the Red army joined Chiang and has since fought against the Japanese invaders in the form of remarkably stubborn and enterprising guerrilla bands.

The assertion of the Japanese that they are fighting Chiang in order to extirpate Communism in China is one of the hollowest of all the disgusting propaganda lies which in our time poison international relations. The truth is that if Japan had supported Chiang and after the conquest of Manchuria had given the Chinese convincing proof that she had no political interests in China proper, pro-Soviet propaganda would have lost its best argument. Soviet propaganda in China since 1931 has been far inferior as a political factor to the rising hatred of the Japanese, the invaders of Manchuria, Jehol, Chahar and the Peking province of Hopei. Hu Shih, China's great national author, recently appointed Ambassador in Washington, formulated the situation in these words, even before the outbreak of war: "Japanese aggression knows no bounds, but our national patience has a limit."

Quite naturally, considering the sharp political antagonism between the Soviet and Japan, the former Power has



supported China during hostilities with war material. A good deal has been written about the motor road, Chuguchak-Urumchi-Hami-Suchow-Lanchow, which Sven Hedin reconnoitred some years ago, having been constructed since the outbreak of war as a real military road along which great quantities of war material are forwarded from Russia to China. It appears to me that these statements should be received with some reserve. The distance is so enormous and the difficulties of modern road construction in the desert are so considerable that the work has probably been confined to the building of proper bridges over watercourses and the clearing of a moderately practicable road. It seems quite certain in any case that this road has a lower traffic capacity than the modern motor roads in China proper. Presumably Russia's most important deliveries of material to China have taken the form of aeroplanes. Hundreds of Russian fighting-planes have been sold to Chiang and hundreds of Russian pilots and mechanics have been engaged to take charge of these machines. It is only thanks to this powerful assistance from Russia that the Chinese in the two phases of the war which we may designate by the names of Hsuehchow and Hankow have been able more or less to hold their own against the Japanese air force, which is in any case far superior.

The Russians must have rendered a still greater service to the Chinese by confining large Japanese forces to the northern boundary of Manchukuo. It has been said that between three and four hundred thousand Russians are there opposed to two hundred thousand or more Japanese. Constant skirmishes along the frontier keep both parties fully prepared, and it must be felt on both sides that sooner or later the strain must reach breaking-point.

Then on July 11th 1938 the serious collision occurred at

Changkufeng to the south-west of Vladivostok, where the Russian maritime province, Manchukuo, and Korea meet in a narrow angle. From a detailed statement in the September number of the well-informed *Oriental Affairs* it appears that the frontier demarcation in these parts has been very sketchily carried out and that frontier posts have been moved by both parties. In any case the Russians claim that Changkufeng is marked as Russian on a map which was recognized in its day by a Chinese-Russian frontier commission—a map the existence of which came as a surprise to the Japanese. Changkufeng, which is a ridge fifteen hundred feet high, affords a view on one side over Possiet Bay in Russian territory, on the other over the very important harbour of Rashin on the Korean coast. Presumably it is only now that both sides have become anxious to secure the possession of this strategically important point.

From the date mentioned (July 11th) to August 10th frontier fighting went on at Changkufeng, unimportant to begin with, but afterwards supported by all arms. At the same time a diplomatic duel was proceeding, in which the Japanese at first assumed that the Russians would easily be frightened into concessions. But after Litvinov, the Russian Commissar for Foreign Affairs, had rejected the Japanese claims with marked acerbity and the Russians had brought up more and more artillery and tanks to Changkufeng, while Russian planes were bombing the adjacent Korean railway, the Japanese came to realize that a serious conflict was threatened, a conflict which might jeopardize not only the result of the war in China, but also Japan's future as the leading military Power in the East. An armistice was arranged on August 10th, but was imperilled on the 15th, when the Russians complained of what they considered a breach of the agreement. They reoccupied their posi-


tions, and to make an end of the threatening incident the Japanese withdrew across the Tumen River.

This month of conflict in the north had powerful repercussions on the war in China. All the troops the Japanese could spare from North China were sent either by Kalgan to Inner Mongolia or by rail via Tientsin and Shanhaikuan to Manchukuo. The relief on all Chinese fronts was sensible, and in Hankow they began to talk about the prospect of a victorious peace.


This hope was not of long duration. The mystery man of the Kremlin, who had previously made away with so many of his expert collaborators, recalled the strong man of East Siberia, Marshal Blücher ; and now it seems doubtful whether this energetic strategist, feared by the Japanese, is still in active service.

I will add, as a personal commentary, that even when the Changkufeng episode was at its height I was not inclined really to believe in a Russian offensive. Everything I saw on my way home through Manchukuo and Siberia in May 1938 seemed to indicate that although the Russian frontier was very strongly garrisoned the dispositions were planned entirely with a view to defence.

Of late (during December 1938 and January 1939) there has been considerable tension between Russia and Japan, partly owing to a dispute over Japanese fishing in Soviet territorial waters and partly because of minor frontier clashes. Japanese troops have again been rushed from China to Manchukuo, where signs of brewing unrest are reported.



FLAHL 2A





## CHAPTER TWENTY

### HONG KONG AND PORT COURBET

John Bull's throne is, at last, in danger.  
For the English, indeed, "bees have stung a crying  
face"!

ISHIMARU : *Japan must fight Britain*, p. 48.

**I**N April last year I travelled from Haiphong in Tonkin to Hong Kong on board the French steamer *Canton* in company with a Japanese diplomatic agent, who was out to gather information about the transport of arms and ammunition to China via Tonkin. I found him very communicative and had the impression that there was a good deal of truth in what he said.

We discussed the Sino-Japanese conflict in all its aspects and he was anxious to have my opinion, as he knew that for many years I had been in the service of the Chinese government and had travelled far and wide in China.

One of my first questions was, how it came about that the Japanese did not stop the great traffic in arms and ammunition through Hong Kong via Canton to Hankow. For it was well known to everybody that the strong resistance which the Chinese were offering just at that time to the Japanese advance in southern Shantung and northern Anhui was only rendered possible by the large consignments of war material that had passed through Hong Kong.

He gave me the following account : At the beginning of

the war the Japanese Consul-general at Hong Kong had approached the Governor of the colony, proposing an agreement for putting a stop to the transport of war material to Canton. The railway from Kowloon (the mainland section of the Hong Kong colony) to Canton was constructed with British capital, and thus the British are interested in its safety in war. The Japanese offered to guarantee full immunity for the railway on condition that the British undertook to stop the importation of war material through Hong Kong. This preliminary agreement was forwarded to Tokyo, where it was approved ; but when it came to London's turn the matter was allowed to rest. The Japanese have since done their best to damage the Kowloon-Canton line, but in spite of constant air attacks enormous quantities of military stores have been forwarded to Hankow.

My next question to the Japanese was : Why have you not declared war on China, when by so doing your fleet would have been able to control sea-borne traffic via Hong Kong and to lay an embargo on war material destined for China ?

His answer was direct and to the point : The incidents of the British gunboats at the time of the capture of Nanking, but above all the unfortunate affair of the sinking of the United States gunboat *Panay*, caused a panic (he used this English expression) in government circles in Tokyo, and the present form of hostilities was retained in order to avoid the chances of friction with neutral Powers which might result from a blockade of the coast.

Some weeks later, as I was on the point of leaving China, I met an Englishman who gave me an extremely interesting insight into the situation as it appeared to a foreigner who had lived for many years in Japan. It should be borne in mind that my meeting with this man took place in the second successful period of Chinese resistance, the stubborn defence

of their positions around Hsuehchow, culminating in the Chinese victory of Taierhchuang.

My informant had lived eighteen years in Japan, he spoke the language fluently and had friends and connections among the leaders of Japan's industrial and commercial life. He himself worked in a concern of world-wide interests which supplied Japan with certain commodities that she only produces on a very small scale and that are essential for the conduct of war.

He then took a very gloomy view of Japan's situation in the great trial of strength. "We fear that this is the end of Japan." He told me how the tenacious and pliant resistance of the Chinese, which never allowed the enveloping tactics of the Japanese to reach a final decision, had come as a complete surprise to the Japanese generals, who expected an easy military promenade, in the course of which they would be able to sit down and fortify their new positions whenever they pleased. Instead they were confronted with an elastic resistance with which it was impossible to come to grips and which forced them, constantly harassed in their communications by guerrilla bands, to plunge farther and farther into a vast country where their difficulties increased with the square of the distance.

I asked whether the reaction of the war on the daily life of the Japanese people was very noticeable.

"Hospital ships are continually arriving with wounded, who are carried up country in train after train. At the same time commodity prices are rising while export trade dwindles. The new requisition laws give the government the right to dispose of all property, even to the rings on the women's fingers. The ordinary man asks what all this is for, as he has no quarrel with the Chinese people. But the military have control not only of the people but of the



government, and the Foreign Office has only to put the best face it can on it when the soldiery rapes the women of Nanking and the fleet bombs neutral vessels."

"But," I went on to ask, "why hasn't Japan formally declared war on China, when after a declaration hostilities could be carried on more effectively and in particular the great trade in arms through Hong Kong could be stopped by a blockade of the coast?"

"At a certain juncture the government had made every preparation for a declaration of war, and a supreme council of State was to be held, presided over by the Emperor. The representatives of the Press were summoned to receive a 'supreme announcement'. The pressmen sat waiting in expectation, till a functionary informed them that they could go home. There was nothing at the moment." The unseen course of events was sketched by my informant in some such terms as these: At one of these extraordinary councils of State everything has to be arranged in advance. The Prime Minister hands a report to the Emperor, who then asks whether all the members of the government are agreed. When there is full agreement the Emperor affixes his signature and the meeting is concluded. But in this case an unforeseen thing happened. Contrary to all precedent the Emperor asked time after time whether this or that corporation had been consulted. After several questions of this kind the meeting was adjourned for further investigation, and to this hour there has been no formal declaration of war. The mighty conflict is still modestly referred to by the Japanese as "The China Incident", a friendly police action which aims at liberating the beloved Chinese people from an oppressive government.

I am well aware that the accounts I received in April and May last year, on the one hand from a Japanese diplomat,

on the other from a British merchant residing in Japan, may be misleading. But they point in the same direction, showing that at that time the Japanese government preferred to attempt the completion of its action in China without a blockade of the coast and without disturbing the delicate corner, Hong Kong.

In the middle of October, when the fall of Hankow was to all appearance a question of days and the Canton-Hankow line had thus lost a good deal of its importance as the main artery of the Chinese defence, the blow fell suddenly upon Canton (and thereby in a secondary sense on Hong Kong). On October 12th, protected by the fire of warships, a fleet of Japanese transports began to land a large force of troops in Bias Bay, in close proximity, on the north-east, to the colony of Hong Kong. The resistance of the Chinese militia was feeble, and in less than a week the Japanese troops advanced fifty miles and occupied the important town of Waichow.

After a very rapid advance the vanguard of the Japanese army reached Canton on October 21st. Practically no resistance was offered, and it was strongly suggested immediately after the surrender of this important city that treachery had played a part in making possible the smashing success following upon the Bias Bay landing. But, when all the available facts are co-ordinated, it seems as if the high command in Hankow, trusting in Hong Kong as a shelter against operations aiming at the capture of Canton, had withdrawn a considerable part of the Kuangtung army, which was used to strengthen the resistance in the Yangtze campaign, leaving Canton a partly denuded city. Still, the easy capture of Canton remains in many ways the most obscure point of the whole China-Japan war.

\* \* \* \* \*

Let us now turn to a far wider question: the international bearing of the Canton campaign. The analysis of this problem naturally involves a consideration of the present extremely dynamic situation, not only in the Far East, but equally in Europe, torn by political conflicts.

Whenever and wherever I have had an opportunity of discussing present-day politics with Englishmen during the last four years, in London or Hong Kong or Shanghai, the conversation has always taken the same turn: the great British rearmament. I have been told that this was being undertaken not for war but for peace, that it was intended to create a Britain in arms, strong enough to enforce respect for her opinion in the service of peace. I was always willing to go so far with my interlocutor as to take it for granted that the British could build up an armed force so overwhelming, especially at sea and in the air, that wherever a great conflict threatened, in Central Europe, in the Mediterranean or in East Asia, they could use this paramount accumulation of power in the service of the eminent spiritual gift which I have always admired in the English, and which they themselves call quite simply common sense.

But I always made this reservation: that the Englishman scarcely has a full understanding of the German, Italian or Japanese psyche—the new cult of power which has grown up in a few years with such rapidity that it seems likely to overspread the whole sky. I maintained that the rulers of these totalitarian States love fighting for its own sake and that Great Britain would therefore have to go to war, if it came to a serious conflict.

Then the Czechoslovakian crisis came as a touchstone for the new British steel. Chamberlain went to Berchtesgaden, because amongst other reasons it was feared in London that the British Ambassador in Berlin had not succeeded

in making it quite plain to Hitler that England would unhesitatingly stand by France in a war. There ensued the great surprise, when Hitler declared without mincing matters that he was ready to go to war if he could not solve the question of the Sudeten Germans' nationality by negotiation on the lines he had laid down.

Obviously Hitler had the best nerves. The end of it was peace—for the time being. Actually Hitler got what he wanted, but to save the Western Powers' face, as the Chinese so nicely express it, the entry of the German troops was postponed for a few days and the Berlin Ambassadors of the Western Powers were given seats on a Four-Power Commission appointed to implement Hitler's dictation.

Peace was saved—in this case. But at what a price ! Leading politicians in Paris have testified to the deep feeling among the chivalrous French people on being forced to sacrifice their ally. The British Prime Minister, personally so courageous and representing much of what is noblest in the English character, must himself have seen that the olive branch he brought to poor Czechoslovakia bore a suspicious resemblance to a surgeon's knife.

Power triumphs, while peace preys on its own liver.

Hardly was the crisis over when it became known that the partial British mobilization had revealed defects in the military organization. At the same time a frightened whisper ran through the world : Germany's military power is invincible !

It is well known that Japanese diplomacy follows with constant attention the fluctuations of power in Europe. Time after time new action against China has been undertaken just when England had suffered a diplomatic reverse or been forced to concentrate all her attention on European problems. And it was certainly no fortuity that Japan

made a new move at the gates of Hong Kong immediately after Great Britain had bought respite for a time at the price of a catastrophic loss of prestige.

Let us then turn our eyes to Hong Kong, its position in world trade, the part it plays in the colonial policy of the British Empire, its importance to a free and peace-loving China and the temptation it offers to Japan in that ambitious country's great plan of turning the South China Sea into a *Mare clausum japonicum*.

Hong Kong, which in less than four years will celebrate its centenary as a British possession, is a typical creation of the great maritime empire, which seeks to preserve its dominion over all the seas of the world. Hong Kong is one of the world's foremost transit ports. So long as China is a free country, Hong Kong will prosper ; for China needs this port both for covering her necessary imports and for dealing with a good deal of her exports. The two great maritime gates to the continental empire of China, Hong Kong and Shanghai, have both been built up, the former entirely, the latter mainly, by the English, and they have both contributed greatly to bring wealth and power to the British Empire in Victorian and post-Victorian times. Shanghai is a peculiar international trading metropolis ; Hong Kong is a British Crown Colony. For their continued existence as centres of international, largely British, commerce they both depend on their hinterland, China, remaining independent and open as before to free commercial competition.

Hong Kong is also a very strong maritime fortress, considerably extended in 1937, when new hangars and other installations for an increased air defence were constructed.

The British naval forces, known as the China Station, which are based on Hong Kong consist (apart from possible

PLATE XVI



*our of Hong Kong with part of the British China Squadron. In the foreground part of the water-front of Victoria ; in the  
overlook and the mountainous mainland section of the colony. From these heights the towns and harbour could be shelled  
lery*



recent changes) of six cruisers, ten destroyers, eleven submarines with a depot ship and one aircraft-carrier. Hong Kong's strongest fort faces seaward, and the whole plan of defence appears to assume that a friendly Power (China) will keep the rear of the fortress moderately free. The area of the whole colony is only four hundred square miles, which is far too small for a land defence, even if sufficient land forces were available. Even now the Japanese have so surrounded Hong Kong with a network of flying bases, some on the islands to the west, some on the mainland to the east, that the defensive position of the colony is less favourable than it was a couple of years ago.

I do not at all think the Japanese are at present planning an attack on Hong Kong, detestable as this place is to them on account of the huge transit trade in war material destined for Hankow. An attack on Hong Kong at this moment would involve the co-operation of Japan's not too numerous battleship fleet for silencing the heavy artillery of the forts. But the risk of losing one or another of these capital ships, which form the only defence of the island empire against the great Anglo-Saxon naval Powers, is too great for the experiment to be attempted, especially as the Japanese certainly realize that if they succeed in the course they are now pursuing Hong Kong will in due time fall to them like a ripe fruit without a blow being struck.

If the Chinese are completely subdued and the belt Bias Bay-Canton becomes a vast Japanese camp with strong air forces and siege artillery able to command Hong Kong from the land side, then the British may prefer to give up their colony without a fight. That the British battle-fleet might be liberated from its duties in European waters in order to force a decision in the South China Sea must be considered out of the question in the present political situa-



tion in Europe. Besides, if Ishimaru, the author of *Japan must fight Britain*, has correctly interpreted the intentions of the Japanese naval staff, Japan as a preventive measure would attack Hong Kong with all her naval forces the moment a British battle-fleet passed through the Suez Canal.

No, I am convinced that the Japanese will spare Hong Kong with its valuable naval establishments, its warehouses and splendid buildings, which may all be theirs on the day the British propose that the Japanese buy it all ; in the same way as the Russians after the Japanese conquest of Manchuria were forced to sell the strategical railway they had formerly built through northern Manchuria to Vladivostok.

If the Japanese make themselves permanently masters of Kuangtung they can be sure of being able to reduce Hong Kong from the land side whenever it pleases them, or by a blockade from both land and sea to starve out that overpopulated little place, which is by no means self-supporting. In this connection it is tragicomic to read how, when the colony was likely to be cut off from the market-gardens of Kuangtung, the Japanese Consul General offered to supply Hong Kong with vegetables from Formosa, which in the interests of humanity were to be delivered without a thought of profit. How nice of him !

I am convinced that only in case of extreme necessity will the Japanese have resort to violence against Hong Kong or against the foreign communities in Shanghai, which are destined in due time to fall into the hands of the new masters when the tightening of the Japanese trade monopoly has forced the last of the Western merchants to take their tickets for home.

My analysis, then, points inevitably to the maintenance

of British power in the Far East standing or falling with a free China, well disposed towards Westerners.

Just as the destinies of England and France in the North Sea and in the Mediterranean are bound together for common action by increasingly stern logic, so do we find the same situation in the East in relation to the great conflict between China and Japan. The French are more hot-tempered and in an extremity are willing to fight merely for their beloved *gloire*, even in a perfectly desperate situation, where the cooler Briton may swallow a humiliation and bide his time. The land forces of French Indo-China amounted a couple of years ago to fifteen thousand men, partly French, partly Annamite soldiers. How far the recently proposed plans for a strong reinforcement of the defences, including some cruisers and submarines, have progressed, I do not know. In any case it is obvious that neither England nor France at this moment possesses in East Asia either land or sea forces capable of successfully opposing the Japanese, when once they have finished in China.

But is it likely that these two European Powers need fear a further Japanese expansion which would jeopardize their possessions?

There is a risk that the Japanese, who are trying very naturally to block all routes for the supply of war material to China, may attempt a rapid action through the province of Kuangsi, that is, along the northern frontier of Tonkin, up to Kunming (Yunnanfu), which is the terminus of a French railway. In that case Pakhoi in Kuangtung, not far from the French border, might become the base of operations on the coast, in the same way as Bias Bay was used for operations along the northern border of the Hong Kong colony. Then, as at Hong Kong, the Japanese would

approach a very interesting point of military geography, this time on French colonial territory.

A discussion is now going on in French circles in Indo-China about a possible alteration of Tonkin's communication with the sea. The present port of Haiphong is a river harbour and can only be used by steamers of shallow draught. Dredgers keep it open with difficulty even for the present modest scale of traffic, and Haiphong shows signs of decline.

A marine-geographical view is now being put forward that shipping should be diverted to Port Courbet, which lies twenty-five miles from Haiphong in a north-easterly direction and fifty miles from the Chinese frontier.

This entirely undeveloped harbour, which is named after one of the early colonial pioneers, Admiral Courbet, offers many natural advantages. At present defended by only a few small batteries, it is capable of being converted into a naval harbour sheltering even large vessels. Between the Ile de la Surprise and the Ile de l'Etoile lies the Rade du Crapaud with a depth at the entrance of seven and a half fathoms and an anchorage of seven and a half to thirteen fathoms. North of the Ile de la Surprise we find another anchorage with a depth of nine fathoms at the entrance and from six and a half to ten fathoms inside.

On the mainland around Port Courbet a sedimentary formation extends along the coast with vast deposits of anthracite, which are exploited by a semi-official mining company and shipped from a series of harbours, the depth of which is about three fathoms. A commencement has also been made with the mining of iron ore, of the same type as that which the Japanese have been exploiting for many years in a number of deposits along the Yangtze River.

French Indo-China is a model colony, of which the French have every right to feel proud. The administration seems to work with neat precision, the scientifically irrigated rice-fields are a joy to behold, and the Annamite population is happy and contented under an orderly government. The only cloud in an otherwise clear sky is the anxious question : will it be our turn one day ?

The French are now on very good terms with the Chinese frontier provinces and communications are being steadily improved. The province of Yunnan has its outlet by the French railway line to Haiphong.

The colonial future of the French in the Far East, like that of the English, is very largely dependent on the national freedom and continued friendliness of China. During the war both nations have earned the gratitude of the Chinese by facilitating an extensive importation of war material from Hong Kong to Canton and Hankow, and from Haiphong to Yunnan and Kuangsi. Thus both have actively contributed to enable the Chinese to carry on their struggle for national independence. It is of the greatest importance to them, not for the sake of the Chinese, but in order to save their own colonial possessions, that they should continue to bring into western China the military supplies which cannot be produced by the Chinese themselves. Formally no state of war exists between China and Japan, for which reason these Western Powers are fully entitled to afford such assistance as they judge to be consistent with their own interests.

The situation would be still more favourable to the Chinese cause if the mighty United States became convinced that it is better not to wait till it is too late. If Japan is allowed to pursue her victorious career unchecked, the day will come when Honolulu will be in danger and a


powerful Japanese admiral will knock at the Golden Gate, demanding free admission for his countrymen.

Those who think I exaggerate in seeing in the great events of to-day an extremely dangerous threat to the continued existence of French Indo-China and of the British Empire, will do well to study their map and learn from it that the Japanese after twenty-five months of warfare have already covered more than half the distance between Shanhaikwan and Singapore. According to Ishimaru their idea is that this great naval harbour can also best be reduced from the land side. Curiously enough this seafaring people in their military operations have always relied as much as possible on the land route.

Naturally I have only been able to touch very briefly on these great problems of the future, which concern not only Hong Kong and French Indo-China, as well as the Straits Settlements and Singapore, but also the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines.

Anyone who wishes to acquaint himself more fully with the Japanese view of this great problem of military geography may be referred to the book which I have already mentioned more than once : Ishimaru's *Japan must fight Britain*. This book, which went through four editions in Great Britain in 1936 and 1937, was translated into English by Captain G. V. Rayment, late Dean of the Royal Naval College, Greenwich. The author, who is a Japanese naval officer, writes as a representative of Japan's Pan-Asiatic movement, the object of which is to make Tokyo the centre of an Asiatic empire of a thousand million inhabitants.

After discussing the course of events that has transformed Japan and Great Britain from two allies into two States which now watch each other with cold reserve, he passes to a consideration of the war between them which he regards as



inevitable. In his survey of the naval and military forces of the two Powers England appears as the weaker side. He regards the naval base at Singapore as an affront to Japan, the British Dominions as apathetic and of little help in the event of war, and the British Navy as no longer equal to its traditions.

In his opinion Japan is entitled to the mastery of the Pacific. If Great Britain does not voluntarily make room for this new World Power, "then war is inevitable, and the result will be that the British Empire will be broken up for ever".

Another document of great interest but of disputed nature is *Le Mémoire Tanaka*, published by the Chinese delegation in Geneva in 1938. This document has been the subject of an animated discussion between Dr. Wellington Koo, the delegate of China, and the Japanese diplomats, who contest its authenticity. According to the published statement this memorandum was submitted to the Emperor on July 25th 1927 by the then Prime Minister, Baron Tanaka. If we follow the text published by the Chinese, its author outlined three stages in Japan's policy of expansion: first the occupation of Manchuria, then the subjection of the whole of China, and after that the conquest of the Eastern Archipelago and Further India.

Future historical research will doubtless settle the controversy about the Tanaka memorandum.

## CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

### THE FUTURE OF EAST ASIA

**T**HREE times in the course of the war it has looked as if the Chinese defence was on the point of collapse. The first time was when the flight from Shanghai to Nanking began, culminating in the fall of the capital. The future then seemed pretty hopeless to a friend of China, as there appeared to be no chance of Chiang and his armies being able to rally again for an effective defence. But soon there was once more a strong Chinese front, which for nearly six months held up the Japanese around Hsuchow. It required an immense Japanese effort, scraping together all the troops that could be hurriedly brought up from various quarters, finally to break down this resistance.

And lastly came the retreat to Chengchow. We were told in the papers that some ten or more Chinese divisions, approximately a couple of hundred thousand men, were cut off and that an irreparable debacle was only a question of hours or at the most of a few days.

But the predicted disaster failed to occur, and by degrees we began to understand that it was actually a part of the plans of the Chinese command to leave behind some bodies of troops, preferably the local militia, to let them conceal their arms and other supplies, become peaceful peasantry for a time, till the Japanese torrent had subsided in that district, and then once more to start operations in



rear of the enemy as a new, well-equipped addition to that Chinese force which the Japanese detest most of all: the patriotic "bandits"—guerrillas.

Now we have again witnessed a local collapse of the first order. The great artery of the Chinese defence, the Canton-Hankow railway, was put out of action in a few days by the fall of its two termini.

That the fall of Hankow was inevitable and that Chiang on the middle Yangtze was only fighting his customary war of retirement and attrition, had been apparent to all for months. But it came as a strange surprise that Canton was abandoned practically without fighting. It has been rumoured from Tokyo that bribery of the Kuangtung generals played a part and that some members of the Chinese supreme command surrendered to the Japanese. I find it difficult to believe these reports, among other things because the province of Kuangtung has been governed for a year and a half by General Wu Teh-chen, formerly Mayor of Greater Shanghai, an officer respected on all sides and one of Chiang Kai-shek's henchmen.

In any case we are here faced with a riddle the solution of which I have not yet been able to find. I believe I have evidence that at the beginning of the summer 1938 there were available in the province of Kuangtung a couple of hundred thousand troops, well equipped and trained, with carefully prepared defensive positions. A foreign observer on the spot then expressed the opinion that the capture of Canton would cost the Japanese much time and heavy losses.

One supposition is that Chiang, in the hope that the Japanese would abstain from meddling with the politically delicate geographical unity Hong Kong-Canton, had withdrawn the best troops of Kuangtung for the defence of Hankow. Considerable Chinese successes in the Hankow

sector shortly before the final collapse point to important and effective reinforcements having been summoned just at that time.

In any event it is a fact that the easy Japanese victory at Canton came as a surprise. On the other hand it is perhaps hardly to be described as a decisive defeat, since the fall of Hankow was seen to be a question of time and the railway connection Hong Kong-Canton-Hankow in any case was about to lose its importance for the defence.

The truth is that the whole military-geographical problem, for attackers and defenders alike, is going to be completely revised—assuming that the Chinese still possess the determination and the resources to continue their slow and stubbornly contested retirement towards the interior of the country. Before we attempt to analyse the prospects of the Chinese in a prolonged war of this nature, it may be convenient first to examine another question: is it likely that the Japanese could now induce the Chinese to accept a cessation of hostilities on such terms as the Japanese obviously have in mind?

It hardly seems probable that Chiang Kai-shek himself is disposed to accept a peace dictated by Japan. A submission of this kind would mean the writing-off of his whole life's work, his twelve years' labouring to forge the country into a national unity with hard blows of the hammer. The whole movement of rebirth, the students' enthusiastic self-sacrifice, the million soldiers who have fallen or been crippled, the burnt cities, the hundred thousand wrecked villages, the violated young women, all these sacrifices, willingly borne by the great patient people through faith in their Leader, would be uselessly thrown away in an immense moral and national bankruptcy. So far as I can see Chiang has no choice but to continue the struggle to

the bitter end, if he wishes to live up to his proud past.

Thus there appears to be a strong probability that a peace at the present time would presuppose the elimination of Chiang, either by his death or by his being driven into exile, sharing the fate of Haile Selassie and Beneš. I know that the Japanese have speculated on getting rid of the hated and dreaded Chinese leader. I have even been told by a Japanese diplomat of their hopes that the two great Kuangsi generals, Pai Chung-hsi and Li Tsung-jen, who before the war repeatedly fought against Chiang, may be willing to serve as executioners. But one of my old friends, now a member of the Chinese government, in a recent letter to me emphasized Pai's and Li's loyal adherence to Chiang as one of the strong points in China's national front.

Those who, not without reason, take a pessimistic view in these days of the democratic Powers' tactics of buying at an exorbitant price a few months' respite from war, may apprehend a mediatory intervention, to some extent in the style of the liquidation of the Czechoslovakian crisis. Great Britain has supplied the Chinese with war material through Hong Kong and Rangoon, and France through Haiphong, without which the defence directed from Hankow would scarcely have been possible. If these two Powers, in order to protect their possessions (Hong Kong, Tonkin), in the face of the probably imminent Japanese offensive through Kuangsi against Kunming, the capital of Yunnan, were to accede to the Japanese demand and stop the supply of material through Burma and Tonkin, perhaps the Chinese might be forced to capitulate and the Western Powers might gain a respite for their colonies bordering on a China thenceforward under Japanese control.

But let us now assume that the Chinese are determined to continue the war until they can win an honourable

peace. Unfortunately such a peace is fairly distant, since Japan must be so tired out that the now prevailing military régime will give way to a civil, liberal government which will invite China to an agreed peace. But on the other hand, it is certain that the Japanese too have only a very distant prospect of conditions resembling peace, since the irregular troops, who are spread over the whole of China and operate in rear of the enemy, can keep up their resistance for five or ten years longer. For the sake of comparison it may be mentioned that the Japanese themselves admit that guerrillas, so called "bandits", to the number of about ten thousand are operating against the Japanese troops of occupation in the mountain and forest tracts of northern Manchukuo. Not infrequently these bands fight regular pitched battles on a small scale against military trains which they have derailed.

The petty puppet governments which the Japanese establish here and there within the occupied parts of China are extremely inefficient and inspire no respect, least of all among the Japanese military, who bitterly complain of the difficulty of finding really capable Chinese to work with. It is mostly among unprincipled adventurers and miscellaneous pro-Japanese riff-raff that these "governments" are recruited. The Japanese are now trying another procedure. They are applying to really prominent Chinese, men widely respected in China, appealing to their sense of duty to save the country from anarchy. Thus they have been negotiating with General Wu Pei-fu, who did not decline outright but replied that he could not have anything to do with the administration so long as Japanese troops were present on Chinese territory.

Let us now pass on to discuss what hopes the Chinese, in a continued resistance, may have of achieving their end :

a peace which shall preserve the independence of their country. To a certain extent operations have now been transferred to regions which will offer great advantages to the defence. The western provinces are mountainous and largely covered with forest. The rich province of Szechuan is surrounded by a vast barrier of mountain-chains, and the valley through which the Yangtzekiang forces its way, being extremely hazardous to navigation even in peace time, ought without difficulty to be effectively barred against the entrance of lighter war-vessels.

We may be sure that the Chinese have made good use of the time, nearly a year, which was at their disposal after the fall of Nanking for setting up a native war industry in Szechuan and the other western provinces, which have now become the theatre of war.<sup>1</sup> Rifles and machine-guns with the requisite ammunition, hand-grenades and so on, can be produced in sufficient quantities to supply entirely new armies. But for a war of position similar to the defence of Hankow, artillery, war-planes, motor-vehicles and petrol will be required, and these must be imported. In future the main route of importation will probably be through Burma, by the railway from Rangoon to Myitkyina and from there by the newly constructed motor road to Kunming, the capital of Yunnan. Here the new line of traffic, which in the coming phase of the war is to secure the supply of

<sup>1</sup> While this chapter was in proof a man, who till quite recently has been living in the centre of events in China, has given me much information of extreme significance. Thus he tells me that all the machinery belonging to the two great arsenals, those of Hanyang and of Kungshsien in Honan, was long ago removed to Szechuan and that manufacture is now in full swing there, far behind the present front.

He further reports that during the retreat along the Peking-Hankow railway the rails were torn up and transported to south-western China for the construction of new strategic railways.

material for China's fighting millions, is in the hands of the British Empire. Much depends on the extent to which the English are able and willing to afford to China, fighting for her existence, the same help that was given with such great success at the time when war material could be brought in by the Hong Kong-Canton-Hankow route. Possibly in a very near future the Japanese will launch two powerful offensives : one through the province of Kuangsi against Yunnan in order to stop the imports through Burma, and another far up in the north to cut off all communication with Soviet Russia.

But even if supplies were completely blocked, from Tonkin and Burma in the south, as well as from Siberia in the north, it is far from likely that the Chinese, who seem determined to defend themselves at all costs, would lay down their arms. It is by no means inconceivable that the regular troops may at last be scattered into guerrilla bands which for many years to come would be able to compel the Japanese to maintain an immense army, certainly more than a million men, constantly on a war footing. This final stage will be the most costly for the Japanese, since then the initiative will have passed almost entirely into the hands of the Chinese.

To sum up the situation as I now understand it : there is a possibility of an early peace on relatively reasonable terms if a powerful group of new Chinese leaders should set about transforming their country into a Nazi régime which would co-operate with Germany, Italy and Japan on a basis of equality ; but, on the other hand, it is possible that the army command and the Kuomintang may continue as in the past to give full support to the great national Leader. And in that case the honourable peace for which Chinese patriots still hope may come some day.

An agreed peace of this kind between Japan and China can scarcely be arrived at before Japan, after protracted guerrilla warfare and the consequent necessity of keeping a million soldiers on a war footing, guarding thousands of places small and large in the immense territory of China, is finally so impoverished that the now all-powerful military party will be overthrown and a new liberal government will offer Chiang Kai-shek an amicable settlement, with the ultimate object of bringing about friendly co-operation on an equal footing between the two great peoples of East Asia, each admirable in its own way.

It is deeply to be regretted that the moderate men among the Japanese people are not in a position to give expression to their misgivings. It is certain that many of them realize that not only China, but perhaps Japan even more in the long run is faced with severe trials and very dangerous times. If China, with continued supplies of war material from Siberia and from Burma, can hold out for a few more years, Japan must by that time be very exhausted both financially and as regards her resources of man-power.

If Russia, in the course of this war of attrition between Japan and China, gets over her present condition of weakness, due to repeated political purges, and if during these years the political situation in Europe becomes stabilized, Japan will always be faced with the risk of a conflict with Russia, just when the resources of the Japanese are practically at an end. Such a conflict would be all the more redoubtable as a Russian offensive would obviously be directed through Japan's Achilles-heel, Korea.

If the war between China and Japan proceeds until both parties have exhausted their resources, there is the risk for both of them, but perhaps more for Japan, that a third Power or a group of Powers may force its offices as mediator

upon the two belligerents. The way in which Russia after the previous war between Japan and China in 1894-5 and the peace of Shimonoseki contrived to secure for herself some of the richest prizes, offers an interesting parallel. Again, Japan's war against the Germans in Shantung ended in the Japanese being forced by their own allies to surrender to China the German possessions they had conquered with their arms.

On the whole I foresee that both Japan and China will emerge from this mighty trial of strength as two badly gashed champions, bled nearly to death. The Red guerrillas will never give up the fight, even if a peace exists on paper. It is probable that those who sign the treaty will find their authority extends no farther than that of the Japanese at present—that is, not beyond the great cities and the main traffic routes.

But if China should finally become a Japanese protectorate, Japan will enter a new and extremely critical phase, characterized by the traditional assimilation-offensive of the Chinese race. Barbarians from the north-east put an end to the over-refined Sung dynasty, but became merged in the mass of the Chinese people. It was the same with the Mongols and with the Manchus ; the Chinese blood always conquered in the end.

It is characteristic of the mentality of the Japanese that, relying on his mechanical superiority, he has no understanding of the mighty spiritual forces which are now at work among the Chinese people and which have grown more vigorously during the hard trials of the war.

In 1925, when the Chinese were sunk in the lowest depths of depression and civil war, it might have been possible for a conqueror to subjugate the country. To-day China



## 254 CHINA FIGHTS FOR THE WORLD

is certainly the stronger in spiritual force, in spite of all uniformity and totalitarian propaganda in Japan.

As a summing-up of all my impressions I should like to say this :

If Chiang Kai-shek can hold out till the Japanese give up, China will be the leading Great Power of the East by 1950. Should the Japanese succeed now in subjugating the country, it will not be till about the year 2000 that the Chinese will regain the importance to which the wealth of their country and the qualities of its people entitle them. China is such a continental unity and the people are so healthy in their peace-loving industry that this great nation cannot remain permanently in a state of slavery. Once struck down, it will rise again from the ruin of war.

\* \* \* \* \*

The text presented above is in all essentials the Swedish version of this book as I completed it by the end of October 1938, at the lowest ebb of the democratic Powers as evidenced by the Anglo-French capitulation to the German war machine in September and the surrender of Canton and Hankow in October. On February 24 1939, as I complete the English edition, I am in the favourable position of being able to review briefly nearly four months of developments in Europe and in China. The outlook is at present somewhat brighter for the cause of the democracies all the world over.

Time works predominantly in favour of the Chinese. Four months without major Japanese advances in any of the various theatres of war may safely be recorded as a Chinese gain in their long-drawn struggle of attrition.

By the middle of November Yochow, an important railway town in northern Hunan and the key to the Tungting lake,

was captured by Japanese troops. At the same time Changsha, the capital of the province of Hunan, was reduced to ashes by the local Chinese commander in a premature effort to carry out the much-talked-of "scorched earth policy". But the Japanese advance was halted before Changsha, and the main part of the railway to Canton remains in the hands of the Chinese fighting forces. In the same way a section of the Peking-Hankow railway south of the Yellow River, and the western part of the Lunghai railway in Honan and Shensi, are still operated by the Chinese. Chinese troops are active in the mountains of Shansi and all over eastern China large numbers of guerrillas hold vast areas in the provinces over which the Japanese claim control. On January 11th the railway track was torn up at Lanfang, half-way between Peking and Tientsin, and a freight train loaded with cotton bound for Japan was burnt. Railway communication was interrupted for two days.

A foreigner travelling on the Peking-Hankow railway in northern Honan immediately before Christmas reported having seen five derailed military trains in the course of a two days' journey.

South of Peking is the centre for organized guerrilla attacks on the railways, directed by a brain trust consisting of former college students and guerrilla veterans from Manchukuo who have been fighting the Japanese for seven years. It is reported that a Chinese translation of Lawrence's *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* serves as text-book for the railway guerrilla warfare and that high hopes are entertained that these relentless attacks on the lines of communication will materially contribute towards wearing down Japanese resistance.

The much-talked-of big Japanese drive towards Sian and farther to the north-west for the purpose of cutting off the

supply of war material from Russia has so far not materialized, and it is said that preparations for this, already far advanced, had to be diverted into a hurried despatch of Japanese troops to north-eastern Manchukuo on account of the increased friction with Russia over the fishery dispute and repeated border clashes.

In spite of furious bombing attacks on inland cities, resulting in thousands of civilian casualties, the Japanese military operations in the interior of China have virtually come to a standstill. By some observers this period of relative inactivity is interpreted simply as an interval of reorganization, in preparation for large-scale operations. Other political and military experts believe that the forces available are insufficient for major offensives and that the Japanese will content themselves with sitting down and consolidating their gains. My personal impression is that such a defensive attitude would spell disaster, as the Chinese would never allow the Japanese forces any considerable period of rest.

In fact, during the last few days there have been reports of intensive Chinese activity on the outskirts of Canton and above all of a large-scale Chinese offensive in northern Hunan and Kiangsi between the Tungting and Poyang lakes. It has even been stated that Chinese troops are present only a few miles south of Wuchang and that gunfire is audible in Hankow. I think it wise not to exaggerate the importance of these reports. A successful large-scale Chinese offensive resulting in the expulsion of the Japanese from the Wuhan cities is exceedingly unlikely. This war has been seen to offer such formidable advantages even to a feeble defence that there are very faint hopes of clearing China of the invaders by means of a military offensive. But the striking activity of Chinese troops at the present

moment proves that the Chinese fighting spirit is still very high and that the Japanese, at least for the present, are not prepared to take the offensive.

The forces at present operating for a change in the situation in China are not predominantly of a military nature. Apparently the Japanese are more anxious for peace than are the stubborn Chinese. As was the case after the fall of Nanking a year earlier, the Japanese after the double victory at Canton and Hankow expected the Chinese to sue for terms of surrender. When nothing of that kind was forthcoming, Prince Konoye, the Japanese Prime Minister, presented on December 21st a peace offer which was considered by Japanese circles as "astounding in its generosity". "The reason for such generosity," declared the *Nichi-Nichi* in its editorial of December 23rd, "is that Japan has only the revival of East Asia in mind. She thus differs in her attitude towards China from European and American Powers which regard China as a proper object of their voracity."

Undoubtedly there was a radical change in the attitude of the Japanese peace-promoters in so far as the old slogan never to deal with Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang party was no longer upheld. There was on the contrary an invitation to co-operate contained in a statement commenting on the Konoye terms and issued from Nanking on December 23rd :

The Japanese military command is always prepared to receive and shake hands with anyone, whether or not affiliated to the Kuomintang or its armies, who is desirous of taking part in the huge task of reconstructing a new China. For those emerging from the nightmare of futility and recognizing the objectives of our sacred campaign, we are willing to accept our enemies of yesterday as our friends regardless of their previous standpoint.

Alas, this peace feeler was nothing but the old harsh terms garbed in a charitable Santa Claus cloak. Konoye demanded :

1. That there be concluded an Anti-Comintern pact between the two countries in consonance with the spirit of the Anti-Comintern pact between Japan, Germany and Italy.
2. That Japanese troops be stationed at specified points in China as an anti-Communist measure, during the time the said pact is in force.
3. That the Inner Mongolian region be designated as a special anti-Communist area.
4. That freedom of residence and trade be granted to Japanese subjects in the interior of China.
5. That China extend to Japan facilities for the development of China's natural resources, especially in the regions of North China and Inner Mongolia.

Simultaneously with the press discussions of the Konoye peace terms there emerged rumours that Dr. Wang Ching-wei, the deputy executive of the Kuomintang, had left Chungking and was about to sponsor the new peace movement. According to one report Dr. Wang had secretly left Chungking by air as early as December 10th and had reached Hanoi in French Indo-China by way of Kunming (Yunnanfu) on December 20th. It seems that he proceeded from Tonkin to Hong Kong, and the Japanese press tried to make capital out of his alleged connection with the Konoye peace feeler. Later it was reported that Wang Ching-wei had gone to Europe. When Chiang Kai-shek's adherents rallied to support his flat refusal of the Japanese peace terms, it became apparent that Konoye had failed to bring hostilities to an end or to cause a serious rift in the

Kuomintang ranks. Prince Konoye then admitted the failure of his China policy, and on January 4th his cabinet resigned and was succeeded by a cabinet formed by Baron Hiranuma, who is considered to represent a more totalitarian régime and a stride towards placing all the resources of the country on a war footing.

During the months of November to February there has been a marked stiffening in the attitude of Great Britain and the United States, as a reaction to the increasing obstacles to foreign trade in China raised by the Japanese authorities. Both these Powers have protested in very strongly worded terms against the efforts of the Japanese military leaders to establish a new order in China based on conquest and seriously infringing the rights of third Powers.

During the same period the two Powers in question have extended to the national government of China two credits, a British of half a million pounds and an American to the amount of twenty-five million dollars. There have been hints in the press that further British credits are under consideration and that this first instalment is chiefly intended for the purchase of motor-lorries to be used on the new motor road Burma-Yunnan.

On the other hand, the Japanese military command has taken strong action directed against Great Britain, France and the United States. As usual their move has been admirably well timed to tally with a political defeat of the democratic Powers of western Europe. Close on the heels of the capture of Barcelona on January 26th by Franco's army, strongly supported by Italian divisions and Italian air squadrons, there followed the seizure by the Japanese Navy of the island of Hainan on February 10th. This large island, situated half-way between Hong Kong and Tonkin,

gives the Japanese an opportunity of establishing bases both for their navy and their air force, which will constitute a formidable threat to these British and French colonies. By this action they have also taken a fresh stride towards the ultimate goal of their naval ambitions : Singapore.

For the future conduct of the Japan-China war the occupation of Hainan is hardly an operation of major importance. The expected landing at Pakhoi on the mainland for a drive towards Yunnan could well be carried out without occupying Hainan, as there is no Chinese navy to disturb such an operation. The seizure of Hainan is aimed far more against the colonial Powers, France and Britain, and is probably intended as a pressure to help in stopping the transshipment of armaments destined for the Chinese fighting forces. There remains, however, the conjecture that Hainan is a pawn in a much bigger political game. Italy and Germany were informed in advance of the occupation of Hainan. France and Great Britain, the two Powers directly involved, were given no notice. Is there an underlying scheme to create a diversion in the South China Sea to serve as a complication in the event of a major conflict in the Mediterranean ?

Another most serious disagreement between the democratic Powers and Japan has arisen over the wave of political assassinations taking place in Shanghai for the removal of Chinese who have betrayed their country by accepting service under the Japanese command. The most startling of these political assassinations was that of Chen Lu, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the pro-Japanese puppet government in Nanking. All in all about one hundred Chinese traitors have been eliminated in this way in an effort of the ruthless nationalist forces to obstruct the local governments of Japanese creation. Granted that this kind

of political murder may be considered a legitimate way of purging China of elements who act disloyally to their country's cause, it is nevertheless only natural that the Japanese should take strong action against a species of clandestine warfare which may endanger the whole status of the foreign settlements in China.

Everything goes to show that there is a marked heightening of the tension surrounding the vast Sino-Japanese life-and-death struggle. For the moment the Chinese seem to be in a good position: they have succeeded in opening the influx of war material from Burma to Yunnan; they have obtained credits from Great Britain and the United States; they have undertaken some local offensives and announce the mobilization of new armies.

The Japanese are evidently hard pressed, especially as they can see no end to their Chinese adventure. They have raised huge new war loans, they are beginning the long-expected confiscation of gold objects in private possession and are organizing special drives for collecting metals for war industry. In addition to all these cares they have to bear the never-healing ulcer of friction with their Soviet neighbours over fishing rights and frontier clashes.

Still, the advocates of a final Chinese victory should never overlook the fact that Japan in her mastery of the sea, her huge war industry and her powerful fighting machine possesses tremendous material advantages.

In the darkening world of to-day two great groups of Powers line up for a coming trial of strength, a contest diplomatic and economic, or eventually a resort to arms. Among the democratic Powers China alone has for twenty-five months fought single-handed and against tremendous odds to uphold the right of a nation to live its free and independent national life. Some indirect support has all the time been



extended to China by the great democracies, the United States, Great Britain and France. Is this support sufficient to help the Chinese through their hour of dire distress? Or is there a risk that one-fifth of the entire population of this planet, a population essentially peace-loving and industrious, will be subjected to slavery under an alien race?

\* \* \* \* \*

Five months have elapsed since I wrote the foregoing part of this chapter. Thanks to the kindness of the publishers I have now been allowed, at the moment when our volume goes to press, to summarize very briefly the main developments in China during these momentous months which mark a turn in favour of the Chinese and against the Japanese aggressors.

In order fully to appreciate what is now happening in China we must remember that the gigantic war of retreat—foreshadowed already by the Russian method of dealing with Napoleon, but never in world history carried out on so gigantic a scale as now by the Chinese—is in no way an improvised strategy forced upon the Chinese generals by a victorious enemy. On the contrary, it is the well-preconceived scheme which was made known to me as early as the end of 1936, fully half a year before the outbreak of hostilities. In pursuance of this plan the Chinese command, holding their ground as long as could be done without too catastrophic losses, have lured the Japanese armies deeper and deeper into the immense expanse of the Chinese Empire, at the same time raising in the rear of these invading armies countless bands, large and small, of irregular guerrilla troops which have made the Japanese occupation largely a costly and dangerous delusion.

In the early months of the war nearly every condition

favoured the Japanese operations : the Chinese—especially in North China—were very poorly prepared, their generalship was far below the standard of their opponents and the supply of aeroplanes and heavy guns was very insufficient when compared with the strongly mechanized Japanese troops.

Again, the very theatres of war in which the first campaigns were fought greatly favoured the invader and made the defence difficult and costly. The loess plains of North China as well as the alluvial plains of Shanghai and Nanking, on account of their lack of forest-cover, offered immense strategic advantages to an offensive supported by a vastly superior air arm. As long as the main operations took place on the coast and along that main artery of navigation, the Yangtze river, the Japanese armies were strongly supported by the navy, whose heavy artillery rendered the Chinese defence exceedingly difficult.

Thanks to the retreat of the Chinese the war has now reached areas where hills, bush and forest, intermingled with swampy paddy-fields, offer every advantage to the defender and all kinds of difficulties to the invaders. This geographical factor should be well kept in mind when we try to analyse the reasons for the Japanese offensive having now reached a dead point.

For such is the situation, for the time being at any rate ; the big Japanese offensive which marked the first fifteen months of the war has dried up and the initiative has largely passed into the hands of the Chinese.

In accomplishing their smashing victories at Hankow and Canton in the autumn of 1938 the Japanese armies seem to have spent most of their power of offensive. Their only important gain during the present year was the capture late in March of Nanchang, the capital of Kiangsi ; but,

as we shall see below, their possession of this city has been far from undisputed.

In the early part of May the Japanese started a big offensive in northern Hupei, north-west from Hankow, with the aim of driving the Chinese away from the Han river ; and in the early part of this offensive great Japanese victories were announced, with the usual statement that a large number of Chinese divisions were on the point of being captured. But towards the end of the month the situation had changed totally : the Japanese had to admit their retreat ; the fighting power and the technical equipment of the Chinese had increased to such an extent that the Japanese found it necessary to abandon their offensive plans and content themselves with entrenching and fighting rear actions against the ever-active surprise attacks of the Chinese guerrillas.

Northern Hupei is only one of the many fronts on which the Japanese offensive has been brought to a standstill. Fighting is still going on round Nanchang, the capital of Kiangsi, and Canton has been hard pressed by Chinese regular troops as well as by guerrillas.

It is reported that Chiang Kai-shek has abundance of war material for another year of fighting. So long as friendly Powers like Great Britain, the United States and Russia are willing to supply China with war material such as artillery, tanks and motor-lorries, aeroplanes, chemicals, etc., and to support these purchases by repeated credits, China cannot be conquered unless the western doors leading into the country from French Indo-China, from Burma and from Siberia are closed by military operations or through diplomatic pressure upon the Powers just mentioned.

Military operations of sufficient magnitude to close the back doors of China seem at present out of the question.

The much-talked-of expedition for the capture of Sian, the capital of Shensi, as a first blow to the Siberian import route has not materialized, thanks to the ever-active guerrillas in southern Shansi, who are reported to be holding up a hundred thousand Japanese troops.

The expected big drive from Pakhoi or Canton towards Kunming (Yunnanfu), which would cut off imports from Tonkin and Burma, has failed to materialize, probably because the bellicose province of Kuangsi presents too serious an obstacle to an expedition of this kind.

The sense of their military impotence has caused the Japanese to turn to their last resort: the bullying of the Powers into submission to "the new state of things in East Asia".

Russia is relatively invulnerable as regards this kind of "third-degree" diplomatic pressure. It seems as if the Russians were pursuing a policy of "wait and see": very friendly to the Chinese and so hostile to the Japanese that the breaking-point would easily have been passed, had not the Japanese been exceedingly cautious of becoming involved in another war while China by itself taxes them to the utmost. Through border incidents, such as have recently occurred on the Mongolia-Manchukuo frontier, and through concession disputes in Sakhalin the Russians have bound large numbers of the crack Japanese divisions which are only too well needed for the war in China.

The Japanese occupation of the island of Hainan hardly influenced the China war, but was intended—as it seems with little or no result—to bully the French in Indo-China into agreeing to stop the import of war material through Tonkin.

Of the Powers involved Great Britain is the most sensitive to Japanese pressure, owing to the very heavy British invest-

ments in the Concessions and elsewhere in the Far East. This is undoubtedly the main reason for the dispute which has been raised over the British Concession at Tientsin. The four alleged assassins, claimed by the Japanese military command, may be worth having, but still more so the fifty million dollars of Chinese silver deposited in the British Concession. But no doubt the Tientsin dispute is merely the overture to an ever-increasing pressure intended to force the British into closing the Burma-Yunnan frontier, thus cutting off the main artery of supply to Chiang Kai-shek. After Tientsin it will be the turn of Shanghai, and eventually of Hong Kong. But the half-hearted way in which the Japanese approach this main issue proves that they are just as anxious as the British not to allow the disputes to develop into armed hostilities.

The British Government is now manœuvring to gain time while strengthening their position in the North Sea and in the Mediterranean. They may be forced to yield on local questions in Tientsin and in Shanghai. But they are certainly well aware that it would be fatal to the cause of the Powers of Western Europe to desert the Chinese, who have been fighting for more than two years with unparalleled sacrifices and with unexpected success.

In their inability to carry out the great military pincer movement between Sian-Lanchow in the distant north and Kunming in the extreme south, by means of which they would cut off all military supplies to China, the Japanese have also had recourse to a determined effort to undermine the Chinese currency ; an effort which has met with only moderate success, thanks partly to the British support of the Chinese dollar. During this race for the destruction of the Chinese monetary system the Japanese have witnessed the failure of the yuan-currency which they have established

in the parts of China occupied by them, and at the same time their own yen has shown signs of weakness.

As another way of giving vent to their rage at the determined Chinese resistance they have repeatedly carried out barbarous bombing raids on the temporary Chinese capital, Chungking. They know very well that the various Chinese government institutions are spread out over an area with a radius of some sixty miles from Chungking. In spite of this they carry out raid after raid upon a city mainly inhabited by a civil population which takes little part in the operations of the war. Thousands upon thousands of the poor coolie population are killed during these raids and hundreds of houses are destroyed in the ensuing conflagrations. It looks as if the invaders from the eastern islands did not realize that the effect of these bombing raids is to stiffen the determination of the Chinese to resist at any cost.

At this time, when day by day the world becomes more sharply divided into two camps, one standing for violence and conquest, the other for peace and national liberty, the democratic Great Powers are well aware that in their own interest they cannot afford to sacrifice China in the same way as has happened with Manchuria, Abyssinia, Czechoslovakia and Albania. In this case the interest at stake is too supreme : one-fifth of the world's population, peace-loving and highly industrious, a nation with a glorious past and a great future, has been fighting for more than two years in spite of the severest handicaps, patriotically and with unparalleled sacrifices under a great national leader, fighting single-handed with only slight assistance from its foreign friends, fighting for the highest principle of the democratic Powers, the right of every people to safeguard and develop its own national ideals.



## INDEX

- Academia Sinica, 15, 78-9  
 Air Force, Chinese, 39-40, 219, 226  
 American attitude to China, 221-22 ; credit granted, 259  
 Anking, 198  
*Augusta*, American flagship at Shanghai, 161  
 Aviation, civil, 36-9  
  
*Bee*, H.M. gunboat, 182  
 Bias Bay, Japanese landing at, 233  
 Blücher, Marshal, 93, 116, 228  
 Borodin, Michail, 92  
  
 Canton, capture of, 233, 246, 247  
 Carlsson, American officer, on Red guerrillas, 214  
 Chamberlain, Neville, 235  
 Chang Chih-tung, General, 177  
 Chang Chun, 3, 49  
 Chang Chung-chang, 55  
 Chang Fa-kuei, 66, 178  
 Chang Hsueh-liang (The Young Marshal), 63-4, 67, 70, 104, 109, 111-14, 116-18, 130  
 Changkufeng, Russo-Japanese incidents at, 211, 227, 228  
 Changsha, 255  
 Chang Tso-lin, 54, 60, 63, 129, 130, 225  
 Chapei, 3, 84 ; burning of, 171-4  
 Chen Chi-mei, 48, 49  
 Cheng Chien, 59  
 Chengchow, 191, 245  
 Chengtu, 106, 201  
 Chen Lu, assassinated, 260  
  
 Chiang Kai-shek, 39-41 ; early life, 44-52 ; northern campaign, 54-61 ; campaigns against war lords, 62-8, 72-3, 86, 87, 91 ; against Reds, 93-6, 102-3 ; imprisonment at Sian, 104-19, 129-31 ; assumes responsibility for defence of North China, 139 ; retires to Hankow, 189 ; future policy discussed, 247-50  
 Chiang Kai-shek, Madame, 40, 87, 104-6, 114  
 Chiang Ting-wen, 113, 114  
 Chin Teh-chun, General, 138  
 Chou En-lai, 115-16, 119  
 Chou Kou Tien, finds from, 20-1  
 Chufu, 212  
 Chungking, 201  
 Chu Shao-liang, General, 177  
 Chync, W. Y., 79  
 Communists, Chinese, 59, 60, 83-4, 93-103, 118, 202-10 ; Peking plot, 223-4  
*Cricket*, H.M. gunboat, 182  
  
 Dayu Doon, architect, 5-7  
 Doihara, General, 196  
 Donald, W. H., 113, 114  
  
 Eighth Army, Chinese, 206-9  
  
 Falkenhausen, General von, 73, 164, 219, 220  
 Fenghua, 44, 60, 118  
 Feng Yü-hsiang, 54, 59, 63, 65, 66, 67, 130



- Finance, 71-2, 74-5  
 French Indo-China, 239-42  
 Fu, H. K., 31-2  
 Fu Tso-yi, General, 136
- Galens (*see* Blücher)  
 Geological Survey of China, 1,  
 13-14, 19-25, 79  
 German attitude to China, 220  
 Guerrillas, 103, 204-14, 246, 255
- Hainan, seized by Japanese, 259  
 Haiphong, 240, 241  
 Hall-Patch, E. L., 162  
 Han Fu-chu, General, 146, 191  
 Hangchow, 59; landing of Japanese troops at, 176-7  
 Hankow, 60, 189; capture of, 198-200  
 Hasegawa, Vice-Admiral, 221  
 Hata, General, 195  
 Hedin, Sven, 226  
 Hideyoshi, 122  
 "Hindenburg Line" (Liuho to great lakes), 179, 219  
 Hitler, Adolf, 235  
 Hong Kong, 75; traffic in arms through, 229-30; present position of, 236-8  
 Ho Ying-chin, General, 96, 113  
 Hsuehchow, defence of, 190-5, 245  
 Hsu Yuan, 2  
 Huang Fu, General, 3  
 Hu Chung-nan, 111  
 Hungjao aerodrome, Shanghai, 157, 158, 212  
 Hu Shih, 128, 225
- Idzumo*, Japanese cruiser, 159, 160, 168  
 Ishimaru, F. T. (*Japan must fight Britain*), 45, 229, 238, 242-4  
 Italian attitude to China, 220
- Japanese, occupy Manchuria, 67, 84, 130-1; conquest of Jehol, 133
- Jehol, 133  
 Joffe, Adolf, 91
- Kalgan, occupied by Japanese, 140, 141, 143, 145  
 Karakhan, Leo, 92  
 Khubilai Khan, 120  
 Kiangyin, Fort, 180  
 Kiukiang, 57, 199  
 Knatchbull-Hugessen, Sir Hughe, 162  
 Konoye, Prince, offers peace terms, 257-9; resigns, 259  
 Koo, Dr. Wellington, 244  
 Korea, 120-6  
 Kung, Dr. H. H., 71, 98, 112, 117  
 Kunming (Yunnanfu), 201, 239, 248, 250  
 Kuomintang, 48, 49, 56, 70, 87, 204, 251, 257  
 Kupeikou, pass of, 133, 143
- Ladybird*, H.M. gunboat, 182, 222  
 Lanfeng, 196  
 Lawrence, T. E. (*Seven Pillars of Wisdom*), 255  
 League of Nations, 131, 216, 244  
 Leith-Ross, Sir Frederick, 71  
 Li Chi-lung, 93, 94  
 Li Tsung-jen, 64, 66, 190, 248  
 Litvinov, 227  
 Liu Chen-tung, 85, 86-7  
 Liu Hsiang, 106  
 Liu Yu-ming, General, 142-3, 145  
 Loo, Dr., 85  
 Lovat-Fraser, Lieut.-Colonel W. A., 162  
 Lu Kou Chiao, opening of hostilities at, 119, 138  
 Lunghai railway, 76, 190, 195, 255  
 Lung-Yen iron ores, 136-7  
 Lytton, Lord, 131
- Manchuria (Manchukuo), 67, 84, 111, 130-1, 133, 217, 226-8, 255  
 Mao Tse-tung, 94  
 Matsui, General Ivane, 161, 176, 181, 184, 188

- Mukden, 63, 64, 130, 133  
 Munich agreement, 235, 241, 248, 254  
 Myitkyina, 250  
 Nanchang, 59  
 Nanking, 17, 26-7, 59, 70, 76-80, 83, 94; fall of, 181; Japanese atrocities at, 185-8, 213  
 Nankou pass, 141-3, 145  
 Niangtzekuan pass, 140, 144  
 Nineteenth Army, Chinese, 3, 131-2, 156  
 Nyström, Professor E. T., 17, 136  
 Olivecrona, Colonel, 169  
*Oriental Affairs*, 200, 208  
 Pai Chung-hsi, General, 64, 66, 178, 248  
 Pailingmiao, 136  
 Pakhoi, 260  
*Panay*, U.S. gunboat, 182-3, 222, 230  
 Peking, 63, 66, 69, 129, 133-6; author's last visit to, 148-54  
 Pennel, W. V., 208-10  
 Perry, Commodore, 123  
 Port Arthur, 124-6  
 Port Courbet, 240  
 Portsmouth, treaty of, 126  
*President Hoover*, S.S., 163  
 Pukow, 66, 129  
 Puppet governments established by Japanese, 249-50, 260  
 Railway construction, 74-6  
 Road construction, 76, 226, 250  
 Roosevelt, President Franklin, 183, 222  
 Roosevelt, President Theodore, 126  
 Russia, 51, 91; war with Japan, 125-6, 203; Peking embassy plot, 223-4; aid to China, 226; risk of conflict with Japan, 252  
*Scarab*, H.M. gunboat, 182  
 Seeckt, General von, 96  
 Shanghai: plans for Greater Shanghai, 1-11; fighting at (1932), 131-2, 156; (1937), 155-65; "Bloody Saturday", 159-60; author revisits, 168-75; French attitude at, 215-16  
 Shanhaikuan, 133  
 Shansi, campaign in, 143-4  
 Shihchiachuang, 137, 140  
 Shimonoseki, treaty of, 253  
 Shi Yu-san, 66  
 Sian, Chiang Kai-shek detained at, 104-19  
 Singapore, 242, 244, 260  
 Sinyang, 199  
 Smedley, Agnes, 207  
 Snow, Edgar (*Red Star over China*), 98, 115, 119, 204-6  
 Soochow, 179  
 Soong family, 87, 98  
 Soong, T. V., 71, 113, 114, 117  
 Sun Chuan-fang, General, 1, 55, 58  
 Sun Fo, 37  
 Sun Yat-sen, Dr., 28-9, 37, 48, 49, 52, 55, 70, 82, 90, 92, 98, 116, 223  
 Sung Cheh-yuan, General, 134-5, 137, 139, 145  
 Sungkiang, 178  
 Taierhchuang, Chinese victory at, 193-5, 231  
 Taihu, Lake, 179, 180  
 Taiyuan, 140  
 Taku, 140  
 Tanaka memorandum, 244  
 Tang Sheng-chi, 66, 181, 184  
 Tatung, 140  
*Tatung*, S.S., 182  
 Techow, 140  
 Tientsin, treaty of, 124; occupied by Japanese, 140; author visits, 147, 152  
 Timperley, H. J. (*The Japanese Terror in China*), 186-8  
 Ting, Dr. V. K., 1-3, 12-17, 81-2, 203

- Tingszekiao, 58  
 Tong, Hollington K., biographer  
     of Chiang Kai-shek, 44  
 Tsinan, 67, 127, 129  
 Tsingtao, 127  
*Tuckwo*, S.S., 182  
 Tungchow, 134  
 Tushihkou, 142  
  
 Wang Ching-wei, 23, 66, 67, 93,  
     258  
 Wanping, 138  
 Whampo Military Academy, 53,  
     56, 72, 93, 116  
 Wong Wen-hao, Dr., 14, 16, 17,  
     22-5  
  
 Wuhu, 180  
 Wu Pei-fu, 55, 58, 107, 249  
 Wutaishan, 209, 211  
 Wu Teh-chen, General, 3, 15, 246  
  
 Yang Hu-cheng, 110, 115  
 Yellow River, embankments burst,  
     196-7  
 Yen Hsi-shan, General, 55, 59,  
     63, 66, 67, 130, 143, 145, 146  
 Yen, W. W., 131  
 Yenmenkuan pass, 144, 189  
 Yochow, 254  
 Yuan Shih-kai, President, 13, 49,  
     50, 69, 82, 90, 127  
 Yukong wharf, Shanghai, 10, 168





